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Abstract 
This thesis evaluates the use of a loadtime metaobject protocol as a practical mechanism 
for enforcing access control policies upon applications distributed as user-level compiled 
code. 
Enforcing access control policies upon user-level compiled code is necessary because 
there are many situations where users are vulnerable to security breaches because they 
download and run potentially untrustworthy applications provided in the form of user-level 
compiled code. These applications might be distributed applications so access control for 
both local and distributed resources is required. Examples of potentially untrustworthy ap-
plications are Browser plug-ins, software patches, new applications, or Internet computing 
applications such as SETI@home. Even applications from trusted sources might be mali-
cious or simply contain bugs that can be exploited by attackers so access control policies 
must be imposed to prevent the misuse of resources. Additionally, system administrators 
might wish to enforce access control policies upon these applications to ensure that users 
use them in accordance with local security requirements. Unfortunately, applications devel-
oped externally may not include the necessary enforcement code to allow the specification 
of organisation-specific access control policies. 
Operating system security mechanisms are too coarse-grained to enforce security poli-
cies on applications implemented as user-level code. Mechanisms that control access to 
both user-level and operating system-level resources are required for access control poli-
cies but operating system mechanisms only focus on controlling access to system-level 
objects. 
Conventional object-oriented software engineering can be used to use existing security 
architectures to enforce access control on user-level resources as well as system-resources. 
Common techniques are to insert enforcement within libraries or applications, use inheri-
tance and proxies. However, these all provide a poor separation of concerns and cannot be 
used with compiled code. 
In-lined reference monitors provide a good separation of concerns and meet criteria for 
good security engineering. They use object code rewriting to control access to both user-
level and system-level objects by in-lining reference monitor code into user-level compiled 
code. However, their focus is upon replacing existing security architectures and current 
implementations do not address distributed access control policies. 
Another approach that does provide a good separation of concerns and allows reuse of 
existing security architectures are metaobject protocols. These allow constrained changes 
to be made to the semantics of code and therefore can be used to implement access con-
trol policies for both local and distributed resources. Loadtime metaobject protocols allow 
metaobject protocols to be used with compiled code because they rewrite base level classes 
and insert meta-level interceptions. However, these have not been demonstrated to meet 
requirements for good security engineering such as complete mediation. Also current im-
plementations do not provide distributed access control. 
This thesis implements a loadtime metaobject protocol for the Java programming lan-
guage. The design of the metaobject protocol specifically addresses separation of concerns, 
least privilege, complete mediation and economy of mechanism. The implementation of 
the metaobject protocol, called Kava, has been evaluated by implementing diverse security 
policies in two case studies involving third-party standalone and distributed applications. 
These case studies are used as the basis of inferences about general suitability of using 
loadtime reflection for enforcing access control policies upon user-level compiled code. 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
"It is what I sometimes have called "the separation of concerns". which. ewn if 
not perfectly possihle, is yet the only available technique for effectiw ordering 
of onc's thoughts that I know of." (E. W. Dijkstra in "On the role of scientific 
thought" [Dijkstra 1976]) 
System administrators are responsible for ensuring site-specific acces ... control policie ... 
are adhered to by all llsers to ensure that local resources are not misu ... ed. Ideally the ac-
cess control policic ... should be enforced using the site's local security architecture [Butler, 
Welch, Engert, Foster, Tuecke, Volmer & Kesselman 2000] and should follow thc "'CCLI-
rity engineering principles of least privilege, complete mediation and economy of mccha-
nism [Saltzer & Schroeder 1975]. Unfortunately, operating ... ystem security i ... insufficient to 
implement these principles with respect to applications distributed a ... compiled code, ... uch 
as email attachments. dynamic web content, and so forth. Conventional object-oriented 
software engineering techniques cannot be used to modify the applications so the) are con-
strained by the local security architecture because they do not provide a clean separation of 
concerns [Dijkstra 1982] or require access to source code. More recent approacheli. such as 
in-lined reference monitors [Erlingsson & Schneider 2000. Evans & T\\yman 1999. Sirer, 
Grimm. Gregory & Bershad 1999, Pandey & Hashii 1999, Hashii. \;lalabarba, Pandey & 
Bishop 2000] do implement the principles and provide a clean separation of concern ... but 
do not allow Lise of the local site \ security architecture and do not addre ...... distributed 
access control. 
3 
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Metaobject protocols (MOPs) are object-oriented implementations of reflection [Maes 
1987, Kiczales, des Rivieres & Bobrow 1991]and provide a mechanism wh ich can be used 
to enforce access control for objects and distributed objects [Riechmann & Hauck 1997, 
Riechmann & Hauck 1998, Oliva & Buzato 1999, Caromel & Vayssiere 2001. Caromel, 
Huet & Vayssiere 2001, Caromel & Vayssiere 2003, Fabre, Nicomette, Perennou, Wu & 
Stroud 1995, Killijian, Fabre, Ruiz-Garcia & Chiba 1998, Killijian & Fabre 2000, Benantar, 
Blakley & Nadain 1996, Ancona, Cazzola & Fernandez 1999]. Furthermore, a loadtime 
MOP allows enforcement of access control policies upon compiled code using techniques 
that allow security engineering principles to be satisfied. However, existing loadtime MOPs 
do not explicitly address the implementation of complete mediation, or have been evaluated 
by using them to enforce access control policies upon remotely developed applications 
using a local security architecture. 
This thesis describes the design and implementation of a loadtime metaobject protocol 
called Kava for Java designed to provide complete mediation and two case studies where 
Kava is evaluated by comparing conventional enforcement with using Kava for enforce-
ment. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 1.1 introduces the thesis 
of this dissertation. Section 1.2 provides the motivation for the thesis. Section 1.3 details 
the contributions of this thesis. Finally, Section 1.4 provides an overview of the thesis itself. 
1.1 The Thesis 
The thesis of this work is that loadtime MOPs can implement a clean separation between 
concerns for compiled code allowing reuse of existing security architectures and are able 
to completely mediate all accesses to base-level objects. A clean separation allows the 
modularisation of security concerns providing the benefits of reuse, reduced development 
time and improved comprehensibility. While, complete mediation is required for assurance 
that access control policies are correctly enforced. 
The thesis presents a loadtime MOP called Kava and the results of two case studies 
that contrast the use of Kava with conventional software engineering techniques. Although 
there are now other implementations of loadtime MOPs [Chiba 2000, Caromel et al. 2001], 
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Kava was the first to be developed for security enforcement [Welch & Stroud 1999a], can 
enforce access control policies upon resources implemented by application Java library 
code, and the first to explicitly address how it meets the security engineering principles. 
The design and implementation of Kava is discussed and an argument for complete 
mediation by metaobjects bound at loadtime is presented. The first case study shows that 
using Kava leads to a better separation of concerns compared to conventional techniques 
such as relying upon system-level enforcement or manually inserting enforcement code into 
application code. The second case study shows that this improvement is also found when 
the use of Kava is compared with conventional techniques such as proxies and inheritance. 
1.2 Motivation 
This section provides the motivation for the thesis and presents an overview of the argu-
ments for using loadtime metaobject protocols for security enforcement. The discussion 
found in the overview is amplified in Chapter 2 that discusses related work and develops a 
set of goals for the thesis. 
1.2.1 New Problem Domains 
Security needs have evolved with the move away from the tightly controlled multi-user 
timesharing systems of the 1960s and 70s to today's wide-area, open distributed sys-
tems [Colouris, Dollimore & Kindberg 2001]. Today there is widespread use of appli-
cations developed remotely that may not conform to local security requirements whereas, 
in the past, there was tighter control over the development of applications because they 
were either developed in-house or in conjunction with trusted suppliers. Unlike centrally 
managed systems of the past, modern applications can be installed and executed by users 
without requiring the involvement of system administrators. This has created a requirement 
for tools that automatically enforce site-specific access control policies upon applications 
installed by either system administrators or ordinary users. Some contexts where thi" prob-
lem arises include: 
Email attachments Most email programs allow users to receive applications in the form 
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of compiled code contained within email attachments. These applications may be 
buggy or have been developed by malicious individuals for the purpose of damaging 
the user's system or stealing valuable details such as financial information. For ex-
ample, the W32/Bagle-F virus [Sophos Anti-Virus 2004] sends itself as a password 
protected ZIP file. When executed it exploits the user's own privileges to harvest 
email addresses from the hard disk andre-sends itself via its own SMTPengine. It 
may also provide a backdoor for remote attackers who wish to access resources on 
the infected machine. Although viruses are a continuing problem email attachments 
remain an important and valued aspect of email functionality. An improved approach 
is to enforce site-specific access control policies that prevented or curtail exploitation 
of user privileges by an email attachment. 
Dynamic web content Most browsers allow the viewing of dynamic web content in web 
pages consisting of static content and executable compiled, for example ActiveX 
controls or the popular Shockwave plug-in. Code distributed in this way may contain 
viruses or Trojan programs that appear to the user as benign but are performing ma-
licious actions in the background. They usually execute with the same privileges as 
the user so they can misuse any resource that a user has access to. Viruses delivered 
in this way have been implemented in recent "Phishing" attacks in which attack-
ers attempt to steal the account name and password for a user's electronic banking 
system [Anti-Phishing Working Group 2004]. These attacks succeed because rogue 
programs have unrestricted access to the user's hard-drive and can search for these 
details or collect them with dialog boxes that mimic those displayed in pages de-
livered to a browser by a bank's legitimate web server. Legitimate programs often 
require few of the many many system privileges allowed them and a solution to the 
general problem is the imposition of access control policies that curtail privileges 
granted to any downloaded program. 
Mobile code The two examples provided earlier can be seen as examples mobile code. 
Mobile code is code produced on one host and executes on a different host. Mobile 
code may be used to dynamically extend a thin client's functionality, [Yoshikawa, 
Chun, Eastham, Vahdat, Anderson & Culler 1997] or it may be a convenient way to 
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distribute an application across a group of hosts. The motivation for its use include 
better resource utilisation or improved performance [Chess, Harrison & Kershen-
baum 1995]. In all of these cases, it is desirable that site-specific policies are im-
posed upon the code and, because mobile code executes as user-level code. imposing 
security enforcement at the operating system level is insufficient because code may 
need to directly invoke other code at this level rather than services at the kernel level 
of the system. 
Standalone applications Organisations increasingly use third-party commercially-produced 
or open-source applications rather than developing their own applications. These ap-
plications may be untrustworthy or buggy, requiring site-specific policies to be en-
forced upon them to restrict the damage that they can cause. For example, a chat 
application with unrestricted functionality may be installed on users' PCs though se-
curity concerns required that access is limited to approved channels or chat servers. 
In order to enforce a suitable security policy, the application may need modification 
because it will not possess the necessary hooks for this to be accomplished externally 
since it has has been designed for a large and indeterminate user-base. 
Component-oriented programming In the same way that use is made of third-party ap-
plications, organisations may also make use of sub-applications or components that 
are assembled together to build something larger [Szyperski 1998]. At runtime com-
ponents would be linked into application code and execute in the same address space. 
Though programmers have access to specifications for the interface to these compo-
nents, as with mobile code, interaction between these, other components and the 
application code cannot be mediated solely at the level of the operating system. 
Computational grids Organisations may choose to share computational resources by al-
lowing users to upload compiled code to remote hosts for execution, for example 
in a computational grid [Foster 2001]. A computational grid is made up of het-
erogeneous resources belonging to multiple administrative domains. Resources may 
be applications, data or computational services. Although individual organisations 
may be distrustful, they share resources in a limited way to achieve some mutual 
purpose. This can mean sending an application to a data source and returning the 
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results to the application's originator. Obviously, the host where the application is 
executed would prefer to constrain its interaction with system resources, other local 
programs and with remote resources. This requires imposing site-specific policies 
upon applications that may not contain the appropriate enforcement code. 
The security problem shared by all of these cases is how to enforce site-specific ac-
cess control policies upon applications distributed as compiled code. To prevent misuse of 
resources, access to resources implemented as user-level code as well as resources imple-
mented by kernel-level code must be controlled by access control policies. What constitutes 
misuse might be defined relative to what is considered the minimum required privileges for 
the application to perform as expected. Additionally, what constitutes misuse might also 
be defined in terms of an organisation's norms. 
Generally, there are two types of access control policy considered in this thesis. The 
first are application-specific policies where the organisation imposes security policies gov-
erning access to resources provided by the application. The second are general policies 
where the organisation imposes security policies upon the use of resources provided by the 
organisation. 
1.2.2 Man-machine Scale 
Before discussing different approaches to enforcement of access control policies in these 
domains it is essential to establish a layered model of the computer system. Enforcement 
can be placed in any layer and the choice of layer governs the expressiveness of access 
control policies. Much of the rationale for loadtime MOPs depends upon which layer in 
the computer system that enforcement code is placed. 
Gollmann calls this the man-machine scale because it is assumed that the upper layers 
of the computer system are more closely tailored to an individuars needs whilst the lower 
layers are general purpose and tied to the constraints of the hardware. Figure 1.1 shows a 
layered model of an IT system due to Gollman [Gollmann 1999]. Users run applications 
that make use of resources provided by other applications, services or libraries. The ser-
vices or libraries may be middleware or provide access to the resources implemented by the 
underlying operating system. Applications and services both execute as user-level code, so 
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their access to each other may not be mediated by the operating system. Depending upon 
the language runtime, the services mayor may not be modifiable or protected from the 
application. The operating system executes as kernel-level code and is protected against 
tampering by either applications or services. 
Applications 
User-level 
Services and Libraries 
Operating System Kernel-level 
Figure 1.1: Layers of an IT system (based upon Figure 1.2 from Gollmann's book [Goll-
mann 1999]) 
1.2.3 Criteria for Evaluation 
This thesis uses four main criteria for evaluating the effect of placing enforcement at dif-
ferent layers within the computer system. The first was was coined by Dijkstra [Dijkstra 
1976] and the last three are Saltzer and Schroeder's famous principles for good security 
engineering [Saltzer & Schroeder 1975]: 
Separation of concerns To provide reduced development time, improved system flexibil-
ity and increased comprehensibility the best way to tackle implementation of com-
plex systems is to separate the system into separate concerns that can be addressed 
in isolation to each other. With regard to security enforcement this means separating 
enforcement code from application code to allow separate development, testing and 
reuse. 
Least privilege Least privilege limits the impact of failure. Every program and every user 
of the system should operate using the least set of privileges necessary to complete 
the job. 
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Complete mediation Complete mediation ensures that policies are enforced as intended. 
Every access to every object subject to a security policy must be checked for author-
ity. 
Economy of mechanism Economy of mechanism deals with the practical problem of en-
suring that enforcement mechanisms behave as intended. A recommendation is that 
code should be as simple and small in scale as is reasonable. 
1.2.4 Operating System Enforcement 
One approach to imposing site-specific access control policies is to rely upon the architec-
ture of the operating system. Although operating systems separate mechanism from policy, 
which allows policies [Wulf, Cohen, Corwin, Jones, Levin, Pierson & Pollack 1974] to 
reflect user requirements, the approach suffers from three major drawbacks from the per-
spective of the application. The first is the principle of least privilege, the second is that 
economy of mechanism is violated and the third belongs to the realm of complete media-
tion. The first two are described by Schneider and his colleagues [Schneider, Morrisett & 
Harper 2000] and the third is related to problems associated with least privilege. 
Least privilege is violated in the first instance because the privileges given to the appli-
cation are usually the same as the user and access controls enforced by the kernel are too 
coarse grained. Complete mediation depends upon mediation by the kernel in all accesses 
to protected resources and this is assured because of address space partitioning. However, 
in many of the problem domains in Section 1.2.1, applications that may be untrustworthy 
are loaded into the same address space as the user-level code implementing the resources 
we wish to protect. Finally, economy of mechanism simply may no longer apply in many 
operating systems because more and more functionality is included within their kernels. 
This makes it difficult to ensure that they enforce security correctly. 
1.2.5 Conventional Object-Oriented Techniques 
Schneider argues [Schneider et al. 2000] in favour of language-level enforcement in order 
to meet the challenges presented by these new problem domains. By placing enforcement at 
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the language level, access control can be formulated in terms of the operations provided by 
application or library objects rather than being restricted to the operations provided hy the 
system-call interface. Object-oriented languages appear ideal for language-level enforce-
ment because they provide information hiding because an object's encapsulate state is only 
accessible via the object's interface. Enforcement code can be placed at the interface by 
inserting access control checks into the object's methods. These access control checks can 
invoke components of the existing security architecture. This satisfies complete mediation 
because information hiding requires that all accesses take place via the object's interface. 
Least privilege is satisfied because access control policies can be specified in terms of the 
operations provided by the objects, and this is varied upon a per-application basis. 
Where resources are implemented by libraries, or libraries are used to implement com-
munication between applications (i.e. middleware), placing fixed enforcement code within 
libraries might seem attractive. However, this approach suffers from similar problems as 
those faced by enforcement at the level of the operating system. The end-to-end argu-
ment [Saltzer, Reed & Clark 1984] implies that libraries are designed to service a range 
of applications otherwise the functionality would be included at the application level. This 
means that libraries have coarse grained interfaces in order to satisfy a range of applications 
acting as clients to the library. This leads to the problem of least privilege. Implementing 
distributed access control may be easier to implement because all remote method invo-
cations follow a generic pattern. However, as discussed by Blair and colleagues [Blair, 
Coulson, Andersen, Blair, Clarke, Costa, Duran-Limon, Fitzpatrick, Johnston, Moreira, 
Parlavantzas & Saikoski 200 I], middleware tends to implement fixed strategies for non-
functional concerns that cannot be adjusted on a per-application basis. For example, au-
thentication and confidentiality protocols might be hardwired making it difficult to imple-
ment new application-specific protocols. Furthermore, local applications may still be able 
to invoke each other directly without mediation by the libraries, thereby violating the prin-
ciples of complete mediation. 
An improved approach to dealing with these problems is to manually add enforce-
ment code as required. However, manually inserting enforcement code is a laborious and 
error-prone process. So object-oriented software engineering techniques such as capabili-
ties [Dennis & Earl C. 1966], proxies [Redell 1974] and inheritance are typically used to 
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simplify this programming task. However, each of these techniques has drawback.... In-
heritance leads to a tight coupling between enforcement and functional code. Similarly. 
capabilities and proxies both require modification of the application code and have other 
problems such as the confinement problem or self problem. The tight coupling and need 
to change application code means that there is not a clean separation of concerns between 
the enforcement code and application code. As discussed by Stroud and Wu [Stroud & Wu 
1995] the lack of a clean separation of concerns between security and application func-
tionality means that changing either requires changes to the other. This reduces system 
flexibility, maintainability, reduces reuse and reduces comprehensibility. 
Aside from the lack of a clean separation of concerns, a major problem with applying 
these object-oriented engineering techniques is the requirement to have access to source 
code. For example, source code is not available for Java applets nor for some libraries. 
Since all conventional object-oriented techniques require some access to source code, these 
techniques only have limited application. 
1.2.6 In-lined Reference Monitors 
In-lined reference monitors and related tools pre-process compiled code before execution 
and insert enforcement code under the control of an access control policy [Pandey & Hashii 
1999, Evans & Twyman 1999, Erlingsson & Schneider 2000, Sirer et al. 1999, Hashii et al. 
2000]. Enforcement code monitors runtime behaviour and terminates execution if violation 
of an access control policy is detected. Unlike conventional object-oriented techniques, no 
access to source code is required. 
Depending upon the particular implementation, low-level language events can be moni-
tored allowing the property of least privilege to be satisfied. Also, as long as it can be shown 
that the enforcement code cannot be removed or tampered with, complete mediation can 
be shown. In fact, complete mediation is easier to show for in-lined reference monitors 
than conventional object-oriented techniques because the semantics of compiled code is 
simpler [Erlingsson & Schneider 2000]. Another benefit of in-lined reference monitors 
is a better economy of mechanism [Saltzer & Schroeder 1975] compared to comentional 
object-oriented techniques. This is because inserting access checks into source code relie ... 
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upon trusting the language compiler to correctly implement the checks in the compiled 
code thereby making the language compiler part of the trusted computing base. 
Although current applications of this technique are able to implement a wide-range of 
access control policies, for example Erlingsson shows how to re-implement Java's stack in-
spection policy [Vlfar Erlingsson & Schneider 2000], nonetheless, the focus is upon local 
access control rather than distributed access control. Implementing distributed access con-
trol would require re-implementing the tools, permitting them to change program outputs 
for example to implement encryption of network communications. 
More fundamentally, the focus of this approach is upon replacing or emulating existing 
security architectures rather than modifying compiled code to make use of existing security 
architectures. The motivation is to make analysis of the correctness of the security enforce-
ment more tractable. However, for many of the problem domains discussed earlier, system 
administrators prefer to apply existing security architectures to new application code be-
cause of the investment in existing code. Though this approach provides a clean separation 
of concerns and meets the requirements for good security engineering but is not flexible 
enough to allow reuse of existing security architectures. 
1.2.7 Metaobject Protocols 
An alternative approach to separating concerns between enforcement and code functional-
ity is behavioural reflection. An advantage of behavioural reflection over code rewriting is 
that a wider range of policies can be enforced because the focus is at the level of program 
behaviour rather than program structure. Behavioural reflection [Maes 1987] is a technique 
for opening up the implementation of a system in a controlled way using a process called 
reification. An abstraction of the system's internal state, structure and behaviour is made 
visible via a meta-level programming interface. This abstraction is causally connected to 
the underlying system in the sense that any changes made to this model or reification of 
the system at the meta level, are reflected back into the actual system. Thus, it is possible 
to customise the behaviour of a system transparently by changing the abstraction of the 
system. 
Metaobject protocols are an object-oriented implementation of reflection. Here, the 
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meta level is implemented as a metaobject that is bound to a base-level object. The interface 
of the metaobject defines the metaobject protocol. Different metaobjects can be bound to 
different objects providing different customisations of object behaviour. It is therefore 
natural to consider placing enforcement code within a metaobject. 
A clean separation of concerns is provided by the use of a MOP. The security metaobject 
can be developed independently of the base-level object and bound to the base-level before 
application execution. Modularising the different concerns leads to the improvement of 
software quality [parnas 1972]. Development and testing time can be reduced because 
work can be divided between domain specialists. Reusability is improved because security 
concerns are implemented once and reused with multiple applications. Comprehensibility 
is improved because, with this approach, security concerns are considered independently 
of the application. System flexibility is also improved because changes at the meta level do 
not necessarily impact the base level and vice-versa. 
1.2.8 Loadtime Metaobject Protocols 
The requirement to be able to enforce access control policies upon compiled code means the 
binding between objects and metaobjects must take place after compilation. The most ap-
propriate type of MOP providing this type of binding is referred to as a loadtime metaobject 
protocol [Welch & Stroud 1999a]. A loadtime MOP binds the metaobject to the object at 
loadtime, this can be achieved by pre-processing the compiled code before loading. Load-
time MOPs can be used where MOPs requiring access to source code are not and a loadtime 
MOP has better economy of mechanism and greater portability compared to a runtime MOP 
where modification to the interpreter is required. With the exception of the Simple Security 
MOP for Java [Caromel et al. 2001], most existing security architectures are not loadtime 
MOPs [Benantar et al. 1996, Riechmann & Hauck 1997, Riechmann & Hauck 1998, An-
cona et al. 1999]. Though the Simple Security MOP provides a limited metaobject protocol 
and is a proof-of-concept of an improvement to loadtime metaobject protocols, it cannot be 
used to enforce access control policies on the use of system-resources by applications. 
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Making use of a loadtime metaobject protocol to implement security enforcement en-
sures that the requirements of least privilege, complete mediation and economy of mecha-
nism are met. Kava [Welch & Stroud 1999a, Welch & Stroud 2000a, Welch & Stroud 200 I] 
is a loadtime metaobject protocol designed with these requirements in mind, combining the 
best of MOPs and IRM techniques, making use of existing security architectures, and ful-
filling the requirements of least privilege, complete mediation and economy of mechanism. 
1.3 Contributions 
This thesis makes three main contributions: development of a loadtime metaobject proto-
col, analysis of the limitations of conventional security engineering techniques for security 
enforcement and evaluation of how these limitations can be addressed using a loadtime 
metaobject protocol. 
1.3.1 Design and Implementation of a Secure Loadtime Metaobject 
Protocol 
First, the thesis describes the design and implementation of a loadtime metaobject protocol 
for Java called Kava. Arguments for least privilege, complete mediation and economy of 
mechanism are presented and analysed so that users of Kava can have confidence that se-
curity enforcement implemented using Kava can be trusted. Kava is a loadtime metaobject 
protocol for Java, implemented as part of the experimental work for this thesis, and repre-
sents a proof-of-concept for using behavioural reflection to enforce access control policies 
upon compiled code. Kava was the first loadtime metaobject protocol [Welch & Stroud 
1999a] although other loadtime metaobjects have subsequently been developed [Caromel 
et al. 2001]. Java was chosen for the implementation because it is a popular language for 
exploring program mobility due to its first-class support for dynamic class loading and link-
ing. Nonetheless, Java places some constraints upon implementation techniques that Kava 
must address, for example enforcing access control policies upon the use of system-level 
resources and dealing with Java's inheritance model. 
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Figure 1.2 shows the Kava architecture. The standard Java compiler is used to com-
pile both the target Java program and Kava Metaobjects. The metaobjects allow the local 
redefinition of the semantics of the Java language, for example method execution can be 
locally redefined to include Java security permission checking before execution is permit-
ted. The resulting byte code is then processed by Kava itself, either by applying Kava to 
the class files or by intercepting the loading of the compiled classes into the JVM. Kava 
uses a byte code rewriting toolkit to insert hooks into the program byte code that bring the 
runtime objects under the control of metaobjects. Where these hooks should he added is 
governed by a binding specification that is encoded using XML. The binding specification 
tells Kava which program classes and Java semantics should be under the control of an 
associated metaobject class. The transformed reflective program is then loaded as normal 
by the standard JVM. 
Access control policies are represented in Kava by a combination of the binding spec-
ification and the enforcement code that is encapsulated by metaobjects. When used to 
implement security using the Java permission-based security model, the security policies 
are specified by a combination of a Java security policy file, the enforcement code encap-
sulated by metaobjects and a binding specification that effectively indicates when enforce-
ment checks should be made. 
Enforcement upon compiled code is possible because Kava requires no manual changes 
or access to source code of the application classes. This is a feature that has been absent 
from existing reflective implementations unless they have modified the JVM implementa-
tion. In addition, an approach based upon code rewriting has the benefit that it is easier to 
make the argument for complete mediation of security related operations by enforcement 
code compared to other approaches to implementing reflection in Java. 
Reuse of access control policies is supported because the set of metaobjects containing 
enforcement code can be generic and parameterised for a particular application through 
the creation of an application-specific binding specification. This binding specification 
goes further than indicating individual methods to be controlled by a security policy but 
also allows control over field access, method invocation, method execution and exception 
handling. The ability to control the invocation of methods at the caller side in addition to 
the traditional control over method execution at the callee side allows security policies to he 
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Figure 1.2: Overview of Kava. Classes are loaded by an application-level class loader. The 
class file structure is then passed to Kava for rewriting. After hooks have been added the 
class is verified and loaded as normal. 
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applied to classes that cannot be rewritten by Kava due to constraints of the Java language. 
1.3.2 Demonstration of the Limitations of Conventional Object-Oriented 
Techniques 
Second, this thesis provides a demonstration of the limitations of conventional objeLt-
oriented software engineering techniques for implementing acce,>,> control policies. Two 
case studies are analysed where access control policies are enforced upon third-party appli-
cations, the first case study is a standalone application that uses the Java security architec-
ture and the second case study is a distributed application that use,> the self-defence '>ecurit) 
architecture. These case studies enforce security through a combination oj manual editing 
of source code, enforcement placed in system-level libraries, proxiel., and inheritance. 
1.3.3 Evaluation of Separation of Concerns 
Third, the thesis evaluates whether Kava can be used to implement a clean ,>eparation of 
concerns between security enforcement code and application code. This allowed an eval-
uation of the effectiveness of using a loadtime metaobject protocol to enforce local and 
distributed access control upon remotely developed applications that may be distributed as 
compiled code. At the most general level, the approach offers a highly practical solution, 
even through there is a requirement to understand application semantic,> and '>tructure for 
enforcing application-specific access control policies. Where access control policie-. aim 
to prevent abuse of local resources, there is a similar requirement to understand library 
semantics and structure. Additionally, to make the approach easier to use, work must be 
done on a more declarative binding specification and higher-level language for specifying 
policies. 
1.4 Thesis Overview 
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. 
Chapter :2 revie\\s general security policy enforcement, conventional object-oriented 
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enforcement, in-lined reference monitors and metaobject protocols before defining the 
goals of the thesis in greater detail. Some of the analysis of the limitations of conventional 
object-oriented techniques has been presented previously and published [Welch 1997. Welch 
& Stroud 1998a, Welch & Stroud 1999b]. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the design and implementation of Kava. Much of the 
work in this chapter has been published in a series of papers charting the evolution of Kava 
from an initial prototype called Dalang [Welch & Stroud 1998b, Welch & Stroud 1999a. 
Welch & Stroud 2000a, Welch & Stroud 2001, Welch, Stroud & Romanovsky 2001]. This 
chapter addresses goals related to enforcement of access control upon compiled user-level 
code and satisfying the requirements of separation of concerns, least privilege, complete 
mediation, economy of mechanism. 
Two chapters describe case studies undertaken to demonstrate that using a loadtime 
metaobject protocol to enforce access control provides a better separation of concerns than 
conventional object-oriented techniques. Chapter 4 reports upon a case study where ac-
cess control polices are enforced upon a third-party standalone IRC chat application named 
Lirc. It contrasts conventional object-oriented techniques based upon manually placing en-
forcement code with a loadtime metaobject approach. Chapter 5 reports upon a case study 
where access control policies are enforced upon a third-party distributed application named 
System K. It contrasts conventional object-oriented techniques based upon modifying sys-
tem libraries, inheritance and proxies with a loadtime metaobject protocol approach. These 
two chapters draw upon papers describing the Lirc and System K case studies [Welch & 
Stroud 2000b, Welch & Stroud 2002, Welch & Stroud 2003]. 
Chapter 6 uses the experience of the case studies to make inferences about general 
applicability of loadtime metaobject protocol such as Kava to enforcing access control 
policies. It summarises the results of the two case studies and discusses constraints upon 
applying the approach to other applications or within the context of other languages. 
Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the thesis, the contributions made by the thesis and dis-
cusses future work. Some of the future work relating to metaobject libraries for enforce-
ment of Clark-Wilson policies has already been presented elsewhere [Welch 1999] and as 
has work on a prototype policy compiler for Kava [Lu 2004]. 
Chapter 2 
Related Work 
The goals of this the~i~ have been developed by ~ystematically evaluating exi~tillg sel'urit) 
engineering techniques against a set of criteria, The criteria used for e\ aluation are hO\\ 
well the technique provides a clean separation of concerns and confomls to the three cla~..,ic 
principles of security engineering. 
This chapter is organised as follows, Section 2,1 prmides an overview of acce..,.., con-
trol policies, The XACMLlSAML framework is introduced, which i.., a frame\\ork for 
implementing a wide range of acce~~ control policie..,. This framework facilitates compar-
ison of the different security engineering techniqlle~ di..,cu..,..,ed in thi.., chapter. Section 2.2 
explains the set of criteria used to evaluate the different security engineering technique~. 
Sections 2,3-2,6 apply the criteria to operating system enforcement. cOll\cntional object-
oriented software engineering, in-lined reference monitors and metaobject protocols, Each 
of the existing techniques or applications of the techniques either have a different goal (in-
lined reference monitors) or do not satisfy all of the criteria, This lead~ naturally to the 
development of a set of goals for the thesis in Section 2,7, The goab of the thesis are to 
develop a loadtime metaobject protocol for Ja\a that allows enforcement of acce~s control 
policies O\cr objects and distributed objects. Unlike existing loadtime metaobject proto-
cob. this metaobject protocol should demonstrate that it meets the requiremenh of least 
privilege, complete mediation and economy of mechanism, Furthermore, the metaobject 
protocol's applicability to enforcing access control policies upon user-level compiled code 
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should be demonstrated through case studies involving enforcing existing security archi-
tectures upon third-party applications. 
2.1 Access Control Policies 
A security policy comprises of both security goals and rules [MAffIA Project 2003]. Se-
curity goals correspond to the traditional view of security properties such as confidentiality. 
integrity and availability [Pfteeger 1997]. Security goals provide a high-level view of a se-
cure system; security rules are lower-level constraints on system behaviour that ensure the 
system is robust against accidental or deliberate misuse. Rules may regulate both social 
and technical systems, where social rules consist of prohibitions, duties and obligations. 
and technical rules usually take the form of access control rules. The assumption is that 
both sets of rules will be correctly formulated to ensure that the security goals of the system 
are guaranteed. 
The focus of this thesis are a subset of security policies called access control policies. 
Access control policies are enforced by access control mechanisms that mediate all access 
to resources [Lampson 1974, Lampson, Abadi, Burrows & Wobber 1992]. Conceptually. an 
access control mechanism can be thought of as a device that monitors system behaviour and 
blocks any action that would result in a violation of a technical rule [Schneider et al. 2000j. 
As evidenced by work on standards for building access control systems [Rutt, Curtis, Hop-
kins, Fairthorne, Hartman, Nessett, Vleck, Frantz, Lejeune, Blakley, Mukerji, Ammon, 
Salmond & Allred 1995, Anderson, Parducci, Adams, Flinn, Brose, Lockhart, Beznosov, 
Kudo, Humenn, Godik, Andersen, Croker & Moses 2003], access control policies are suffi-
cient to describe the security requirements of many real world systems despite being unable 
to enforce availability and some confidentiality properties [Schneider 2000]. 
The OASIS XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) standard [Ander-
son et al. 2003] and SAML (Security Assertion Markup Language) standard [Lorch, Proc-
tor, Lepro, Kafura & Shah 2003] provide a useful framework for understanding how access 
control policies are implemented. XACMLlSAML can be used to enforce access policies 
upon both local and distributed objects. The framework's terminology is used throughout 
the rest of this chapter. 
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XACML provides a framework for implementing a wide range of security policies. 
XACML focuses upon the framework components. It defines the responsibilities of each 
component, the content of access control queries and responses. XMACL does not de-
fine the communication protocols used for communication, these are defined by the SAML 
framework. SAML is a standard XML-based framework for exchanging authentication and 
authorisation information [Philpott 2004]. How the authentication and authorisation infor-
mation is derived is beyond the scope of the SAML framework [OASIS Group 2004]. For 
example, the SAML framework may describe how to represent the statement "X is authen-
ticated" but it does not describe the protocol for authenticating X, this must be handled by 
some platform-specific component. 
The XACMLlSAML framework components act together to implement a rcference 
monitor [Anderson 1972] that mediates all requests for access by an application to a rc-
source according to an access control policy. 
The main components in the framework are: 
Policy Enforcement Point PEP performs access control by making decision request and 
enforcing authorisation decisions. The PEP is application-specific. 
PDP Policy Decision Point evaluates the applicable policy and makes an authorisation 
decision. The PDP is application-independent. 
Context Handler Context handler acts as a intermediary between the PEP and the PDP, 
it maps application-specific attributes associated with requests to an abstract syntax 
and adds additional context if required. 
Figure 2.1 shows how the components work in concert with each other to enforce an ac-
cess control policy. In the figure, an application attempts to access a resource. A resource 
may be a service provided by libraries or a service provided by another application pro-
gram. Essentially each access is mediated by a PEP that delegates the access decision to a 
PDP. The general notion is that of policy/mechanism separation with policy being encoded 
within a PDP and mechanism implemented by a PEP. 
Although XACMLlSAML can be applied to controlling access to local resources by 
local applications the main application for the framework is securing distributed appli-
cations. When using XACMLlSAML to secure a distributed system there are additional 
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Figure 2. 1: ( I ) An applicati on program reque t acce to a re ource fr m a PEP (Policy 
Enforcement Point). (2) The PEP sends the reque t to an appropri at cont t hand ler. (3) 
The context handler sends the translated reque t (dec ision reque t) to th PDP (Policy De-
cision Point). The PDP identifies the applicab le policy (using the 'emantic defined by the 
framework) by searching its policie and determine which poli cy (or po licie ) apply to the 
request. The PDP evaluates the policy rule. (4) The PDP retum the reo pon e context ( in-
cluding the authori sati on dec i ion) to the contex t handler. The authori sati on deci . ion may 
be permit, deny or intermed iate. (5) The contex t handler tran late the re pon e contex t 
to the native response format of the PEP. (6) The PEP ful fi l the obligati on . If acce 
permitted, then the PEP permits access to the re ource; otherwi e, it denie access. 
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problems that arise from the threats particular to a distributed system that must be solved 
by implementers. For example, the possibilities of eavesdropping. replay. message inser-
tion, message deletion, message modification, etc. The SAML specification does not define 
protocols or mechanisms for preventing this but it does specify the support required from 
transport-level protocols that can defeat these threats. In particular the standard proposes 
using TLS/SSL [Dierks & Allen 1999] to provide message confidentiality and authentica-
tion. 
2.2 Criteria for Evaluation 
We are interested in security engineering techniques that allow the use of existing security 
architectures to enforce access control policies upon compiled user-level code. This section 
discusses the criteria for evaluating the different techniques reviewed in this chapter. An 
ideal technique should meet these criteria and allow reuse of existing security architectures. 
The criteria are: 
• Clean separation of concerns. 
• Least privilege. 
• Complete mediation. 
• Economy of mechanism. 
Table 2.6 on page 55 summarises the result of evaluating operating system, conven-
tional object-oriented, in-lined reference monitors and metaobject protocols against the 
criteria. The only technique allowing reuse of existing security architectures and meeting 
the majority of criteria are loadtime metaobject protocols. In-lined reference monitors also 
meet the majority of criteria but do not allow reuse of existing security architectures. 
2.2.1 Separation of Concerns 
According to Dijkstra [Dijkstra 1976], the ideal way to tackle implementation of a complex 
system is to partition the system into separate concerns that can be addressed in isolation to 
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each other. Each concern can be designed, implemented and tested independently modules 
before being combined together within a single application. This ideal is known as a clean 
separation of concerns. 
Besides making implementation tractable, a clean separation of concerns provides the 
benefits associated with good modularisation. These benefits are reduced development 
time, improved system flexibility and comprehensibility [Parnas 1972]. Development time 
is improved because the modules can be developed independently of each other. System 
flexibility is improved because changes to one module will not impact upon another mod-
ule. Comprehensibility can be improved because one module can be studied in isolation 
without requiring understanding of the system as a whole. 
A good example of a clean separation of concerns from an operating system perspective 
is the Hydra operating system [Wulf et al. 1974]. Hydra implemented policy decision mak-
ing in user-level code and policy enforcement in kernel level code. This separation allowed 
new policies to be implemented without requiring modifications to the operating system. 
There are problems with this separation of concerns from an application perspective as will 
be discussed in Section 2.3. 
The problem domains identified in Section 1.2.1 require a security technique that pro-
vides a clean separation of concerns. For example, enforcing a local access control pol-
icy upon a third-party application requires developing enforcement code separately and 
somehow imposing it upon the application. The concerns are already separate because 
the application has been developed independently of the security requirements. Ad-hoc 
modification of the application may not be possible because the source code of the applica-
tion may not be available. Additionally, if the source code was available then upgrades to 
the application would require modification again. Besides being tedious, this would be an 
error-prone process. Ideally the two concerns should be kept separate and an appropriate 
technique used to automatically combine them together as required. 
A security engineering technique providing this degree of separation of concerns may 
still require knowledge of the semantics of either the application or the resource being 
protected. Where there is a specification for the application, application-specific policies 
can be defined in terms of the application interface. Where there isn't a specification, for 
example dynamic web content, the policies can be defined in terms of the interfaces of the 
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resource being protected. 
Separation of concerns is a desirable property of any security engineering technique and 
the remainder of this chapter uses the concept as a means of evaluating a range of different 
security engineering techniques. 
2.2.2 Security Engineering Principles 
The XACMLlSAML framework provides an architecture with a degree of separation of 
concerns for implementing security policies. However, the correct implementation of se-
curity policies in a computer system is difficult due to non-trivial dependencies upon the 
mechanism's components allied to the difficulties associated with finding the right mapping 
from policy abstractions to the concrete enforcement mechanisms [Samarati & Vimercati 
2000]. However, there is some agreement upon basic principles that designers of enforce-
ment mechanisms should follow to increase confidence in their design, these principles are 
the ones adopted in this thesis. They were first discussed by Saltzer and Schroeder [Saltzer 
& Schroeder 1975] in their paper on the basic principles of data protection and the main 
ones are listed below: 
Least privilege Least privilege limits the impact of failure. Every program and every user 
of the system should be allocated the least set of privileges necessary to complete the 
job. Least privilege limits damage created when a subject abuses their privileges. For 
example, granting a doctor the right to request information only about the patients 
slhe treats protects the privacy of other patients on a hospital records database. 
Complete mediation Complete mediation ensures that policies are always enforced as in-
tended. Any access to an object subject to a security policy must be checked for 
authority. Complete mediation means that a reference monitor that enforces a secu-
rity policy intercepts every request to a resource being protected. Unless this property 
holds, a request that leads to the violation of a security policy would be allowed. 
Economy of mechanism The principle of economy of mechanism, by keeping the design 
as simple and small as possible, is an attempt to assure that the mechanism beha\es 
as intended by limiting the unintended effects associated with needless complexity. 
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When applied to a reference monitor this means minimising its size makes fonnal 
verification of its correctness tractable. 
These three principles provide criteria for evaluating the effectiveness of a particular 
security engineering technique. 
2.3 Operating System Enforcement 
The traditional approach to enforcing security in operating systems is to place PEPs within 
lower system layers. This has the advantages that it is easier to show complete media-
tion of accesses by the PEP and it reduces the perfonnance overheads caused by security 
checks [Gollmann 1999]. In these circumstances there is no need for access to source 
code when enforcing an access control policy upon an application. Some operating sys-
tems, for example OTOS [Secure Computing Corporation 1997] or Flask [Spencer. Smal-
ley, Loscocco, Hibler, Andersen & Lepreau 1999], provide policy/mechanism separation 
to provide system flexibility. Here, PEPs are protected from tampering by placing them 
within the operating system kernel and as a result policy decisions can be delegated to a 
component at the user level, allowing per-user access control policies [Wulf et at. 1974]. 
This then allows new policies to be specified without requiring changes to the kernel. Un-
fortunately, from an application-level perspective, operating system security enforcement 
violates the principle of least privilege and complete mediation is limited to operating sys-
tem resources provided by the kernel. More generally, modem operating systems do not 
satisfy the principles of economy of mechanism. Each of these three problems will be dealt 
with in turn in the following sections. 
2.3.1 Evaluation 
Table 2.1 summarises the evaluation of operating system security techniques against the set 
of criteria. Although providing a good separation of concerns, from an application-level 
perspective, operating system mechanisms do not meet the requirements of least privilege. 
complete mediation or economy of mechanism. 
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Table 2.1: Evaluation of operating system enforcement. 
Technique Description Separation Least Complete Economy 
of Privilege Mediation of 
Concerns Mechanism 
Operating system Fixed placement of Good Coarse Limited control Complex 
enforcement code over user-level 
within kernel. code 
Separation of' Concerns 
The security concern as represented by the enforcement code is completely separated from 
the functionality of the application that is the subject of an access control policy. Changes 
to the application do not require rewriting the enforcement code while changes to the en-
forcement code have no impact upon the application's code. No access to an application's 
source code is required to enforce access control policies upon the application. 
Least Privilege 
Least privilege is violated for two reasons. First, the privileges given to the application are 
the same as those of the user but the user needs many more privileges than the application. 
This permits the application to perform many actions that are not strictly necessary for it 
to implement its functionality. A misbehaving application will do far more harm than one 
with more constraints placed upon it. Second, access controls enforceable by the kernel 
may be too coarse grained. For example, the operating system can grant access to an 
individual file but cannot control what or how much data is written to the file or can grant 
access to the network but cannot distinguish between invocations sent across the network. 
This is because control can only be enforced at the kernel's interface and this interface is 
much coarser grained than the application's interface. This leads to the conclusion that the 
lower the layer in which the enforcement is placed then the less able security policies are 
to reflect user requirements [Gollmann 1999]. 
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Complete Mediation 
Complete mediation is violated because the operating system only mediates accesses to 
the kernel. Although address space isolation in traditional operating systems may force 
interactions between user-level code to go via the kernel, the advent of extensible systems 
such as Java or component-oriented programming leads to a situation where code is not 
isolated from other code in processes and can invoke each other without mediation by the 
kernel. 
Economy of Mechanism 
Depending upon the operating system implementation, the property of economy of mecha-
nism may not be satisfied due to the migration of user-level functionality into system-level 
code. Schneider and his colleagues use the example of Windows 2000, which contains 
many millions of lines of code because of the inclusion of windowing and other libraries 
within the kernel [Schneider et al. 2000]. 
2.4 Conventional Object-oriented Security 
As discussed by Gollman [Gollmann 1999], object-oriented systems provide some useful 
features to support security. Objects encapsulate data and only allow access via a well-
defined interface. This is guaranteed by the language interpreter or a combination of checks 
provided by compilers and execution environment. Java [Gong, Mueller, Prafullchandra & 
R. 1997] is one example of a security architecture built using object-oriented principles 
that can enforce access control policies, and CORBA [Rutt et al. 1995] is an example of 
a security architecture for distributed object systems that can enforce distributed access 
control policies. 
These features provide a useful basis for implementing security. However, there must 
also be some means of enforcing a specific access control policy. One way is to insert PEPs 
at the start of code implementing methods. These cannot be bypassed if all invocations are 
guaranteed to be via a well-defined interface and no other access to an object's code or state 
is possible. 
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2.4.1 Examples 
Thi s section evalu ates di fferent conventi onal object-ori ented oft are engineering te h-
niques for enforc ing access control policie . For implicity, it i a umed that en h In er 
below the current layer being considered satisfi e the principle of complete m diation and 
economy of mechanism. 
Place Enforcement within Libraries 
One approach to language-level enforcement i to pl ace PEP within the librar od im-
plementing the serv ices that application u e, for example midd leware or y tern libra ri e . . 
The Java security architectu re fo llows thi s model. Java prov ide ex ten ible fin e-grained 
access control for compi led u er-Ievel code while providing upport for a eparati on be-
tween policy and enforcement. In previous versions, new security policie required th 
rewriting of the security manager but now policy is specified in a fil e that can be adjusted 
independently of the app li cation allow ing per-applicat ion acce s control policie . 
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Figure 2.2: Overview of the Java securi ty architecture 
Figure 2.2 hows the Java Security Architecture. Compiled code in the form of cia e 
is loaded by a class loader into the Java Virtual Machine (Java VM). A SecureClassloader 
loads each class and ass ign it to a protection domain depending upon who igned the code, 
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who is executing the Java VM, and where the class was loaded from. Unlike operating sys-
tem security architectures, enforcement of protection domains is not achieved by isolating 
code within a process only able to communicate with other processes via the kernel. In-
stead, namespace management and type safety provide the isolation properties. This has 
the advantage of efficiency, since a process-based mechanism requires expensive context 
switches when communicating between processes. Requiring a process per-class would 
make Java unusable because of the communication overheads. 
The Java core class libraries playa role similar to a kernel in operating systems such 
as DTOS or Flask. Java system classes must be invoked to access services or operating 
system resources and this provides a natural place to enforce access control policies. When 
a method of a compiled class tries to access resources such as the filesystem or the network, 
the SecurityManager is invoked. This is because each resource is encapsulated by a class 
whose methods contain hardwired security enforcement code that delegates the decision as 
to whether access is allowed by the SecurityManager. The SecurityManager itself delegates 
the access control decision to an AccessControlier class that makes the decision depending 
upon the current Java security policy. The Java security policy assigns permissions to 
protection domains and the AccessControlier evaluates the access decision by checking if 
the requested permission is held by every protection domain on the current call stack. 
With regard to least privilege and complete mediation, library-level enforcement suffers 
from the same problems as operating system enforcement. The granularity of the library's 
interface determines the granularity of the access rights that can be granted to applications. 
Additionally, not all accesses to application resources will require invoking services con-
taining enforcement code thereby making it impossible to impose access control policies 
governing access to application resources. Furthermore, middleware services will imple-
ment fixed protocols that can only be changed by rewriting the middleware [Coulson 2002]. 
The effect of these problems can be illustrated using two simple examples. First, con-
sider preventing malicious email attachments from subverting the user-level email applica-
tion and using it to send spam. Libraries such as Java's JavaMail API [Sun Microsystems 
1999-2004] may mediate access to services allowing the sending of email but the services 
do not have the application-knowledge required to distinguish between user-initiated email 
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and virus-initiated email. Second, consider using a remotely developed standalone appli-
cation or component lacking the necessary access controls for enforcing an organisation \ 
local policies. For example, an organisation might wish to enforce a local acceptable use 
policy upon the use of a third-party IRC (Internet Relay Chat) application. This might 
require restricting IRC access to approved chat channels. However, there is no way for 
the libraries used by the IRC application to distinguish between access to particular chat 
channels and simply providing access to a server. 
Manually Place Enforcement within the Application 
The solution to the problems stated above is to insert PEPs directly into the application it-
self. For example, Java's security architecture allows access control checks to be manually 
inserted into application code. The checks themselves can make use of the standard per-
mission framework and architectural components such as the AccessControlier. But placing 
the access control checks at the level of the application's interface allows enforcement to be 
tailored to the application itself thereby providing least privilege and ensuring that all ac-
cesses are mediated by enforcement code. Unfortunately, manually inserting access control 
checks is laborious and error prone. 
Treat Objects as Capabilities 
One way to avoid requiring addition of PEPs to existing code is to adopt a capability-based 
architecture. Capabilities [Dennis & Earl C. 1966] represent access rights as unforgeable 
pointers to resources and their possession represents the right to invoke the services or 
methods of the resource. Originally developed for secure operating systems, capabilities 
have since been used to provide security for applications [Wallach, Balfanz, Dean & Felten 
1997] and some languages provide special facilities for implementing capabilities. For 
example, Java provides a Guard class that hands out capabilities to subjects possessing 
the appropriate permissions. A client requests the capability by invoking a method of the 
Guard object, this method performs an access check to see if the client is allowed access to 
the capability before returning the capability. Once the client has the capability then it can 
invoke methods of the protected object. 
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There are two drawbacks to using a capability-based architectures. First, although it 
requires fewer changes to application source code than simply inserting PEPs within each 
method of an object, it still requires changes to the application. This doesn't provide a 
clean separation of concerns because changing the application still requires changes to en-
forcement code and vice-a-versa although it is more modularised and ad-hoc than manually 
inserting enforcement code. For example, using a Guard requires inserting code to request 
access to the object protected by the Guard. Second, the application must ensure confine-
ment [Lampson 1973] of capabilities. But once a capability has been released to a client 
there is always a possibility that it can be in turn be given to a client who shouldn't have 
access or that an error in implementation might expose capabilities to clients who similarly 
should not have access. The problem is that possession allows clients to further delegate 
access as they wish. 
Place Enforcement within Proxies 
Redell's Caretaker pattern ([Redell 1974] as discussed in Miller and Shapiro's paper on 
implementing capabilities [Miller & Shapiro 2003]) is a specialisation of the proxy pat-
tern [Gamma, Helm, Johnson & Vlissides 1995] that is similar to the Java Guard except 
allows revocation. A proxy object plays the role of a surrogate for an object implementing 
a resource. The client using the proxy believes it is invoking the methods of the resource 
object but it is really interacting with the proxy. The proxy enforces the security policy by 
performing an access check before delegating the method invocation to the real resource 
object. Hence, the proxy is described as playing the Caretaker role. Unlike a simple ca-
pability model, the Caretaker can revoke the access rights granted to a client at any time. 
Because the client must always go through the Caretaker there is no way for the client to 
simply bypass the proxy. Obviously the proxy is acting as a fine-grained PEP for individual 
objects. However, there a four main drawbacks to the use of Caretaker. 
First, proxies raise the self problem that was first described by Lieberman [Lieberman 
1986]. Lieberman claims inheritance-based languages cannot implement delegation. The 
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problem is with the rebinding of the self1 variable that takes place when the method in-
vocation is delegated. It is possible to work around this by passing the self variable as an 
additional argument in all method invocations and then making all self invocations use this 
passed variable instead of the default. This requires that affected classes follow a partic-
ular programming convention. However, since the classes being wrapped are constructed 
independently of the proxy with which they are used, it is unlikely that they would support 
such a convention unless we could transform the compiled classes' methods. 
Second, using proxies to add functionality to existing classes requires logical wrap-
ping [Holzle 1993] to ensure that the proxy and proxied instances are always associated 
with each other. Any class that returns an instance of the proxied class must be modified 
(or itself proxied) to ensure that it returns a proxy instance. This requires programmers to 
introduce logic into the application in addition to the definition of the proxy class itself. 
Other implementations are possible, for example, the proxy could be automatically gen-
erated at the client side. However, there must always be additional processing in order to 
maintain the association between the proxy and the proxied class. 
Third, in a reasonably complex application, it is possible that an instance of a proxied 
class returned by a method invocation might not be replaced with an instance of its proxy. 
Such an unwrapped instance would then allow the proxied instance to be invoked directly 
bypassing the proxy. This is simply a variant of the confinement problem [Lampson 1973] 
and is a possibility that always exists whenever a proxy is used. 
Fourth, an interface gap exists because of the introduction of an extra proxy c1a'is 
that must maintain the same interface as the proxied class. Whenever the interface of the 
proxied class changes, the interface to the proxy class must also be updated. 
Successfully implementing proxies requires changes to the objects being proxied and 
this detracts from the separation of concerns gained. In addition, problems remain regard-
ing the leakage of pointers to the unprotected object and this complicates implementation. 
I In Java the self variable is represented by the this keyword. 
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Place Enforcement within a Superclass 
Another approach to implement security functionality or security state is to implement 
these in a subclass and have classes implementing resources subject to a security policy 
inherit this functionality or state. For example, a SecureObject class could be implemented 
that includes a checkAccess method and fields able to track access-relevant state. All 
classes implementing resources subject to a security policy would inherit from SecureOb-
ject and call checkAccess wherever appropriate. This reduces the burden on programmers 
because they no longer need to re-implement checkAccess for every class or add extra 
fields to each class definition. 
The main drawback is that this approach imposes an obligation on the implementer of 
the secure class that leads to tight coupling between functional and enforcement code [Stroud 
& Wu 1995]. In the example given, this consisted of calling inherited methods at particular 
points and it might also involve defining extra class-specific methods. This causes the code 
implementing the functionality of the secured class to become intertwined with the code 
enforcing security. As discussed earlier this makes it difficult to reuse enforcement code. 
It also hardwires choice about the types of enforcement that can be implemented. Chang-
ing enforcement requires changing the superclass. Changing the superclass is problematic 
because it forces all subclasses to change because the changes may introduce new methods 
or change the arguments of existing method calls. 
2.4.2 Evaluation 
Table 2.2 summarises the evaluation of conventional object-oriented techniques against the 
set of criteria. Conventional object-oriented techniques are able to satisfy least privilege 
and also complete mediation but do not necessarily provide good economy of mechanism 
nor provide a clean separation of concerns. 
Separation of Concerns 
Implementing PEPs within library code provides a clean separation of concerns because 
enforcement code is independent of application code. All of the others share a lack of 
clean separation of concerns. Changing either enforcement code or application code will 
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Table 2.2: Evaluation of conventional object-oriented techniques. 
Technique Description Separation Least Complete Economy 
of Privilege Mediation of 
Concerns Mechanism 
Libraries Fixed placement of Good Coarse Limited Language 
enforcement code dependent 
within kernel. 
Manual insertion Place enforcement Poor Fine Complete Language 
as required within dependent 
application 
Capabilities Treat object Moderate Fine Limited Language 
references as dependent 
capabilities and 
control handing out 
capabilities. 
Proxies Place enforcement Moderate Fine Limited Language 
code within dependent 
proxies 
Inheritance Place enforcement Moderate Fine Complete Language 
within superclass, dependent 
all secure objects 
inherit behaviour 
and state. 
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lead to some changes in both. Manual insertion leads to the worst separation of all because 
enforcement code is intertwined with application code. Capabilities and proxies provide 
cleaner separation because enforcement code is more modularised but still requires some 
changes to application source code: (1) Capabilities require changes to the objects that 
return references to protected objects and careful programming to avoid the confinement 
problem; (2) Proxies require the generation of entirely new classes and changes to objects 
that return references to protected objects to ensure references remain wrapped. Inheritance 
imposes additional obligations upon developers of application code and require modifica-
tion of the source code in order to implement inheritance. 
Least Privilege 
Library-level enforcement suffers from the same problems as operating system enforce-
ment of access control policies because PEPs are located at the wrong level of abstraction 
and cannot be easily changed. However, placing PEPs at the application level successfully 
provides least privilege because the access control policies can now specify fine-grained 
rights on a per-method basis for application or library code. 
Complete Mediation 
Complete mediation requires that the PEPs cannot be bypassed. Placing enforcement man-
ually within application code or within the superclass provides complete mediation as the 
language ensures invocations can only take place across a well-defined interface. Capabil-
ities and proxies are more problematic because both suffer from the confinement problem. 
Libraries only offer limited complete mediation because they cannot mediate in accesses 
to application resources. 
Economy of Mechanism 
Economy of mechanism is also quite dependent upon the development and execution en-
vironment. However, it is possible to make the observation that implementing PEPs by 
inserting source code into an application does require that the compiler is trustworthy a-. 
well as the execution environment. We must be able to trust that the compiler does not 
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remove the PEPs at compilation time. This results in a larger trusted computing base than 
operating system enforcement because we now consider the compiler as well as the execu-
tion environment (and system libraries) as part of the trusted computing base. 
2.5 In-lined Reference Monitors 
In-lined reference monitors (IRMs) provide an alternative approach to operating system or 
conventional object-oriented security engineering. IRMs focus on replacing the existing 
security architecture rather than bringing applications under the control of existing security 
architectures. The main benefit of replacing existing security architecture is that the ar-
chitecture implemented by the IRM may be easier to verify as being correct. Additionally. 
existing IRMs only enforce access control upon local objects rather than distributed objects. 
To implement distributed access controls, new mechanisms to support remote authentica-
tion and confidentiality would need to be added to existing IRM toolkits because current 
IRMs do not provide facilities to implement these concerns. Nonetheless. they are worth 
reviewing because they solve the problems of clean separation of concerns for compiled 
code and meet the criteria for access control for local objects. 
IRM tools in-line automata that monitor execution of the application being secured and 
halt its execution if a violation of the security policy is detected [Erlingsson & Schneider 
2000]. Figure 2.3 describes the IRM security architecture. An application provided as 
compiled code has the enforcement code for a security policy in-lined by an IRM Rewriter. 
The resulting application is now a secure application. The key notion here is that the 
enforcement and policy decision code can be automatically generated from a security policy 
written in terms of application abstractions. Essentially the PEP and PDP is merged into 
the target application and the term in-lined reference monitor reflects this because the 
notion is that the reference monitor is not in system libraries or kernels. Instead it is in-
lined into the application itself. The inspiration for this work belongs to software based 
fault isolation [Wahbe, Lucco, Anderson & Graham 1993a] where address-space isolation 
is implemented by modifying user-level compiled code. 
Examples of IRM architectures are SASI [Erlingsson & Schneider 2000], PoETIP-
Slang [Olfar Erlingsson & Schneider 2000], Naccio [Evans & Twyman 1999], Ariel [Pande) 
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Fi gure 2.3: In-lined Reference M onilor archi lecture. eparalion bel een enf rcem nl and 
functionality. At runtime, an applicat ion is proce sed by an IRM rewriter that ins rl!'l en -
forcement code at appropriate pl ace under the contro l of a ecurity polic . Thi pr duc ~ 
a ecure application containing both enforcement and policy deci . ion code (diagram ba~ed 
upon a diagram from [V lfar Erlingsson & Schneider 2000]. 
& Hashii 1999, Hashii et al. 2000] and the Di tr ibuted Virtual Machin ( 0 
19991· 
) [ 1 rer I a I. 
The following secti ons analy. e how IRM technique. add re. . eparat ion f c nce rn s" 
least privilege, complete mediation, economy of mechani m. 
2.5.1 Evaluation 
Table 2.3 summari ses the evaluati on of IRM technique . Each example i not hown indi-
viduall y because of their similarily. IRM technique pro ide lea I privilege and economy 
of mechanism. However, il i les fl ex ible than conventional object-oriented oflware engi-
neering b caLI se it repl ace ex isting security architecture rather than pro iding a means to 
integrate appli cations with them. IRM techniques do pro ide least pri vilege with regard to 
enforcing access contro l upon user-level objects. Howe er, current IRM implementation~ 
cannot enforce access cont rol upon di stributed object . 
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Table 2.3: Evaluation of IRM techniques. 
Technique Description Separation Least Complete Economy 
of Privilege Mediation of 
Concerns Mechanism 
IRM enforcement Policy determines Good Fine Control over Good 
in-lining of user-level code 
enforcement but not 
within compiled distributed 
code. Replaces objects. 
existing security 
architecture. 
Separation of Concerns 
A clean separation of concerns can be achieved by in-lining security codes into user-
level applications [Erlingsson & Schneider 2000, Evans & Twyman 1999, Sirer et al. 
1999, Pandey & Hashii 1999, Hashii et al. 2000]. In-lined reference monitors (lRMs) 
realise access control policies by rewriting compiled applications and inserting enforce-
ment code as necessary to effect the access control policy. A clean separation of concerns 
is provided because enforcement code can be changed independently of application code. 
A new access control policy can be implemented simply by modifying the policy definition 
and using the IRM to reapply the policy to the application. Similarly, when the application 
is changed the access control policy can be reimplemented simply by rerunning the IRM 
against the application. 
Least Privilege 
All of the examples of IRM except for Naccio provide fine-grained control for all user-
level code. Naccio does not provide fine-grained control because it only intercepts access 
requests for resources implemented by library code and not application code. 
None of the IRM implementations surveyed here provide control over access to dis-
tributed objects. 
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Complete Mediation 
Schneider and Erlingsson's [Schneider 2000, Erlingsson & Schneider 2000. Ulfar Erlings-
son & Schneider 2000] argument for complete mediation by IRMs depends upon showing 
that: 
• Enforcement code mediates all the events relevant to the access control policy being 
enforced . 
• Enforcement code and its variables are protected against tampering at runtime. 
Ensuring All Relevant Events are Mediated. The enforcement code must mediate all 
events governed by the access control policy being enforced. This means the enforcement 
code must be capable of mediating an event and the IRM adding the enforcement code must 
be capable of identifying when mediation is required. Achieving confidence in the toolkit 
requires both an assessment of its code analysis capabilities and the scope of control of 
the IRM code. For example, consider an object-oriented language that allows direct access 
to an object's state without requiring the use of accessor methods. An IRM only able to 
identify method invocations or insert enforcement code to control method invocations could 
not be used with this language for controlling access to object state. 
Resisting Tampering. The integrity of the enforcement code and its variables must be 
protected from subversion. The secured application should not be able to bypass, tam-
per with or modify the values of variables controlling execution of the enforcement code. 
PoET/PSlang uses the following techniques to prevent tampering with enforcement code: 
1. The secured application is prevented from invoking methods belonging to the en-
forcement code or accessing enforcement variables because the enforcement code 
does not use names that exist within the application's namespace. For example, Po-
ET/PSLang uses names containing characters that are illegal in Java source code 
and would be rejected by a compiler. Additionally, because these names are not 
mentioned in the application's original namespace, the application could not contain 
code using these names. Note though, that care has to be taken with Java because of 
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its introspection capabilities - these must be disabled to prevent generic code making 
use of these capabilities to access variables or invoke methods. 
2. The secured application is prevented from bypassing the in-lined enforcement code 
because there is no way to branch around in-lined enforcement code. There are jump 
instructions included in the Java VM's byte code and used to implement exception 
handling and conditional branching but they cannot be used to either jump from one 
method into the body of another or make arbitrary branches within a method body. 
a. Bypassing enforcement code controlling access to a method requires being able 
to make an arbitrary jump into the middle of method from another method. 
This not possible because the Java verifier statically analyses the byte code and 
disallows jumps between methods. 
b. Bypassing enforcement code within a method requires being able to make an 
arbitrary jump within a method body. Any jump instruction that attempted to 
bypass enforcement code around an instruction that is the target of an access 
control policy would be unable to branch over the enforcement code because it 
does not exist yet. It could try to confuse the IRM by implementing a complex 
control flow but as long as the IRM can identify the correct placement of en-
forcement code then it can update the target of the jump instructions to point to 
the newly in-lined enforcement code. 
3. The secured application is prevented from viewing code as data, otherwise it would 
be able to remove enforcement code at runtime. This is guaranteed by strong type 
checking enforced by the Java compiler. Additionally, the Java verifier that forms part 
of the Java virtual machines ensures that [Yellin 1996]: (1) There are no stack over-
flows or underflows. (2) All register accesses and stores are valid. (3) The parameters 
to all byte code instructions are correct. (4) There is no illegal data conversion. 
This is not the complete story, it shows that inserted enforcement code cannot be by-
passed but what if the attacker can confuse the IRM tool and avoid in-lining of enforce-
ment code. Pandey and Hashii [Pandey & Hashii 1999] argue it is essential for an IRM 
tool, whose access control policy is based upon associating access checks with particular 
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classes, to take account of Java's inheritance model [Pandey & Hashii 1999]. In Java, the 
compiled format of a class includes only those methods defined for that class. Any inher-
ited methods are defined in the subclass and at runtime dynamic dispatch ensures that the 
correct method implementation is used. The implication of this for an IRM approach is 
that enforcement code must be added to the methods defined in superclasses as well as the 
class that is the subject of an access control policy. However, this leads to instances of 
both the superclass and the subclass being subject to access constraints. One solution is to 
create stub methods in the subclass that delegate calls to the superclass and provide a place 
to in-line enforcement code. However, Java allows classes to define some methods as final 
thereby preventing overriding. The solution to this problem is to insert an invocation in 
the superclass of an access check method defined as a null method in the superclass. The 
original method remains final but the access method can be overridden by the subclass and 
enforcement code in-lined. 
These arguments for complete mediation can be extended to C++. What is required is 
the use of additional tools to ensure that access to code is only via well-defined interfaces. 
For example, SAS I makes use of tools such as typed assembly language [Morrisett. Walker. 
Crary & Glew 1999a] to ensure type safety guarantees are maintained and Naccio relies 
upon tools implementing Software-Based Fault Isolation (SFI) [Wahbe. Lucco, Anderson 
& Graham 1993b]. 
Economy of Mechanism 
The security engineering techniques discussed in this section provide good economy of 
mechanism compared to inserting PEPs into application source code. Preprocessors could 
be used to insert enforcement code but working with compiled code has distinct advantages. 
Compiled code is easier to parse than source code and doesn't require the co-operation of 
the compiler. This implies that the compiler does not need to be treated as part of the trusted 
computing base [Schneider et al. 2000]. 
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2.6 Metaobject Protocols 
Metaobject protocols are a software engineering technique that provides the strengths of 
conventional object-oriented engineering techniques while providing a clean separation of 
concerns. Metaobject protocols are an object-oriented implementation of reflection. Re-
flection [Maes 1987] allows a system's implementation to be exposed, while hiding its com-
plexities, allowing it to be changed. A reflective system is comprised of a base and meta 
level. Reflection allows the system's base-level implementation to be opened up while 
hiding implementation details. This is achieved by providing a meta-level causally con-
nected model, which is a reification of the base-level system. The model has two important 
features. First, the model is an abstraction that hides the complexities of the base-level 
implementation. Second, changing the model also changes the base-level system because 
they are causally connected together. 
When discussing reflection there is a notion of functional and non-functional concerns. 
Normally, non-functional concerns are considered orthogonal features that can be found 
in many applications, for example persistence or distribution. In the context of this thesis, 
the non-functional concern is security and the functional concern is implemented by the 
application. 
Malenfant and colleagues [Malenfant, Jacques & Demers 1996] define two types of 
reflection: structural and behavioural. Structural reflection is concerned with providing a 
reification of an application's structure. Behavioural reflection is concerned with reification 
of the language's semantics and of its implementation, as well as a reification of the state 
and implementation of the runtime system. 
A metaobject protocol (MOP) [Kiczales et al. 1991] is an object-oriented implementa-
tion of reflection that allows for incremental, and constrained changes to a system. Object-
oriented programming allows the meta-level model to be changed locally and incremen-
tally. The base level is the object, and the meta level is implemented as a metaobject that 
is causally connected (bound) to the base-level object. The protocol defines the interaction 
between an object and metaobject, and constrains changes that may be made to the object's 
behaviour. Because the meta level is implemented as an object, techniques such as special-
isation by inheritance can be used to structure it. Though metaobject protocols can be used 
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to implement both behavioural and structural reflection, this thesis focuses upon the use of 
metaobject protocols for behavioural reflection. 
One possible implementation of a metaobject protocol for behavioural reflection is 
shown in Figure 2.4. In this example, an object is bound to a metaobject. The metaob-
ject provides a protocol that allows adjustment to the behaviour of method invocations at 
the receiver. This is implemented by transparently intercepting method invocations sent to 
the base-level object, reifying the method invocation as a first-class value and invoking the 
metaobject. This act of interception is known as a meta-level interception (MLI) [Zimmer-
man 1996]. In a CLOS style before/after metaobject protocol the metaobject can perform 
computations before and after the invocation is delegated to the base-level object for pro-
cessing. Depending on the details of the metaobject protocol, a before computation could 
change the arguments of the method invocation and an after computation could change the 
result of the invocation before it is returned to the caller. 
Meta 
Object 
Object J 
Figure 2.4: A metaobject can be conceptualised as an object associated with a base-level 
object that intercepts all operations invoked upon the base-level object. It can perform 
before or after processing and delegate the operation to the real object. Operations might 
be method invocation, state access and so on. It might also include operations performed 
by the object itself such as method execution. 
A useful way of classifying MOPs is based upon when the binding between an object 
and metaobject is implemented. Table 2.4 shows the four main types [Welch & Stroud 
1999a]: compile time, loadtime, runtime and just-in-time compile time. 
The use of reflection and metaobject protocols to implement non-functional properties 
of a system in a clean way has been proposed for sometime [Stroud 1992]. This approach is 
based upon the fact that non-functional properties can be implemented as metaobjects and 
enforced upon base-level objects using a metaobject protocol. Use of metaobject protocob 
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Table 2.4: A major way that implementations of behavioural reflection differ from each 
other is their binding time. Binding times can be classified according to when metaobjects 
are bound to objects [Welch & Stroud 1999a] by the addition of meta-level interceptions 
(MUs) [Zimmerman 1996]. In terms of the Java object lifecycle the possible binding times 
for behavioural reflection (and therefore the last moment at which new bindings can be 
established) are shown in this table 
Binding time Description 
Source code Preprocessor of class source code inserts MUs 
Compile time Metaobject protocol customises the behaviour 
of compiler so that either a runtime metaobject 
protocol is implemented by adding MUs or the 
compiler creates a customised compiled class 
that no longer has an explicit meta level but whose 
structure has been changed so that the 
non-functional concerns are realised at the base level. 
Loadtime Instead of pre-processing class source code 
the compiled representation of class is modified and 
MUs are inserted. This can happen at any point from 
after compilation to the point at which the 
class is loaded for execution. 
Runtime Metaobject protocol exists that allows 
the semantics of the language and therefore the 
interpretation of byte code to be changed at 
runtime. This is done by changing the runtime interpreter. 
lust-in-time compile time Identical to compile time binding 
except that the compilation is from 
some intermediate object code into native 
object code. 
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make reuse of code easier because MOPs provide a clean separation of concerns between 
functional and non-functional features. MOPs allow metaobjects to be developed sepa-
rately from the base-level objects, which are bound to the base level before use. Depending 
upon the type of MOP implementation binding can take place anytime from compile time 
to runtime. The notion here is that non-functional concerns such as persistence and security 
should be implemented once only and reused with different applications to customise their 
behaviour so that it meets non-functional requirements. This represents a flexible separa-
tion of concerns because not every base-level object needs to be bound to a metaobject, 
and not every behaviour of a base-level object requires interception by MUs. There are 
many examples of using MOPs to implement non-functional concerns. For example, atom-
icity [Stroud & Wu 1995], concurrency [Briot, Doi, Honda, Ichisugi, Kodama, Ohsawa, 
Shibayama, Takada, Watanabe & Yonezawa 1990], fault tolerance applications [Fabre et al. 
1995], and middleware services [Kon, Roman, Liu, Mao, Yamane, a & Campbell 2000]. 
Using metaobjects to enforce security involves defining a special type of metaobject that 
implements security enforcement by checking accesses to their base-level object. Essen-
tially, the metaobject plays the role of a PEP in relation to a base-level object by enforcing 
access checks upon accesses to the base-level object. Using a metaobject to implement 
security policy enforcement permits the enforcement to be applied to an existing object 
without requiring any co-operation by the object implementer. Late binding allows en-
forcement of security policy upon compiled applications (see Table 2.4 for a description of 
possible binding times). Implementation of enforcement code at the meta level allow~ the 
enforcement codes to be reused by requiring co-operation from the target applications. 
There are similarities between an IRM approach and using MOPs for security enforce-
ment. Both provide a clean separation between enforcement and application functionality 
that allows each to be varied independently of the other. Both mechanisms allow security 
enforcement to only be applied where needed. This means that you do not pay a per-
formance hit for enforcement that you don't need. This is because with a code rewriting 
mechanism the code can be selectively injected into the application at the interface to the 
protected code. With a metaobject protocol, the behaviour of the application can be varied 
incrementally rather than as a whole. Finally, as for IRM, the principle of complete medi-
ation of events relevant to the security policy by enforcement code must be satisfied. For 
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MOPs, this means that the binding between the base level and meta level should not tie 
able to be bypassed or removed. In addition, metaobjects containing the enforcement code 
should not be able to be tampered with at runtime. 
Unlike IRM techniques MOPs are a general purpose software engineering technique. 
sufficiently general to address multiple concerns within the same framework and capable 
of allowing existing applications to be integrated with existing security architectures. IRM 
techniques focus upon enforcing access control policies and implementing their own secu-
rity architecture. 
A security architecture based upon behavioural reflection and metaobjects. where en-
forcement is implemented in terms of changes to application behaviour, allows not only 
enforcement of security but also other concerns as the model for change is not targeted 
towards a particular concern. This is because the scope of what can be changed using the 
metaobject protocol is determined by what abstractions exist rather than the range of fore-
seen changes. The implementation of concerns is then specified in terms of the general lan-
guage abstractions rather than abstractions relating to the concern itself. This implies that 
a wider range of concerns can be implemented using the metaobject protocol than simply 
security. The general idea is that differing concerns are implemented as different metaob-
jects and these can be combined together at the meta level to implement different concerns. 
For example, the Friends reflective architecture for fault-tolerant distributed systems can 
implement not only network security but also distribution and fault tolerance [Fabre et al. 
1995]. 
2.6.1 Examples 
Examples of the application of metaobject protocols to enforcing access control policies 
fall into one of two categories: (1) Those that enforce access control policies upon objects; 
(2) Those that enforce access control policies upon distributed objects. 
The scope of this survey has been deliberately restricted to metaobject protocols that 
have been used to engineer security. This is because we were interested in those implemen-
tations of metaobject protocols that had considered at least some of our criteria. This rule" 
out reviewing MOPs such as Iguana/J [Redmond & Cahill 2002] because they have been 
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designed for a different application area or not been explored with security in mind. 
Access to Objects 
There are three examples of access control enforcement upon local applications using 
MOPs: Metaobjects for Access Control [Riechmann & Hauck 1997, Riechmann & Hauck 
1998], Guarana [Oliva & Buzato 1999] and Simple Secure MOP [Caromel & Vayssiere 
2001, Caromel et al. 2001, Caromel & Vayssiere 2003]. 
Metaobjects for Access Control [Riechmann & Hauck 1997, Riechmann & Hauck 
1998] defines security metaobjects (SMOs) that are used to implement a capability-based 
security architecture. In this security architecture, capabilities are references to objects. 
Security metaobjects are bound to these references and add behaviour such as controls on 
the delegation of capabilities, etc. Here, the security architecture is implemented by using 
a metaobject protocol provided by the MetaXa [Golm & Kleinoder 1999] reflective virtual 
machine. The metaobject is invoked whenever the base-level reference is passed as a return 
value, or a method is invoked using the reference. It can decide whether access is permit-
ted, depending on the parameters of the invocation or the principal making the invocation. 
Principals are attached to domains of objects rather than arising out of authentication of 
subjects or association with threads. The binding between references and metaobjects is 
established at runtime using an interface to the metaobject protocol, and the association 
between objects and domains is similarly achieved. The protection of the metaobject, and 
the binding between instance and metaobject instance depends on the implementation of 
the MetaXa virtual machine. The main drawback of this mechanism is that a non-standard 
virtual machine is required. 
Like MetaXa, Guarana [Oliva & Buzato 1999] is a modified Java VM that includes fea-
tures that enable runtime binding of metaobjects to objects. Although there are no examples 
of using Guarana to implement enforcement of security policies, it has been designed with 
enforcement in mind. In particular, it addresses the problem of a base-level object being 
able to interfere with the correct execution of a meta-level object and thereby avoids hav-
ing its requests mediated according to the current security policy. First, the identities of 
metaobjects bound to an object are hidden from the base-level object and other meta-l eye I 
objects. This prevents direct tampering. Second, although Guarana supports rebinding at 
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runtime this can be controlled by the metaobject itself rather than the base level. There-
fore, once the metaobject has been bound to the base-level object it cannot be arbitraril) 
removed. 
The Simple Secure MOP [Caromel & Vayssiere 2001, Caromel et al. 2001. Caromel 
& Vayssiere 2003] is a loadtime MOP implemented using code rewriting techniques. It 
allows the Java security architecture to be used to implement enforcement of access con-
trol policies. It takes special steps, the saving of AccessController context, to ensure that 
metaobjects do not need to be granted an application permission in order to check that is 
held by the application objects. Recent work [Caromel & Vayssiere 2003] has extended this 
to providing a security framework for controlling the accesses the meta level may make to 
the base level. The use of code rewriting allows the MOP to enforce access control poli-
cies upon compiled code without sacrificing portability. However, the Simple Secure MOP 
cannot enforce access controls upon the use of Java services by user-level code because it 
can only control method execution by inserting MUs into method bodies and this cannot 
be done for the Java core classes that provide the services. 
Access to Distributed Objects 
Friends [Fabre et al. 1995, Killijian et al. 1998, Killijian & Fabre 2000], DSOM [Benantar 
et al. 1996] and mCharm [Ancona et at. 1999, Cazzola 2000] are examples of enforcing 
distributed access control using MOPs. Each mechanism uses one of two ways to imple-
ment distributed access control: (1) Use a MOP to implement distributed access control by 
customising the behaviour of the components implementing remote method invocation im-
plementation. (2) Provide a MOP for remote method invocations that hides implementation 
details and allows distributed access control policies to be specified declaratively. 
In the first mechanism, the choice of abstraction level provided by the protocol con-
strains the types of policies that can be enforced. For example, distributed access control 
relies upon authentication of the remote client and this is normally done using some form of 
digital signature. Implementing this requires being able to manipulate messages as if they 
were collections of bytes. This is because a digital signature must be calculated using byte 
values. Furthermore, since the digital signature must travel with the message, the message 
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abstraction must support concatenation so that the result can be added to the messaae be-
e 
fore transmission across the network. This is relatively straightforward in a non type-safe 
language like C++ as you could simply cast a message as an array of bytes. for example in 
the Friends architecture. However, it requires careful choice of abstraction in a type-safe 
language like Java because type safety may prevent manipulating a message as an array of 
bytes. In a type-safe language, the remote method invocation framework might need to be 
modified to provide the necessary access. For example, mCharm uses a replacement for 
the standard Java RMI that provides access to remote method invocations as untyped byte 
codes. 
The second mechanism doesn't expose all the details of the remote method invocation 
implementation. Instead, it provides an interface that allows the security policies to be 
specified declaratively and fixed enforcement code implements them. A reflective security 
architecture that takes this mechanism is DSOM, which is a reflective implementation of 
the CORBA security architecture. DSOM has a per-orb quality of protection object that 
specifies the type of protection for messages and access control policies to use when per-
forming remote method invocations. 
The choice of approach depends on the desired flexibility. The first mechanism allows 
arbitrary policies to be implemented but requires more skill on the part of the programmer. 
The second mechanism is easier to use but only offers a fixed set of policies because the 
programmer cannot write a metaobject that can directly manipulate messages. In particular 
it is not suitable when using MOPs as a technique to use an existing security architecture. 
2.6.2 Evaluation 
Metaobject protocols provide least privilege although existing MOPs tend to address either 
access control for objects or distributed objects rather than both. Complete mediation has 
been discussed in relation to compile-time and runtime MOPs but not for loadtime MOPs. 
None of the CUtTent implementations provide mediation of both accesses to local and dis-
tributed objects. Loadtime MOPs provide a better economy of mechanism than other types 
of MOPs. A clean separation of concerns is central to the idea of a MOP but has not been 
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demonstrated with real-world, third-party applications. Table 2.5 summarises the e\alua-
tion of the applications of metaobject protocol techniques surveyed in this section. 
The Simple Secure MOP for Java is the only example of a MOP that can be used 
to enforce access control policies upon compiled code without running into the problem 
of economy of mechanism faced by runtime MOPs. It differs from the loadtime MOP 
developed in this thesis because it is a deliberately simple MOP designed to explore issues 
of least privilege in regard to metaobjects. The Simple Security MOP for Java approach 
has not been applied to the problem of enforcing access control policies upon resources 
provided by libraries or distributed resources and doesn't explore the issues of complete 
mediation or economy of mechanism. 
Table 2.5: Evaluation of MOP techniques. 
Technique Description Separation Least Complete Economy 
of Privilege Mediation of 
Concerns Mechanism 
Compile-time MOP Metaobjects enforce Good Fine Examples of Includes 
policy at runtime control over compiler 
and bind to base distributed and MOP 
level at compile objects but implementation 
time. not local. inTCB 
Loadtime MOP Metaobjects enforce Good Fine Examples of Only include,> 
policy at runtime control over MOP 
and bind to base local objects implementation 
level at load but not inTCB 
time. distributed. 
Runtime MOP Metaobjects enforce Good Fine Examples of Includes 
policy at runtime control over runtime 
and bind to base local objects and MOP 
level at runtime but not inTCB 
time. distributed. 
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Separation of Concerns 
Implementing enforcement code within the meta layer should allow for a clean separation 
of concerns. Metaobjects can be designed, implemented and tested separately from the 
objets to which they will be bound. The examples reviewed in this chapter do not address 
how successful or not this approach is when applied to real-world applications. Example 
applications developed to demonstrate the approach suffer from being developed with a 
particular purpose in mind. This is problematic because the problem domains from Chap-
ter I make no assumptions about the structure of the application or component that will be 
subject to the policy. 
Least Privilege 
MOPs provide least privilege although the MOPs reviewed above only provide either access 
control for objects or distributed objects rather than both. At a minimum most MOPs 
provide access control at the level of individual methods. MOPs providing control over 
other aspects of object behaviour allow even finer-grained control. The Simple Security 
MOP takes the discussion of least privilege further than simply the granularity of control 
over access to base-level objects, it considers the privileges granted to base-level and meta-
level objects. The position taken is that meta-level objects should not be granted the same 
privileges because they only need to check privilege rather than use it. 
Complete Mediation 
Only mCharm and Guarana consider the problem of implementing complete mediation. 
Complete mediation is important because otherwise there is no guarantee that the desired 
access control policy can be enforced. This requires non-bypassable binding between the 
base-level object and the meta-level object and preventing the metaobject implementations 
or state being tampered with at runtime. Should the binding be bypassed then accesses 
could escape access control checks and should metaobjects be tampered with then the ac-
cess checks could be removed. The mCharm architecture [Cazzola 2000] argues that if the 
metaobjects are located on separate hosts that are protected then they cannot be tampered 
with. There is no discussion of how the binding to the metaobject is achieved. Because 
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mCharm relies upon a compile-time protocol, which customises the compiler, the binding 
relies upon correct rewriting of source code and the use of mechanisms such as class renam-
ing and language-level visibility (private, protected, etc.) to prevent bypass. No specific 
argument is made about the effectiveness of the binding. Guarana provides complete medi-
ation by preventing access to the meta level by base-level objects. Metaobjccts arc invisible 
to the base level (preventing tampering) and reconfiguration of the binding between meta 
and base levels can be controlled thereby preventing the base level removino the bindino ~ e- e-
between the base and meta level. However, the protection of the binding relies upon correct 
implementation of the Guarana virtual machine. Requiring changes to the VM introduces 
the possibility of error and requires a large trusted computing base. 
Economy of Mechanism 
Regarding economy of mechanism, the type of behavioural reflection used has a direct 
impact upon the size and complexity of the enforcement code. Remembering the argument 
for object code rewriting versus source code rewriting it can be argued that source code and 
compile time binding requires re-implementation of compiler semantics because they both 
deal directly with application source code, a non-trivial task. Similarly, runtime requires 
modification of the execution environment, also a non-trivial task. This implies a relatively 
large and complex enforcement code when compared with code rewriting mechanisms. 
Loadtime MOPs should have a smaller economy of mechanism because, with regard to 
MUs, the compiler does not have to be part of the trusted computing base. Also, it is easier 
to parse compiled code than source code leading to a smaller implementation of the tool 
that realises the MOP. 
2.7 Goals of Thesis 
The previous sections evaluate techniques and implementations of those techniques against 
criteria for aood security enoineerino and a clean separation of concerns. The results of I:> I:> I:> 
the evaluation are summarised in Table 2.6. Only in-lined reference monitors and loadtime 
metaobject protocols meet all the requirements. However, in-lined reference monitors do 
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Table 2.6: Evaluation of security engineering techniques 
Technique Description Separation Least Complete Economy 
of Privilege Mediation of 
Concerns Mechanism 
Operating Fixed placement of Good Coarse Limited control Complex 
systems enforcement code over user-level 
within kernel. code 
Libraries Fixed placement of Good Coarse Limited Language 
enforcement code dependent 
within kernel. 
Manual Place enforcement Poor Fine Complete Language 
insertion as required within dependent 
application. 
Capabilities Treat object Moderate Fine Limited Language 
references as dependent 
capabilities. 
Proxies Place enforcement Moderate Fine Limited Language 
code within dependent 
proxies. 
Inheritance Place enforcement Moderate Fine Complete Language 
within superclass. dependent 
IRMs Policy determines Good Fine Control over Good 
in-lining of local objects 
enforcement. code but not 
within compiled distributed 
code. Replaces 
existing security 
architecture. 
Compile-time Metaobjects enforce Good Fine Examples of Includes 
MOPs policy at runtime control over compiler 
and bind to base distributed and MOP 
level at compile objects but impl. 
time. not local inTCB 
Loadtime Metaobjects enforce Good Fine Examples of Only includes 
MOPs policy at runtime control over MOP 
and bind to base local objects impl. 
level at load but not inTCB 
time. distributed 
Runtime Metaobjects enforce Good Fine Examples of Includes 
MOPs policy at runtime control over runtime 
and bind to base local objects and MOP 
level at runtime but impJ. in TCB 
time. not distributed I 
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not meet the requirement to enforce access control policies using existing security archi-
tectures and existing implementations cannot implement distributed access control. On the 
other hand, existing loadtime MOPs have not been demonstrated to meet all of the criteria 
and have not been used to implement distributed access control policies. 
The goals of this thesis are to design and implement a loadtime MOP for Java that can 
be used to enforce both types of access control policy, enforce access control policies upon 
resources provided by applications or libraries while explicitly addressing the problem of 
complete mediation. The specific goals are to: 
1. Implement a MOP that enforces access control policies upon compiled code. 
2. Implement a MOP that controls access to both application, library and operating 
system resources. 
3. Implement a MOP that satisfies the requirements for: 
• Least privilege 
• Complete mediation 
• Economy of mechanism 
• Clean separation of concerns 
4. Demonstrate a clean separation of concerns compared with conventional software 
engineering techniques that still allows reuse of existing security architectures. 
Chapter 3 
Design and Implementation of Kava 
This chapter provides an overview of the design and implementation of Ka\ a. Ka\ a j" a 
metaobject protocol for enforcing acce"" control policies upon compiled code. It j" in-
tended to allow standard Java security features to be used for enforcement -.0 the meta 
level is written using the Java programming language. Thi" allows it to make u-.e of the 
Java language features and existing security architectures when implementing enforcement 
code. 
There are three main sections to this chapter: (I) Section 3. J prmide" an men iew or 
the main elements of the Kava metaobject protocol; (2) Section 3.2 provide" an men jew or 
Kava's implementation; (3) Section 3.3 evaluate" Kava against the goal-. from Section 2.7. 
The following features of Kava specifically addre"" the goals from Section 2.7: 
• Kava's metaobject protocol includes extra metaobject method" to allow metaobjech 
to control access to application, library and operating -.y"tem resource". Thi.., i.., di..,-
cussed in Section 3.1.1. 
• Special care has been taken to include acces"e" that are not represented by method 
invocations to ensure least priyi\ege is provided. This is di"cu..,,,ed in Section 3.1.2. 
• MOPs provide a clean separation of concerns by allowing non-functional concerns tl) 
be modu1arised. Additionally, Ka\a allem s specialisation through parameterisation 
of MUs. This is discussed in Section 3.1 . .5 . 
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• Kava exploits Java's loading and dynamic linking architecture to allow metaobjects 
to bind to classes provided as compiled code. This is discussed in Section 3.2.1. 
• Kava's MOP satisfies the principle of least privilege because all accesses that are 
possible in Java can be controlled by a metaobject bound to a base-level object. This 
has required special care to include the control of static members as discussed in 
Section 3.2.8 . 
• The arguments for complete mediation discussed in Section 2.5.1 have been applied 
to Kava's implementation. However, additional questions particular to MOPs and the 
implementation of Kava must be considered such as binding, the Java reflection API, 
how inheritance is handled and so on. This is discussed in Section 3.2.9. 
3.1 Language Design of Kava 
This section provides an overview of the main elements of the Kava mctaobject proto-
col. The role of metaobjects in the protocol is to allow per-instance changes to the Java 
language model. A meta-level programmer implements the standard Kava metaobject pro-
tocol or subclasses a default metaobject implementation. The metaobject protocol allows 
redefinition of method invocation by an object, method execution, field access, creation of 
new instances of classes by an object and exception raising. 
Each object at the base level may have an associated metaobject. The association be-
tween objects and metaobjects is established at loadtime. This is declaratively specified 
in a special binding specification that specifies the associations between base-level and 
metaobject classes. Kava does not provide any special features for composing metaobjects 
together at the meta level, though it is possible to write meta-level programs using standard 
patterns for object collaboration such as the chain of responsibility pattern [Gamma et al. 
1995]. 
Meta-level interceptions (MUs) cause control to switch from the base level to meta 
level at runtime, the context of the behaviour being brought under control is reified and 
made available to the metaobject. This allows the metaobject to choose a strategy ba,>ed 
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Listing 3.1: I MetaObject Java interface representing the Kava metaobject protocol. 
public interface IMetaObject { 
II behavioural reflection 
public void beforelnvokeMethod (II nvokeContext context); 
public void afterlnvokeMethod (1lnvokeContext context); 
public void beforeExecuteMethod (I ExecuteContext context); 
public void afterExecuteMethod (I ExecuteContext context); 
public void beforePutField (I FieldContext context); 
public void afterPutField (I FieldContext context); 
public void beforeGetField (I FieldContext context); 
public void afterGetField (I FieldContext context); 
public void beforeNewOperator (INewContext context); 
public void afterException (IExceptionContext context); 
II introspection 
public Object getBase (); 
public boolean boundToClass (); 
public String getClassname(); 
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upon the context of the MLI and modify the context if required. For example, changing the 
results of a method invocation or field access. 
Reuse is facilitated in Kava because each MLI may have a meta parameter associated 
with it. This allows specialisation of a metaobject for a new object by modifying the bind-
ing specification and goes beyond the usual notion of specialisation of mctaobjects through 
inheritance. 
3.1.1 Overview 
The Kava metaobject protocol is represented by a Java interface as shown in Listing 3.1. 
Each Java method on the interface represents a base-level behaviour that can be redefined 
by Kava. 
To provide least privilege and complete mediation, all possible accesses to an object 
must be represented. Only controlling callee-side invocation (method execution) i" insuffi-
cient because the Java VM allows direct access to an object"s state and there is a technical 
difficulty in binding metaobjects to Java libraries or services provided to Java applications. 
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Therefore, the Kava MOP includes methods that do not necessarily appear upon a C++ 
MOP or other Java MOPs. 
In addition to methods that allow redefinition of base-level behaviour, others support 
introspection using the java.lang.reflect package. 
The Kava MOP uses the convention that each type of access (or behaviour that rna) be 
changed at the meta level) has a before and after metaobject method. The before metaob-
ject method defines what happens before the base-level behaviour and the after metaobject 
method defines what happens after the base-level behaviour. 
Every Kava metaobject must implement this interface. To ease the programming task 
for a meta-level programmer a default implementation of the interface is provided that im-
plements the introspection methods. Normally, programmers will extend the (MetaObject) 
class and override the before/after methods that correspond to the base-level behaviour that 
they want to modify. Note that each method takes a single argument representing the reified 
base-level context. The context is particular to the type of interception, for example when a 
switch to the meta level takes place upon interception of a field access, the context is rei fled 
as a context object with an lFieldContext. 
Kava metaobjects can invoke any code written in Java because they are themselves writ-
ten in Java. In particular the metaobjects can make use of any existing security architecture 
implemented in Java. 
3.1.2 Kava Metaobject Protocol 
The following sections discuss each type of metaobject method and how they relate to 
enforcement of access control policies. The metaobject methods are: 
• Invoke metaobject methods 
• Execute metaobject methods 
• PutField and GetField metaobject methods 
• New metaobject method 
• Exception metaobject method 
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• Introspection metaobject methods 
Invoke Metaobject Methods 
The metaobject methods beforelnvokeMethodO and afterlnvokeMethodO allow a meta-level 
programmer to write code that executes before an invocation takes place and after an invo-
cation has taken place, and the result of the invocation is about to be returned to the caller. 
This allows policies to be imposed that change the arguments being used in an invocation, 
control whether a method can be invoked, change the result of an invocation or prevent an 
invocation from taking place. 
Invoke and execute metaobject methods are duals of each other; invoke methods im-
pose constraints upon which methods a base-level object may invoke, and execute methods 
impose constraints upon which methods belonging to the base-level object may be invoked 
by other objects. In theory, either could be used in place of the other. Enforcing controls 
over what methods may be invoked by others is more straightforward because its imple-
mentation simply requires no more than the transformation of the method being invoked, 
rather than all possible methods performing this action. However, the requirement for an 
invoke metaobject method arises because it is impossible in Java to intercept the loading of 
some classes and transform them. The reasons for this are discussed in Section 3.2.1. 
Execute Metaobject Methods 
The metaobject methods beforeExecuteMethodO and afterExecuteMethod) allow a meta-
level programmer to write code that executes before and after a method body is executed. 
It allows implementation of policies, which are similar to the invoke methods, but enforces 
them on the object being invoked rather than the object making the invocation. This method 
implements the same functionality as the invoke metaobject methods in reflective languages 
such as OpenC++ [Chiba & Masuda 1993]. Note that a constructor of an object is an 
ordinary method, so this method can be used to redefine object initialisation. 
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PutField and GetField Metaobject Methods 
Some access control policies require control over access to the state of the target object. 
For example, a Bell-LaPadula [Bell & LaPadula 1976] style policy may require that the 
label associated with an object is changed, depending upon the clearance of the subject 
associated with an update of an object's state. 
The metaobject methods beforePutFieldO and afterPutFieldO allow code to be executed 
before and after fields are updated. For example, the code can be used to update the labels 
associated with objects when their state is changed. The metaobject methods beforeGet-
FieldO and afterGetFieldO allow code to be executed before and after fields are read. 
Note that the fields that are the target of these methods do not necessarily belong to the 
object that is bound to the metaobject defining PutField or GetField. This is an artefact of 
the Kava implementation. There is no way to intercept state update other than wrapping the 
byte code instructions for PutField or GetField. Subject to the visibility of the target field 
(public, protected, package or private), any object can access the state of another object 
without invoking an accessor method belonging to the target object's interface. Therefore 
to implement least privilege and complete mediation, the metaobject protocol must allow 
these operations to be redefined at the meta level. The metaobject can redefine how the 
object to which it is bound accesses other object's state. 
New Metaobject Method 
As mentioned above, the execution of a constructor can be intercepted and redefined at the 
meta level by redefining the execute metaobject method. This is useful when adding extra 
initialisation steps to a base-level object or initialising a metaobject. However, it may be 
impossible to do this if the object is implemented as system-level code or the allocation of 
space for the new object might itself represent a violation of an access policy. 
Alternatively, another approach might be to specify the constructor of the target ob-
ject's class when binding a metaobject that redefines the invoke metaobject method. The 
problem is that the byte code for creating a new instance is different from simply invok-
ing a constructor. The Java VM will create a new instance of an object and then calls its 
constructor. This could result in static code being executed and this code might subvert the 
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access control policy. 
Therefore, the Kava MOP goes beyond controlling execution and invocation. It allows 
requests for new instances of objects to be intercepted and redefined. This is done by im-
plementing the beforeNewOperatorO metaobject method. which allows code to be executed 
before a new instance of an object is created. The metaobject redefining the creation of new 
instances is bound to any object attempting to create one of the target objects. 
Exception Metaobject Method 
The Kava MOP allows exception raising to be redefined because not including exception 
raising as a redefinable behaviour would introduce a covert channel. Otherwise, the de-
veloper of an object that will be have its behaviour constrained by the Kava MOP could 
bypass the MOP simply by raising exceptions and using them to return results to a client. 
Kava allows exception raising to be intercepted at runtime but only permits changes to 
the raised exception rather than allowing exception raising to be suppressed. This is be-
cause programmer's develop their programs with a termination model in mind and Kava 
should not confound programmer's expectations. This is why, in Kava, only an afterEx-
ception metaobject method is provided. This allows additional behaviour to occur when an 
exception is raised and the exception instance to be substituted by another that is a subtype 
of the original instance. 
Introspection Metaobject Methods 
In order to implement an access control policy, a metaobject may need to introspect upon 
the state of the object to which it is bound. For example, in a health record context where 
access decisions must take into account the age of the patient recorded within the record 
itself. 
The three introspection methods are designed to support these operations and default 
implementations for these methods are provided in Kava. They do not provide the intro-
spection capability themselves, but provide the information needed to use the java.lang.reflect 
package for introspection. 
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As a metaobject can be bound either to a class (to support static members. see Sec-
tion 3.2.8) or an instance of a class there needs to be a means of detecting the fact. A 
metaobject can determine what it is bound to by invoking boundToClassO. Either true \\ ill 
be returned, indicating that it is bound to a class, or false will be returned. indicating that it 
is bound to an instance of a class. 
A metaobject bound to an object can obtain a reference to the object that it is bound 
to by invoking getBaseO. The metaobject can then use the java.lang.reflect package to 
introspect upon the state of the instance. A metaobject bound to a class can get the name 
of the class by invoking getClassnameO. As for the case of being bound to an instance. the 
java.lang.reflect package can be used to introspect upon the state of the class. Note that in 
Java, classes can define static members that maintain per-class state. 
To support complete mediation, metaobjects are hidden from the base level to prevent 
tampering (see Section 3.2.9) although meta-level programmers can implement their own 
mechanism if they wish. For example, a registry class can be used for metaobjects to 
register themselves with when initialised. Base-level objects could lookup their associated 
metaobject by using their own object pointer as a key. The important point. however. is by 
default, Kava does not expose the meta level that is enforcing security policies. 
3.1.3 Context Parameters 
All base-level behaviours have a context that must be accessible for the implementation of 
access control policies. Depending upon the base-level behaviour being redefined. the con-
text's content will vary. Kava uses the concept of Context objects to simplify the metaobject 
protocol, which allows the possibility of lazy reification [Masuhara, Matsuoka, Watanabe 
& Yonezawa 1992]. In Kava there is a partial implementation of lazy reification in that run-
time instances of java.lang.reflect.Method, java.lang.Class or java.lang.reflect.Field are only 
created on demand. This is achieved by reifying only the minimum information needed to 
derive them at runtime. Ideally, even this minimal information would have its reification 
deferred until the meta-level program actually needs to access them but because the Java 
language does not provide direct access to a thread's stack, the current implementation of 
Kava cannot do this. 
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K ava differs from other Java MOPs that simpl repre ent conte t e pli ill) in the 
metaobject methods. For example, Javassist [Chiba 2000] reifie the conte t of interc pt-
ing field accesse as the field name and value being et or read . Th i \\a e\pl red in 
Dalang [Welch & Stroud I 999a], a predecessor of Ka a, but it led to t\i 0 pr blem, . Fir. t. 
it lead to method interfaces that were unwie ldy becau 'e of the number of c nle 1 param-
eters. Second, i t meant that it would be more difficult to implement laz rein ati n if lhe 
parameters were ordinary Java classes such a Object or String, becau e th re is n \\'a 
to redefine their implementation. B y providing a generic Context object il i~ P . ~ib l e to 
provide implementations that can take advantage of Ja a YM , UPP0rl for laz r ificati n. 
Each metaobject protoco l method i pa ed an in lance f a Context obj Cl and a 
it using the appropriate interface (see Figure 3. 1 to see the hierarch ). F r e ample, Li~l ­
ing 3.2 shows the interface IFieldContext that pro ide acce . to the reified conte t of a 
fie ld operation (e i ther a get or a put fie ld operati on). A meta-level programm r u~ ~ th 
IFieldContext interface to acce s the reifi ed contex t of a field operation. Sthe i~ ab le t lnd 
out the name of the fie ld (getFieldName()) , the type of the fie ld (getFieldType() ), the va lu 
either being returned from the field acce , or the value that i being \I rill n 1 the field 
(getFieldValue()) and is able to change the va lue that i ' either being returned I' b ing u~ed 
to set the field va lue (setFieldValue()). 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
cc interface » 
lExecuteContext 
7- \ 
\ 
\ 
" interface » 
fTllrgetContext 
cc Inte rface » 
IExceptlonContext 
)::,1 
/ 
/ 
!> \l "'-
\ "'-
\ " 
«interface » «interface » 
RnvokeContext lNewContext 
,--' --"'--" ---, 
«interface " 
Wit: IdC onte x t 
Figure 3. 1: Context hierarchy. All contexts implement lContext. 
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Listing 3.2: IFieldContext interface. 
public interface IFieldContext extends ITargetContext 
public String getFieldName (); 
public Type getFieldType (); 
public Object getFieldValue (); 
public void setFieldValue (Object 0); 
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As the metaobject protocol works with a uniform model of objects, primitive types are 
not used for methods that introspect upon values or allow the setting of values. Instead, if 
the field is one that has a primitive value type then wrapper classes must be used to coerce 
primitive values into objects and vice-versa. 
Unlike a standard CLOS before/after metaobject protocol [Attardi, Bonini, Boscotre-
case, Flagella & Gaspari 1989], Kava allows some behaviours to be overridden. Base-level 
behaviours can be overridden where the behaviour's reified context object implements the 
method overrideBaseO. For example, the Listing 3.3 shows how method execution can be 
overridden. Kava ensures that if the overrideBaseO method is invoked, the matching after 
metaobject method will not be invoked. 
3.1.4 Binding 
Kava binds metaobjects to objects at loadtime. This allows Kava to be used with compiled 
user-level code, a particular benefit because source code may not always be available to 
meta-level programmers. Additionally, it is actually more straightforward to parse Java 
compiled code than source code and working with compiled code provides a better econ-
omy of mechanism (as discussed in Section 2.5.1). In Java, all code is encapsulated by a 
class. Therefore, to bring all code under the control of policies implemented at the meta 
Listing 3.3: Implementation of a metaobject method that overrides execution of base-level 
methods. 
public void before Execute Method (I ExecuteContext context) { 
context. overrideBase (); 
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level, each class loaded should be bound to a metaobject class. To allow per-instance poli-
cies at runtime, each instance should also be associated with a metaobject class. As Java 
also supports static members and methods, the implementation of Kava for Java also allows 
the binding of a metaobject to a class itself as this allows static methods and field accesses 
to be brought under the control of the meta level. 
Unlike compile-time metaobject protocols, Kava does not allow programmers to anno-
tate source code with binding information. Kava works with compiled code so the binding 
information is supplied separately to the base-level program. The binding specification is 
represented at loadtime by a BaseMetaConfiguration object and a default implementation 
has been provided that parses an XML file located in the local file system. Alternative 
implementations can be used that download specifications from a central server so that an 
organisation's use of meta objects to enforce security could be centrally managed. The DTD 
for the XML binding specification is shown in Listing 3.4. 
The Kava binding specification allows metaobjects to be bound on a per class and per 
behaviour basis. This means that for an object of one class, the invocation behaviour can he 
intercepted and redefined by the metaobject bound to the object, while for another object 
of another class, both the invocation and execution behaviours can be intercepted and rede-
fined. Since only those behaviours that are of interest to the meta level are intercepted, the 
application will perform far better than one where all behaviours are intercepted. This no-
tion of fine-grained binding of metaobjects to objects is inspired by the Iguana metaobject 
protocol [Gowing & Cahill 1996] that allows the customisation of metaobject protocols. 
The Kava binding specification is also used to parameterise metaobjects by allowing 
meta parameters to be specified for all behaviours, these are discussed in Section 3.1.5. In 
addition, the specification allows optimisation hints to be passed to Kava (for example, if 
not all the context is required to be reified). 
3.1.5 Meta Parameters 
Each metaobject is an instance of a metaobject class. Inheritance can be used to spe-
cialise metaobjects. In addition, each meta-level interception can be parameterized to al-
low metaobjects to change their tolerances or strategies according to parameters encoded 
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Listing 3.4: DTD for Kava binding specification 
<?xml version=' 1 .0' encoding=' UTF-8'?> 
<!-
OTD for kava binding specifica tion . 
Version O.94a 
-> 
<! ELEMENT binding (class *» 
< ! ELEMENT c I ass (i n t e r c e p t *) > 
<! ATTLIST class classname CDATA #REOUIRED> 
<! ATTLIST class metaclass CDATA #REOUIRED> 
<! ATTLIST class extends CDATA "" > 
<!ELEMENT intercept (execute?, get?, put?, raise?, invoke?, new?» 
<!ELEMENT execute (optimisations?, method?» 
<! ATTLIST execute metaparameter CDATA "" > 
<!ELEMENT get (optimisations?, method?, field ?» 
<! ATTLIST get metaparameter CDATA "" > 
<!ELEMENT put (optimisations?, method?, field ?» 
<! ATTLIST put metaparameter CDATA "" > 
<!ELEMENT raise (optimisations?, method?» 
<!ATTLIST raise metaparameter CDATA ""> 
<!ELEMENT invoke (optimisations? method? targetmethod?» 
<!ATTLIST invoke metaparameter CDATA ""> 
< ! ELEMENT new EMPTY> 
<!ATTLIST new targetclass CDATA #REOUIRED> 
< ! ELEMENT 0 P tim is at ion s EMPTY> 
< ! ATTLIST 0 P tim is a t ion s rei f y (r e if Yin 0 rei f y) "r e i f Y "> 
<!ATTLIST optimisations reflect (reflect I noreflect) "reflect "> 
<!ATTLIST optimisations before (beforelnobefore) "before"> 
<!ATTLIST optimisations after (afterlnoafter) "after"> 
<! ELEMENT method (arguments ?» 
<! ATTLIST method name CDATA "*" > 
<!ELEMENT arguments (type *» 
< ! ELEMENT t Y P e EMPTY> 
<!ATTLIST type name CDATA #IMPLlED> 
< ! ELEMENT fie I d EMPTY> 
<!ATTLIST field class CDATA "*"> 
<!ATTLIST field name CDATA "*"> 
<!ATTLIST field type CDATA #IMPLlED> 
<!ELEMENT targetmethod (arguments?» 
<! ATTLIST targetmethod class CDATA "*"> 
<!ATTLIST targetmethod name CDATA "*"> 
<!ELEMENT metaparameter CDATA "*"> 
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within the binding specification file. Each binding specification includes meta parameters 
that are passed to the metaobject when a meta-level interception takes place. This allows 
easier reuse of metaobjects because a metaobject can implement several different strategies 
and the binding specification can encode which strategy is most appropriate for a particular 
program. For example, it may be necessary to distinguish between methods that update 
the state of an object from those that don't. A metaobject could be implemented that hard-
codes the names of the methods that update the state of an object. Reusing the metaobject 
requires updating its list of methods to include any new methods belonging to the classes 
implementing the program it is going to be reused with. In Kava, parameterisation al-
lows the list of methods to be encoded in a binding specification file that is written for the 
particular program the metaobject is being reused with. At runtime, the parameters are 
passed to the metaobject. This avoids the need to rewrite the metaobject. This notion of 
parameterisation is based upon CodA's [McAffer 1995] approach to parameterisation. 
3.1.6 Meta-Level Cooperation 
Implementing access control policies may require multiple metaobjects with each metaob-
ject addressing a different security concern. Although Kava only allows one metaohject 
to be explicitly bound to each object, Kava does not preclude composing metaohjects to-
gether at the meta level to cooperate in changing the behaviour of a base-level object. 
This is because the chain of responsibility pattern [Gamma et al. 1995] can be used to 
compose metaobjects together at the same meta level to create a complex meta architec-
ture (similar to the approach described in Mulet et al. [Mulet, Malenfant & Cointe 1995], 
or Olivia [Oliva & Buzato 1999]. Another approach uses reflection recursively to build 
a tower of metaobjects (the approach adopted by FRIENDS [Fabre et al. 1995, Fabre & 
Perennou 1996]). The advantage of using chaining is that each metaobject may introspect 
on the base-level object whereas with a metaobject tower, only the base metaobject may 
introspect on the base-level object. In addition, with chaining, the cost of interception and 
reification of method calls is only incurred once, because the metaobject classes involved in 
the tower do not need to have meta-level interceptions added. Perhaps the tower approach 
is appropriate only when moving to a higher level of abstraction such as in the ABCUR 
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[Briot et al. 1990] approach. 
3.1.7 A Misbehaved Applet 
This simple example demonstrates how Kava can be used in practice. The basic scenario 
is that a badly-designed or maliciously-designed applet may crash a host system by con-
suming all its resources by creating an unbounded number of top-level windows. In order 
to protect against this attack, the system should track the number of windows created and 
either block or throw an exception when a predetermined limit is exceeded. The class used 
to generate top-level windows is the Java library class Frame. 
Using Kava, a simple preventative approach is to implement a mechanism limiting the 
creation of new instances of Frame objects. This can be done by creating an implementation 
of a Metaobject that monitors creation of Frame objects. A simplified implementation of 
the metaobject is shown below: 
import kava. *; 
public class ResourceMonitor extends Metaobject 
{ 
public void beforeNewlnvocation (INewContext context) 
{ 
if (context. getTarget () instanceof Frame} 
incrementFrameUsage () ; 
if (exceededMaximumFrame () } 
{ 
throw new 
RuntimeException ("Too~many~frames~created~by~applet" ); 
Kava performs a static analysis of the applet as it is loaded and binds a Resource-
Manager metaobject to any object invoking a new operation and the metaobject method 
beforeNewlnvocation redefines how new instances are created. The process is as follows. 
First, it checks if the target of the invocation is an instance of a Frame class. If this i" 
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the case it cal1s a method incrementUsage that increments a global count of the number 
of instances of that class and its superclasses. To avoid a malicious program subcla~sing 
Frame to avoid being controlled, superclasses are counted as an instance of a subclass of 
a monitored class that might be created. Then it calls a method exceeded Maximum that 
checks if the maximum limit for the number of instances of any monitored class has been 
exceeded. If the limit has been exceeded, a runtime exception is thrown and the execution 
of the applet halts. 
The binding specification defining this binding is shown below: 
<binding> 
<class classname=" *" metaclass=" ResourceMonitor" > 
<new tar get c I ass = " * " / > 
</class> 
</binding> 
3.2 Kava Implementation 
This section provides an overview of the implementation of the Kava metaobject protocol. 
The main elements in the architecture are the application-level class loader used to inter-
cept class loading, the meta-configuration object that parses the binding specification and 
the transformer objects that insert meta-level interceptions according to declarations in the 
binding specification. The main steps are to add metaobject pointers to the base-level class, 
add MUs around blocks of byte codes such as methods and add meta-level interceptions 
around individual byte codes. Choosing where to add the MUs is driven by the binding 
specification. The program being brought under the control of the metaobject protocol 
must be analysed c1ass-by-c1ass and bytecode-by-bytecode to see if any of the declarations 
in the binding specification apply. If they do then the appropriate MU is added. 
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3.2.1 Overview 
Kava i written purely in Java and runs using an unmodified er ion of the Java De\ el p_ 
ment Kit l and uses the BCEL (Byte code Engineeri ng Library) [Dahm 199 1 to reali 'e the 
binding between metaobjects and objects. 
The implementati on of Kava exploits thi . ability to intercept cia s load ing of applicati n 
classes by providing an 0pp0l1unity to instrument cia fi le. before pa ' ing the c l as~ file I 
the Java YM for instanti at ion. Kava wa the fir t implementati on of a meta bje t prol 
for Java that exploit thi s feature [Welch & Stroud 1998b, Welch & lroud 1999 J and 
builds upon existing work on addi ng new fun cti onali ty to ex i ting cia ' es [D 'lhm 199 . 
Keller & Holzle 1998, Czajkowski & von Eicken 1998]. 
1 loadClass() 
: kava ,URLClassloader 
1 transform() 
transform( ) transform() 
1 transform() 
: MelhodTransformer 
Figure 3.2: High-level object coll abo ration di agram how ing object and their inte rac ti o n ~ 
when a class is loaded into the Java YM . 
Figure 3.2 shows the col1 aborations between the main object making up Ka a that re-
ali se the binding. Kavakava i a replacement fo r the java SDK too l ( ee Li ting 3.5). 1L 
is responsible fo r load ing an application' s root clas and implementing the Ka a metaob-
ject protocol before invoking the mainO method of the cIa . CIa 'e are loaded u ' ing the 
'The mos t recent ver ion or JOK used is IA . but 111 0 t of the work de cribed in Lhi s th es i~ Web done u ~i ng 
JOK 1.2, 
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kava.URLClassloader class loader. Because the root class is loaded using the URLClass-
loader, subsequent application-level classes are also loaded using this class loader. 
Listing 3.5: Kavakava replacement for Java. 
public class Kavakava { 
public static void main (String args []) throws Exception 
II parse arguments 
URLClassLoader loader = 
new kava. runtime. URLClassLoader ( ... ) ; 
Class c = loader.loadClass(args[O]); 
II construct arguments 
II construct parameters so and look up the main method 
Class [] parameters = new Class [] { arguments. getClass ()}; 
Method method = c. getMethod ( "main" , parameters); 
try { 
method.invoke(null, new Object[] arguments }); 
catch (1llegalAccessException e) 
System. err. p r in tin (e) ; 
catch (I nvocationTargetException e) 
System. err. println (e); 
At runtime, the binding between metaobjects and objects is represented by a meta-
configuration policy object. All meta-configuration policy objects are instances of classes 
that extend the BaseMetaConfiguration class. Each policy implementation can determine 
the bindings in different ways. For example, in Figure 3.2 the JDOMMetaConfigHandler 
object is an instance of a class that extends BaseMetaConfiguration and determines the 
metaobject and object bindings by parsing an XML binding specification resident on the 
local file system. As an alternative to loading the binding specification from the local file 
system, an implementation of BaseMetaConfiguration might fetch the binding specification 
from a remote server and verify it using a digital signature. The meta-configuration object 
determines how to modify the class by parsing the binding specification and will invoke 
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the AddMetaObject transformer to add the fields and methods necessary to bind an object 
to a metaobject. It then inserts hooks into method bodies (using MethodTransformer) and 
around individual instructions (using InstructionTransformer). These hooks switch control 
from the base level to the meta level (the associated metaobject) when the base-Ie\el ob-
jects carry out certain behaviours. Finally, after rewriting the class to include these traps, 
the class loader passes an internal representation of the class to the Java VM's byte code 
verifier. The significance of this is rewritten classes that must still honour rules such as type 
safety. 
3.2.2 Intercepting Class Loading 
Kava can intercept class loading because Java allows redefinition of class loading. Class 
loaders support dynamic loading of classes on the Java platform [Liang & Bracha 1998]. 
Classes are distributed as binary representations known as class files. Class files do not need 
to be real files. A class file may be stored in a database, memory or downloaded across a 
network. The Java VM uses class loaders to load class files and create class objects. Class 
loaders are ordinary objects that can be defined in Java code. Every class loader is an 
instance of the class Classloader. The Classloader class provides a loadClass(String name) 
method that loads a specified class into the Java VM. This involves reading the byte stream 
representing the compiled class and passing it to a Java native method (defineClass) that 
instantiates the class within the Java VM itself. 
A primordial class loader used to bootstrap class loading and load all Java core sy"-
tern libraries is implemented within the Java VM. The application-level class loaders are 
implemented by extending the Classloader class and overriding 10adClassO with an imple-
mentation specific method for loading classes. Should a class loader not be able to locate a 
named class, it delegates the class loading to its parent class loader. Application-level c1a~s 
loaders cannot override the loading of Java's system libraries because this would allow an 
attacker to substitute an untrustworthy class for a system class such as java.lang.Object or 
java.lang.String. 
Having to call loadClass explicitly to load classes would make programming difficult, 
so Java provides a way to implicitly invoke 10adClass upon an appropriate class loader. 
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For example, an application class referred to within a class loaded by an application-level 
class loader X will be implicitly loaded by X without requiring an explicit invocation of 
10adClass. 
Kava provides a class loader based upon the Java URLClassLoader class for loadino and 
~ 
rewriting application classes. This class overrides the default loadClass method and dele-
gates the loading of classes across the network or local filesystem to a ne\',' method called 
defineClass. The defineClass method is shown in Listing 3.6. The method has two param-
eters: the name of the class to define and an instance of a Resource as parameters. The 
Resource is a representation of the unloaded class that implements a method for fetching 
the bytes representing the class and a method for getting the security certificates associated 
with the class. This array of bytes is then converted into a JavaClass, which is a BCEL 
representation of an unloaded class that allows manipulation of the class structure. This is 
then passed to a Kava BaseMetaConfiguration class that performs the changes to the class 
necessary to implement the Kava metaobject protocol. The JavaClass returned from this 
method is then converted back to an array of bytes before finally being passed to the Java 
VM with a set of security certificates that are used to authenticate classes. 
3.2.3 Adding Meta-Level Interceptions 
The Kava metaobject protocol is implemented using the technique of byte code rewriting. 
Kava makes use of the Byte Code Engineering Library [Dahm 1998] toolkit to implement 
the standard transformations that add the hooks necessary to switch control from the base 
level to the meta level at runtime. The byte code rewriting toolkit deals with technical 
details such as maintaining relative addressing when new byte codes are inserted into a 
method, or determining the number of arguments a method supports before it has been 
instantiated as part of a class. An earlier version of Kava used the Java Instrumentation 
Object Environment (JOIE) [Cohen & Chase 1998] but this toolkit was discontinued and 
Kava was rewritten to use BCEL. The particular toolkit is unimportant as long as it allows 
instrumentation and deals with updating instructions that use relative addressing when new 
byte codes are introduced. An abstraction layer can be used to hide the dependency upon a 
particular toolkit so that it is easier to change toolkits if required to do so in the future. 
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Listing 3.6: Kava's class loader. 
1* 
* Defines a Class using the class bytes obtained from the specified 
* Resource. The resulting Class must be resolved before it can be 
* used. 
*1 
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private Class defineClass (String name, Resource res) throws IOException ( 
II package validation 
II Now read the class bytes and define the class 
byte [] b = res. getBytes () ; 
ByteArraylnputStream is = new ByteArraylnputStream (b); 
II create a class object 
JavaClass clazz = new ClassParser (is, name). parse (); 
II invoke Kava to rewrite the class to add binding 
JDOMMetaConfiguration. setMetaConfigFile (binding); 
BaseMetaConfiguration metaConfig = 
JDOMMetaConfiguration. getMetaConfiguration (); 
KavaClass kc = metaConfig. transform ( 
new KavaClass (new ClassGen (clazz ))); 
b = kc. getClassGen (). getJavaClass (). getBytes (); 
java.security.cert.Certificate[] certs = res.getCertificates(); 
CodeSource cs = new CodeSource ( uri, ce rts ); 
return defineClass (name, b, 0, b. length, cs); 
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Standard byte code rewritings are used to add hooks for individual methods and indi-
vidual byte code instructions. These hooks reify the context of a behaviour being trapped, 
invoke the metaobject associated with an object and reflect any changes to the context back 
to the base level. The metaobjects invoked are completely separate from the byte code 
hooks and are developed entirely in Java. This separation means that the runtime meta 
level can be adjusted dynamically at runtime although determining which behaviours are 
trapped is determined at loadtime. 
Kava only performs binary compatible byte code rewriting. This ensures that a rewrit-
ten class can still be linked against other classes that it references without requiring recom-
pilation or being rejected by the Java verifier. There are nine possible binary compatible 
changes [Arnold & Gosling 1998]. Kava will implement only two of these. namely: 
1. Re-implementing existing methods, constructors, and initializers by inserting MUs. 
2. Adding new fields, methods, or constructors to an existing class or interface to bind 
metaobjects to objects. 
Like compile-time reflection Kava reflects upon the structure of the code in order to 
implement reflection. However, Kava works at a level much closer to the Java machine 
than most compile-time approaches that deal with the higher-level language. Although this 
means it is impossible to extend the syntax of the higher-level language. it does mean that 
Kava can implement some kinds of reflection more easily than in a traditional compile-time 
MOP. For example, in the application of OpenC++ version 2 adding fault tolerance in the 
form of checkpointing CORBA applications [Killijian et al. 1998], data flow analysis is 
performed on the source code to determine when the state of the object is updated. With 
Kava no such analysis is necessary; all that is required is to intercept the update of state of 
an object by changing the behaviour of the update field operation in the Java runtime object 
model. When an update has been completed a "dirty" flag is set indicating that the current 
state should be checkpointed. 
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3.2.4 Realising MLls 
The following sections discuss the different types of transformation Ka\"a uses to realise 
MUs. 
Adding Metaobject Pointers 
The first transformation adds the metaobject pointers required for the metaobject bound 
to each object and the metaobject bound to the class. A static private field is added that 
points to an instance of a metaobject responsible for overriding class-based behaviour and 
a private field that points to a per-instance metaobject is added. In addition, the get$MetaO 
method that is used to support Kava's approach to integrating with the Java inheritance 
model is added. The role of this method is discussed in more detail in Section 3.2.9. 
Wrapping Blocks of Byte Code 
The second transformation makes use of the structure of a class file to identify blocks of 
byte code representing class methods, initialization methods, and finalization methods and 
then adds wrappers around them. This allows the method execution and exception raising 
to be intercepted and control handed to a meta layer. Method execution is simpler than 
exception raising to reify. Method execution requires only the insertion of hooks at the 
entry and exit points of a method whereas exception raising requires a try ... catch clause 
to be synthesised for the entire method. 
In order to safely insert new byte code instructions into a class, some difficult technical 
issues must be solved. For example, how to handle the effects of inserting instructions on 
branch instructions and on the exception table. Fortunately, the BeEL framework takes 
care of these low-level issues. 
Wrapping Individual Byte Codes 
The third transformation is applied to byte code instructions such as those dealing with 
invocation and access to state. Here fine-grained wrappers are applied around indi\'idual 
instructions. This allows the MU to intercept base-level behaviour when the class itself 
makes an invocation, accesses state or creates a new instance of a class. The ability to 
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use a byte code rewriting toolkit to insert code into method bodies makes these types of 
interceptions possible. Other Java MOPS, for example Reflective Java [Wu & Schwiderski 
1997] that rely upon proxying method bodies, could not provide control over operations 
such as field access or new invocations. 
3.2.5 Static Analysis 
As a class is loaded by Kava it is analysed to determine if a metaobject should be bound to 
its instances and whether any of its behaviours should be brought under the control of the 
metaobject by inserting MUs. The binding specification is used to determine the answer 
to these questions. Whether a binding should be established is determined by the top-level 
binding declaration and specifies, for a Java class or classes, which metaobject is bound to 
that class' instance. The binding specification also specifies which base-level behaviours 
should be brought under the control of the metaobject. Each class method and byte code is 
inspected to see if it implements any of the specified behaviours. For example. a PUTFIELD 
instruction's target class and field name is tested against a <putfield> declaration to check 
that it refers to the same class and field. 
Where a declaration uses a type to specify whether a behaviour should be brought 
under the control of meta level, for example the type of the class defining a field. the 
instanceof operator is used to determine if the target is the type itself or a subclass. Here, 
Kava is required to determine the inheritance relationship between classes before they are 
loaded into the Java VM to ensure that classes are instrumented before they are made 
immutable. The current version of Kava requires this information to be encoded in the 
binding specification but a better approach would be to use static analysis to determine the 
relationship between classes before loading (assuming that all classes are available or can 
be retrieved at runtime). This is discussed again in Section 3.2.9. 
Where a declaration uses a simple name, for example the name of a field, syntactic 
matching is used. Here, names may match, or if a wildcard has been used in the declaration, 
then any name may be deemed to match the declaration. 
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3.2.6 Instantiating Metaobjects 
Normally this is achieved by adding two fields: a static private field that points to an in-
stance of a metaobject that is responsible for overriding class-based behaviour, and a private 
field that points to a per-instance metaobject. In addition, an accessor method is added that 
uses a naming convention normally disallowed by the Java compiler. 
3.2.7 Reification 
The state of a base-level object is available to a metaobject via the standard Java features for 
introspection provided by the java.lang.reflect package. This is accessible to the metaobject 
because Kava is implemented in the Java language, making it a meta circular reflective lan-
guage [Cointe 1987] ensuring that all the features of the base-level language are available 
to the meta level. All that is required is access to a pointer to the base-level object and 
standard Java introspection can then be used to access the state of a base-level object or 
invoke its method. This is not passed with each MLI, however, instead the Kava metaob-
ject protocol provides methods for metaobjects to discover the identity of their base-level 
object. 
Beyond the state of the base-level object, there are five types of reified context associ-
ated with the switch to the meta level. The context is available to the metaobject at runtime 
and can be changed by the metaobject. On return to the base level, the changes to the 
context are reflected in changes to the base-level state. The types of context are: 
1. The Invoke context reifies the target object, the method name, arguments and return 
value associated with a method invocation. 
2. The Execute context reifies the method name, arguments and return value associated 
with a method execution. 
3. The PutField and GetField context reifies the field name and values associated with a 
field access. 
4. The Raise context reifies the exception being raised. 
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5. The New context reifies the name of the target class and arguments associated with 
the creation of a new instance. 
There is only one implementation of Context. This results from an optimisation choice. 
At the start of each method, a new Context object is allocated. It is then reused for different 
types of MUs to avoid the cost of object initialization (an expensive operation that should 
be minimised[Roulo 1998]). There is a context object created for each method so that multi 
threading can be supported. An alternative (and possibly more efficient) way is to use the 
per-thread variables that are now available in Java. 
The metaobject protocol reifies each element of context as a java.lang.Object. The proh-
lem is that Java also supports primitive data types such as int, byte, etc. As these primitive 
types are not objects, extra work must be done to allow them to be reified as objects. In 
the initial prototypes, this was done by inserting byte code instructions that wrapped them 
using the Java wrapper classes such as Integer, Short etc. This adds considerable over-
head that is not justified if the meta-level program never uses the reified arguments. To 
reduce the overhead, these primitive types are reified using the ContextBuilder helper class. 
This allows them to be stored as primitive types that are not wrapped unless the meta-level 
programmer actually uses a Context object interface to access the argument. 
3.2.8 Static Members 
Java supports static members in addition to per-instance members. Therefore, to ensure 
least privilege and complete mediation, the implementation of Kava had to take account of 
static methods and fields. 
Since the context of behaviours involving static members is different from those involv-
ing instances, an approach is to provide a different metaobject protocol when dealing with 
static members. In addition, there is the question of whether a metaobject or a metaobject 
class with static methods should be bound to a class with static members. This also leads 
to a different metaobject protocol that has an interface made up of static methods. 
One of the aims of Kava is to provide a uniform metaobject protocol, and developing 
a separate metaobject protocol to deal with static members complicates this. Instead, the 
same metaobject protocol is used in all cases. This has the following impact upon the 
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design: 
v ... 
0_ 
• Some context types reify a target reference, static members d\! not ha\e taraeh "0 the 
eo 
convention adopted uses a default value of null where there i .... no target reference . 
• Each class (which is an object in Java) ha .... a metaobject bound to it in the same wa} 
that an instance of the class would have a metaobject bound to it. 8:- changing the 
implementation of the metaobject, the behaviour of the cla ........ e ..... static memhers can 
be changed. 
3.2.9 Implementing Complete Mediation 
The argument for Kava providing complete mediation is pre .... ented in the following .... ec-
tions. The argument is based upon the following assumptions: 
Trusted computing base The Java Runtime Em'ironment, the Kava implementation, the 
enforcement metaobjects, the binding specification and the Java acce ....... control poli-
cies are trusted. 
Ensuring Kava is always invoked Kava always has acces .... to cla ........ e .... heing loaded in the 
Java YM so it can add MUs as required. 
Enforcement mechanism is protected Attackers cannot tamper with \ILb or metaoh-
jects. 
Inheritance is accounted for by Kava Attacker .... cannot confuse Kava· .... static analy-.i-. by 
subc1assing protected objects. 
Each of these assumptions is justified in the following: section ..... 
Trusted Computing Base 
Kava assumes that the Java Runtime Environment (\\hich includes the Java .... ystem cla .... "e". 
the Java YM and Ja\Cl byte code verifier), the Kma implementation itself. the metaobject" 
encapsulating the permission checks, the binding specifications, and the Ja\'a acee"" control 
policy files, can only be correct. 
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The current implementation protects metaobjects against tampering by using a com-
bination of permissions and code-signing techniques. All metaobjects are packaged into 
JAR files that are signed by the security developer using his or her private key, which is 
associated with a X.509 certificate. The certificate must be distributed via a trusted chan-
nel to the destination system. The metaobject class has a check in its class initializer that 
the current thread holds a KavaPermission permission named "initialiseMetaobjectClass". 
This requires the base-level program code and the metaobjects to have been granted this 
permission in the host's Java access control policy file. The entry in this file for the metaob-
jects should grant the "initialiseMetaobjectClass" permission on the basis of the identity of 
the signer of the JAR file they are contained within. If the JAR file has been corrupted, or 
if the metaobjects are actually provided by another provider then the permission will not 
hold. The permission is checked when the metaobject class is loaded and initialised. 
The Java Runtime Environment, the Kava implementation, the binding specifications 
and Java access control policy files are assumed to be protected using operating-system 
level protection such as ACLs on files. This at least matches the current situation with the 
Java security architecture and future work might consider using cryptographic signatures 
to protect the Kava implementation and the binding specifications. 
Ensuring Kava is Always Invoked 
Kava needs control of class loading in order to rewrite classes at loadtime. However, if a 
class loader is loaded at runtime it may be possible to use it to bypass Kava's class loader. 
Fortunately it is possible to use Kava's metaobject protocol in order to avoid this problem. 
The general idea is to use a metaobject to intercept the act of class definition and ensure 
that Kava is invoked before class definition takes place. This raises two issues: dealing 
with application-level class loaders, and Java system library class loaders. 
The first type is an application-level class loader. All application class loaders must 
call the native method defineClass and pass it a byte code array that represents the class to 
be instantiated within the Java VM. A special metaobject that is bound to the invocation 
of this method by any class loader can be used to prevent the bypassing of the Kava class 
loader. This metaobject simply applies Kava to the byte code and returns the transformed 
byte code to the base level where the class loader passes it to the Java VM for instantiation. 
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This means that any application-level class loader can be transformed into a class loader 
that brings classes under the control of Kava. 
The second type is a system class loader such as an URLClassloader. Since Kava cannot 
rewrite system classes, this would seem to be a problem. However, a metaobject can be 
bound to any invocation of a method on a system class loader. This can redirect such 
method calls to a Kava version of the system class loader that actually does the job of 
fetching the bytes and instantiating them as a class. When the malicious program calls 
getClass, the method is not invoked on the system class loader but is dispatched by the 
metaobject to a Kava version of getClassO that ensures the correct rewritings are applied. 
Another benefit of using Kava recursively to bring all class loading under its control 
is that this prevents malicious use of a byte code rewriting tool to remove Kava's hooks. 
As Kava intercepts all calls to defineClass, it will always be the last tool to add byte code 
before the class is instantiated. This means that even if another byte code rewriting tool 
inserts its own byte code, these cannot have any effect on the hooks that Kava inserts. Note 
that (as guaranteed by the Java platform) we assume that there is no way at runtime to inject 
byte code into a loaded class. 
An unresolved issue are native methods. Java permits native code to be invoked directly 
by classes and this code bypasses all Java security controls. Currently, Kava does not 
provide any control over these although a metaobject approach might be used to detect the 
use of native methods and halt execution if these are used. 
Protecting the Enforcement Mechanism 
As highlighted by Erlingsson and Schneider [Erlingsson & Schneider 2000, Ulfar Erlings-
son & Schneider 2000] in their work on in-lined reference monitors, complete mediation 
requires protection of the integrity of the mechanism enforcing the policy. In the context of 
metaobjects and metaobject protocols, this means that the integrity of binding between the 
metaobject and base-level object must be protected, and pointers to the metaobject bound 
to a base-level object must be unavailable to base-level objects to prevent subversion of 
the enforcement mechanism. Otherwise a program might remove the bindings at runtime, 
and either branch past the meta-level interceptions implementing the bindings, or tamper 
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with the metaobject by invoking its methods or replacing it with a null metaobject. En-
suring non-bypassability, but not preventing an enforcement metaobject to be switched for 
a metaobject that always grants access, means that access control policy enforcement will 
not take place. 
Erlingsson and Schneider protect the integrity of their enforcement mechanism in two 
ways [Erlingsson & Schneider 2000, Vlfar Erlingsson & Schneider 2000]. First. they use 
a base-level language that prevents code from being treated as data and enforces an en-
capsulation boundary preventing arbitrary branching. Preventing code from being treated 
as data ensures that the program containing the in-lined reference monitor cannot remove 
the enforcement code at runtime by dynamically rewriting parts of the program. Prevent-
ing arbitrary branching ensures that the program cannot simply branch around enforcement 
code. Second, access to the enforcement mechanism is prevented by choosing names and 
types for interception code that are invisible to the base-level code. This can be achieved 
by choosing names that either are not in the base-level program's namespace and/or using 
names that are illegal in source code but legal in object code. 
Kava applies these techniques to the implementation of meta-level interceptions (MUs). 
MUs are in-lined into the target class, these must be non-bypassable and the base-level ap-
plication must not be able to tamper with the metaobject invoked by the MUs. First, Java 
was chosen as the base-level language because it offers several low-level security guaran-
tees such as lack of pointer arithmetic and type safety [Yellin 1996]. The lack of pointer 
arithmetic prevents code being accessed as data, and type-safety prevents arbitrary jumps 
to instructions. Furthermore, because MUs are inserted after compilation and cannot be 
removed at runtime, any attempts to write programs branching within a method in order to 
avoid MUs implementing either invoke or field behaviours, will be defeated because Kava 
will locate all the places MUs need to be inserted and adjust branches so that they branch 
to the MUs before the target instruction. Second, base-level access to the metaobject is 
prevented through namespace control. When the base-level program is written, the field 
names for the metaobject pointers are not in the program's namespace. This means that 
no compiler can compile code that tries to use these names as they are not defined yet. In 
addition, the field names contain the $ character and this character is not allowed to be used 
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in Java source code (although it is valid at the byte code level). However. Java doe~ pro-
vide the ability to introspect upon classes. This makes it possible to access a field \\ ithout 
requiring the field's name, for example the list of fields associated with an instance can be 
obtained as an array of fields and code can iterate through the array looking for one of type 
IMetaObject. Therefore we assume that the use of java.lang.reflect package must be pre-
vented or controlled to avoid introspection being used to dynamically access fields. Either 
the Java security architecture can be used to turn off access to metaobject fields, or Kava 
can itself be used to prevent requests for access to these fields by binding a metaobject to 
classes making use of classes from the java.lang.reflect package. 
Dealing with Inheritance 
When implementing Kava, the design required consideration of how Kava's binding model 
would interact with Java's inheritance model. First, it was decided that Kava must ensure 
that metaobject bindings are inherited from parent classes because choosing not to make 
bindings inheritable provides a way for an attacker to bypass an enforcement metaobject 
by simply subclassing the protected class. This implementation must take account of Java's 
method of implementing inherited behaviour. Second, a conflict might occur between in-
herited and explicit bindings. 
Implementing Inheritance of Bindings One approach to implementing inheritance of 
bindings is to override every inherited method in the subclass by a stub method that simply 
invokes the superclass's method. MUs are then added to the proxy methods. This will not 
work where the superclass has defined a method as final because the Java verifier rejects 
attempts to override a final method. This could be addressed by changing the superclass' 
methods to be non-final though this might introduce a security vulnerability. 
Kava uses an alternative approach derived from the work on using byte code rewriting 
to enforce access control policies by in-lining enforcement code [Pandey & Hashii 1999]. 
The basic idea is to edit each method of the superclass and insert MUs as specified for 
the subclass. This addresses problem one and two described above. For example, if the 
execute behaviour of all methods of the subclass are being brought under the control of a 
metaobject then the superclass R would appear as in Listing 3.7. 
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Listing 3.7: Superclass containing MU for method execution. 
class R { 
private myMeta$Object = new MetaObject (" meta1 " ); 
final public void f () { 
get$Meta (). beforeExecuteMethod ( ... ); 
<code for f> 
private get$Meta () 
return myMeta$Object; 
Listing 3.8 shows how a class, class RC in this case, subclasses then overrides the 
get$MetaO method to return the appropriate metaobject. 
Listing 3.8: Subclass defining its own MetaObject to use for method executions. 
class RC extends R { 
private myMeta$Object = new MetaObject ( "meta2" ); 
private get$Meta () { 
return myMeta$Object; 
This means invoking to on an instance RC will result in methods implemented by RC 
and R invoking the MetaObject instance "meta2". On the other hand invoking to on an 
instance of R will result in the MetaObject instance "metal" being invoked instead. This 
is because Java method resolution always chooses the most specific method definition to 
use [Gosling, Joy & Steele 1996]. 
Inserting MUs into superclasses because instances of subclasses are bound to metaob-
jects is problematic if the superclass is loaded before the subclass. After it has been loaded, 
Kava cannot modify its implementation. Therefore, during the program analysis stage 
Kava must identify all subclass/superclass relationships before loading any classes. This 
can be done through static analysis, for example the BCEL toolkitlong-term allows classes 
to be introspected upon before loading them and the BCEL Repository class allows sub-
class relationships to be examined and analysed without loading a class into the Ja\a V~1. 
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This is quite expensive depending upon the length of inheritance relationships. The current 
version of Kava simplifies this task by placing the burden upon the meta-level program-
mer who must specify the relationships between classes in the binding specification. Static 
analysis is a better long-term solution because the meta-level programmer may not be able 
to anticipate what classes will be loaded by Kava. This is particularly true of mobile code 
or other code where a detailed specification of the application is not available. This use of 
static analysis should be the focus of future work. 
Dealing with Conflict The second problem of possible conflicts between explicit bind-
ings and inherited bindings needs to be considered in the context of the different possible 
combinations of bindings and inheritance relationships. The relevant combinations of bind-
ings are: (1) the superclass R has a binding but the subclass RC does not. (2) the supercJass 
R does not have a binding but the subclass RC does. (3) both Rand RC have bindings. 
Another issue to consider is whether Kava should allow bindings on the basis of objects 
implementing interfaces given that Java permits an object to implement multiple interfaces. 
This can be resolved by treating it as another form of case three. 
Each case is considered below: 
Case one The metaobject bound to RC is used when methods defined only in RC are in-
voked upon either instances of the subclass or superclass. In the second case, the 
metaobject bound to R is used when methods defined either in R or RC are invoked 
upon instances of the subclass R. Attempts to invoke methods defined in RC upon 
instances of RC will fail because there is no metaobject bound to RC. This can be 
corrected by either checking if the metaobject pointer is null before attempting to in-
voke a method or associating a metaobject with RC instances that does nothing when 
invoked. Kava currently does the latter although further investigation will determine 
whether the former is more efficient. In both cases there is an overhead because 
reification is done even though it may not be needed. 
Case two In this case there is no conflict. The subclass retains it binding and the superclass 
is not affected. 
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Case three In this case a conflict may occur. According the scheme dt?scribed so far. 
this would result in the subclass's binding overriding the superclass\ binding. Thi" 
may result in a metaclass incompatibility problem because an inherited method 
may rely upon being able to invoke the metaobject bound to instances of its defining 
class rather than the metaobject bound to instances of the subclass [Graube 1989. 
Forman, Danforth & Madduri 1994, Forman & Danforth 1999]. Note that the basc-
level programmer is unaware of the meta level but the meta-level programmer may 
have intended to modify the behaviour of the superclass methods in a way that is not 
implemented by the subclass' metaobject. For example, the subclass might bind to a 
less restrictive metaobject thereby creating a security hole. 
We could address these conflicts by applying multiple inheritance rules. as described by 
Forman and Danforth [Forman et al. 1994, Forman & Danforth 1999], to the metaobjects 
and synthesise a new metaobject or simply invoke each metaobject in tum. However. we 
have to question whether this automatic composition of metaobjects is always appropriate 
and ask "What if the behaviours of the metaobjects are incompatible'?" The current version 
of Kava resolves these questions by refusing to load a class if a possible conflict is detected 
and leaves it to the meta-level programmer to manually resolve the metacla"s incompatibil-
ity. Note that null metaobjects are assumed not to conflict with any other metaobject. An 
improved approach might be to allow multiple inheritance and generate warnings on the 
assumption that in most cases multiple inheritance will not cause a problem. 
3.2.10 Performance 
The focus of this thesis is upon improved software engineering rather than performance 
requirements. However, some measures of the overheads introduced by using Kava were 
obtained. The performance of the execution speed of an application where enforcement 
code is in-lined manually and where the enforcement code is implemented by a metaob-
ject bound to application objects using Kava was measured. Where enforcement code used 
multiple parameters to determine if access was allowed or denied, the metaobject imple-
mentation was on average 156% slower than in-lined code (341 ms compared to 133ms). 
Where enforcement code made the decision using a single parameter, the metaobject wa" 
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on average 7% slower than in-lined code (403ms compared to 377ms). 
Differences in performance are related to the cost of the indirection introduced by the 
MU and the cost of reifying context. In both cases the cost of indirection should be iden-
tical because the same code is in-lined. Therefore, the governing factor in this simple 
analysis was the cost of reification and reflection. The first fragment of enforcement code 
required reification and reflection of a String object and the second required reification of 
multiple primitive objects requiring expensive wrapping and unwrapping. 
Initial performance results indicated the impact that reification and reflection has upon 
Kava's performance. Any unnecessary reification and reflection should be avoided. These 
findings have led to changes to Kava. Kava now allows hints to be passed via the binding 
specification that can be used to determine if reification or reflection is required. Many per-
mission checks need neither and removing unnecessary code would improve performance. 
As discussed in Section 7.3, future work must include a comprehensive performance 
analysis to help identify areas for improvements to performance. It should be possihle 
to reduce the costs of this approach through the application of techniques such as partial 
evaluation[Masuhara, Matsuoka, Asai & Yonezawa 1995] or lazy creationlreification of 
metaobjects [Maes 1987] as has been done with other reflective languages. 
3.2.11 Example: Redefining Field Access 
The following example provides a flavour of how Kava uses MUs to bring object be-
haviours under the control of a meta level. In the following example, the Put Field behaviour 
is brought under control of the meta level and to avoid requiring the reader to parse the byte 
code, this is presented using the Java language. 
Consider the field access shown below2: 
myGreeting = II Kia~ora~te~ao" ; 
After Kava is used to bind a metaobject to the class containing the field access. the field 
access is rewritten at byte code level as shown in Listing 3.9. 
In Listing 3.9 the act of updating a field is reified and handled at the meta Je\eJ. which 
requires two MUs, one before and one after the actual field access. Code is added directly 
2"Kia ora te ao" can be loosely translated as "Hello World". 
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Listing 3.9: A rewritten field access. 
my$Context. clear (); 
ContextBuilder. pushValue (my$Context, "Kia~oro~te~ao"); 
ContextBuilder. pushTarget (my$Context, th is); 
ContextBuilder. pushTarget (my$Context , • meta-parameter" ); 
th is. get$meta () . before P ut Fie Id (my$Context); 
if (my$Context. getContinue () { 
} 
myGreeting = (String) my$Context. getValue (); 
t his. get$m eta () . aft e r Put Fie I d ( my$Context ) ; 
91 
before and after the field assignment instruction (PUTFIELD in byte code). At runtime the 
following takes place: 
1 The current context object associated with the current invocation is cleared. This object 
is reused to avoid initialising a new object for each MLI. 
2 Prior to execution of the instruction, the stack has a reference to the object instance 
encapsulating the field and the value to be stored. The value to be stored is popped 
off the stack and stored in a context object making it available to the metaobject 
when the metaobject methods are invoked. Note that it is not stored directly. Rather 
a helper class (ContextBuilder) is used that simplifies the task of writing interceptions. 
The helper class is written using the Java language and then called by inserting the 
byte code instructions for invoking the necessary method. All helper class methods 
are static and should this should lead to the Java JlT in-lining them. 
3 The target is popped off the stack and stored in the context object. 
4 Meta parameters associated with the MLI are added to the context. This enables 
metaobject behaviour to be parameterised and specialised to a particular application. 
5 The beforePutFieldO metaobject method of the metaobject associated with the object is 
invoked causing a switch to the meta level. 
6 Because the meta level can override the base-level behaviour, this step determines if the 
base-level behaviour is allowed to take place. To override the base-Ie\el behaviour. 
6 
7 
8 
9 
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the meta-level programmer invokes my$Context.overrideBaseO before returning the 
base level. This will cause my$Context.getContinueO to return false thereby causing 
steps 7-8 to be skipped. 
7-8 These steps are executed only if the base-level behaviour has not been overridden. 
Step 7 both restores the stack and invokes the original base-level behaviour. Step 8 
invokes the afterPutFieldO metaobject method bound to the base-level behaviour. 
3.3 Evaluation against Goals 
This section reviews whether Kava meets the goals defined in Section 2.7. 
3.3.1 Enforcement upon Compiled Code 
Kava exploits Java's loading and dynamic linking architecture to allow interception of class 
loading. A byte code rewriting toolkit is used to insert MUs into classes before linking. The 
MUs redirect control at runtime to metaobjects associated with objects through a binding 
specification. The binding specification is specified in a separate file because lack of source 
code and a desire for a clean separation mean code annotation cannot be used. This allows 
Kava to be used with compiled code which is discussed in Section 3.2.). 
3.3.2 Control Access to Application, Library and Operating System 
Resources 
Application and library code both reside in user-level space and are loaded using Java's 
class loader. However, Java prevents direct modification of its core classes preventing 
metaobjects from being bound to objects implementing library services. Therefore Kava 
not only intercepts invocation of application methods at the callee-side but also intercept.... 
invocations made by applications. This allows metaobjects to perform access checking 
before a library is invoked. This is discussed in Section 3.1.2. 
All operating system resources are invoked via a Java library. This means that the 
controls applied to invocation of Java libraries are able to control access to operating s) stem 
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resources. 
3.3.3 Clean Separation of Concerns 
In addition to the separation of concerns provided by a MOP, Kava promotes reusability 
of metaobjects by allowing their parameterisation at the time they are bound to ba .. e-Ievel 
objects. This allows specialisation beyond what is provided by inheritance. An aspect of 
the clean separation of concerns is how easily a set of metaobjects can be reused with a 
new application. Traditionally, reuse of metaobjects is achieved through specialisation by 
inheritance. Kava also allows specialisation through parameterisation. Meta parameters 
can be associated with MUs via the binding specification. This allows generic metaobjects 
to be developed that are tailored to a particular application object by declaring meta param-
eters to be passed to the metaobject when a MU is activated at runtime. This is discussed 
in Section 3.1.5. 
3.3.4 Least Privilege 
Kava provides least privilege because each object can be bound to a metaobject and the 
metaobject can redefine the semantics of all operations listed as part of the object's inter-
face. Therefore all possible operations that may be executed by any code can be brought 
under the control of the meta level. However, Java allows declaration of static methods 
that are part of classes rather than objects and therefore these need to be controlled as well 
as ordinary methods. Kava handles static methods (and fields) by binding metaobjects to 
instances of class objects as well as objects, this is discussed in Section 3.2.8. Also, not all 
possible operations are declared as part of an object's interface. For example, field access 
does not need to be via a method belonging to the encapsulating object. Therefore the Kava 
metaobject protocol provides metaobject methods allowing these operations to be reified 
and handled at the meta level. This is discussed in Section 3.1.2. 
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3.3.5 Complete Mediation 
This section discusses how the principle of complete mediation is prmided by Kava. The 
principle of complete mediation means that access to every object must be checked for 
authority. This requires that the enforcement mechanism's integrity is not compromised. 
In the context of Kava this means ensuring that the infrastructure, meta-level interceptions 
and metaobjects are not compromised either at or during runtime. 
The argument for Kava providing complete mediation is presented Section 3.2.9. The 
argument can be summarised as follows: 
• It is assumed that the Java Runtime Environment, the Kava implementation, the en-
forcement metaobjects, the binding specification and the Java access control policies 
are trusted. 
• It is assumed that Kava always has access to classes being loaded in the Java YM so 
it can add MUs as required. 
• Once MUs have been added to a class, it is assumed that the MUs or the metaobjects 
cannot be tampered with. This is achieved by applying the techniques described in 
Section 2.5.1. 
• Attackers cannot confuse Kava's static analysis by subclassing protected objects. 
This requires Kava's design to take account of how Java implements inheritance. 
3.3.6 Economy of Mechanism 
The Kava metaobject protocol provides improved economy of mechanism compared 
to either source code or runtime MOPs. Source code MOPs require re-implementation 
of the compiler to allow source code to be pre-processed and bindings added. This is a 
more complex task than rewriting byte code because byte code has a more constrained 
semantics than source code. Runtime MOPs require changes to the Java YM. Again, thi" 
is a more complex task than rewriting byte code and requires revalidation of the entire 
runtime environment. 
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3.4 Summary 
This chapter provided an overview of the design and implementation of Kava before eval-
uating Kava against the goals from the previous chapter. The next three chapters motivate 
the use of Kava and address the goal of evaluating the use of a loadtime metaobject protocol 
for security engineering. 
Chapter 4 
Case Study One: Standalone Application 
This chapter demonstrates that using a loadtime metaohject protocol to enforce Java "L'-
curity policies provides a better separation of concerns than using conventional ohjcL't-
oriented techniques. 
Section 4.1 introduces the application that is the subject of the case study and the "L'L'-
nario for its use. Section ~.2 descrihe a conventional ohject-oriented approach to enforce-
ment and Section 4.3 descrihes using Kava, a loadtime metaobject approach. Section -l.-l 
identifies qualitative improvement-. to the separation of concerns gained h) u"ing Kava. 
4.1 Overview 
The case study uses a third-party Java standalone application de\ eloped hy Ja"on von 
Nieda, called Lirc [von Nieda 2001]. Lirc is an IRC (Internet Relay Chat) client. The 
experiments were peIi'ormed with \ersion 1.0 of Lirc, which i" licen"ed under the (j,\[' 
General Public Licence agreement. A benefit of this licensing arrangement i" the "ource 
code is available. 
The scenario is an organisation that provides support for one of it" products wanh to 
permit their technical staff to pro\ide support to customers via an IRe channel. For thi" 
purpose the staff are given permission to run Lirc on their own work "tations. Ho\\ ever, the 
nrganisation must impose upon staff the foIlowing local acces .... control polic): 
I. Users ofLirc should only be allowed to join specificall) named channels, for examplc 
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"#help", 
2. Users of Lirc should have resource limits placed on their network usage. 
The organisation's security officer wishes to use the Java security architecture to enforce 
these policies upon users of Lirc. There are two types of resources subject to the access 
control policy: application resources and system resources. Resources of the first type 
are implemented by the application itself. Resources of the second type are implemented 
by Java system libraries. For the purposes of this case study, the access control policy is 
assumed to be specified using a standard Java policy file. 
4.2 Conventional Object-oriented Security 
This section describes the conventional object-oriented approach to enforcing access con-
trol policies upon application and system resources using the Java security architecture. 
Access to both types of resource is controlled by manually placing enforcement code within 
the Lirc application. 
4.2.1 Application Resources 
In this section the conventional approach to using the Java security architecture to control 
access to named IRe channels by manually placing enforcement code within the appli-
cation is described. Unlike system resources provided by Java core libraries there are no 
standard Java permissions for use in granting rights to access IRe channels. Therefore the 
following steps for customising the Java security architecture in order to support such a 
policy [Gong 1999] must be followed: 
I. Define a permission class. 
2. Grant permissions. 
3. Place permission checks within the code implementing the resource. 
The rest of this section explains each of these steps in tum. 
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Define a Channel Permission 
First, a permission class representing the right to access a permission must be defined. 
Generally, a new permission class should subclass either the java.security.Permission class 
or the java.security.BasicPermission class. Subclassing from Permission allows permis-
sions that have names and actions to be defined. For example, java.net.SocketPermission 
extends java.security.Permission with a constructor that requires a host specification (host-
name or IP address and a port range) and a set of "actions" specifying ways to connect 
to the host. To control what rights that an application has over an IRC channel. a class 
example.lirc.ChanneIPermission is defined that subclasses java.security.Permission and has 
a constructor that requires the name of an IRC channel and a set of actions specifying what 
rights a user has over that channel. 
Listing 4.1: Defining a channel permission by declaring a new class 
package example. Ii r c ; 
public final class ChannelPermission extends 
java. secu rity. Permission { 
public ChannelPermission (String channel, 
String actions) { 
super(channel); 
this. actions=actions; 
public boolean equals (Object obj) { ... } 
public int hashCode () { ... } 
public String getActions () {return actions;} 
public boolean implies (Permission permission) { ... } 
The implementation of the new permission is shown in Listing 4.1. For reasons of 
space, only the constructor and not the other methods, such as equals or implies that must 
also be implemented are shown. The implies method is used to capture the notion that the 
granting of one permission implies the granting of another permission. 
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Grant Access to a Channel 
Once the permission class has been implemented, then the permission must be granted 
by creating a Java security policy file on the host where the application will be used. An 
example policy file granting the Lirc application right of access to the "#help" IRC channel 
is shown in Listing 4.2. The application is code-signed by an internal developer to ensure 
that only that application is granted this right. For the purposes of this case study, the 
internal developer is identified by the name "Bob". There should be an X.509 certificate 
in the local keystore (in this case, "teststore") that associates "Bob" with a public key that 
can be used to check the application's signature. The policy file must be protected against 
tampering by users so operating system rights must be used to make it immutable by users. 
In a Unix environment this can be achieved by the system administrator making the file 
read-only. 
Listing 4.2: Granting access to join a specific channel 
keystore "teststore"; 
grant signedBy "Bob" { 
} ; 
permission example. lire. Channel Permission 
"#help". "join"; 
Place Permission Checks in the Application 
Finally, the enforcement code shown in Listing 4.3 must be added into the application 
just before a channel "join" action. By inspection of the source code we determined that 
the channel "join" action for the application resource "IRC Channel" is implemented in 
the method ereateChannelO of the class Lire. If no source code is available then either 
a debugger could be used to determine what methods are executed when a user joins a 
channel or the byte code could have been inspected. 
The enforcement code consists of a calling the SecurityManager method checkPermis-
sionO to check if Lire has been granted permission to "join" the IRC channel represented 
by the argument channel. The method returns silently if access is granted, otherwbe an 
AeeessControlExeeption exception is raised. Because this is a runtime exception, it doe ... 
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not need to be declared in the method signature and so the exception is propagated up-
wards through the call stack until either a handler is found or the thread terminates \\ ith an 
uncaught exception. 
Listing 4.3: Explicit check for permission to create a channel. 
public void createChannel (String channel) { 
SecurityManager sm = 
System. getSecurityManager (); 
if (sm != nUll) { 
sm. checkPermission (new example. Ii rc . ChannelPermission (channel, 
" j 0 in" ) ) ; 
4.2.2 System Resources 
Placing resource limits on network usage is an example of a dynamic access control policy 
for ensuring availability [Millen 1992]. Availability is guaranteed by limiting the total 
number of bytes an application may transmit across the network. Java represents access to 
the network as an OutputStream object created by opening a network socket. 
The conventional object-oriented technique for enforcing access control upon system 
resources is to place enforcement code within the libraries implementing the resource. As 
discussed in Section 2.4.1, Java applies this technique to control access to system resources. 
Unfortunately, Java provides neither permissions nor enforcement code within its system 
libraries that allows a dynamic access control policy to be expressed and enforced. 
The problem here is that the enforcement for access of system resources is not fine-
grained enough for this application-specific policy. Instead the security enforcement tech-
nique described in Section 4.2.1 must also be applied to controlling Lirc's access to the 
network. The rest of this section describes how this is achieved. 
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY ONE: STANDALONE APPLICATION 101 
Define a Write Permission 
The right to write a certain number of bytes using a resource is represented by the permis-
sion class WritePermission. This is similar to the permission defined to control access to an 
IRe channel. However, unlike Channel Permission, access is not a binary decision. What is 
required is a mechanism that allows the AccessControlier to determine whether holding a 
permission to write x bytes implies that a request to write x or fewer bytes is allowed. Note 
that the permission to write x bytes is immutable and granted in the Java policy file. 
The java.security.Permission class provides an abstract impliesO method for comparing 
granted permissions with requests for permissions that can be overridden by any subclass 
that needs to define itself in relationship to other permissions. For example, holding one 
type of permission might imply a set of other permissions. In this case it is used to define 
a relationship between granting the right to write a certain quota of bytes with a request to 
check if the current number of bytes has been exceeded or not. 
Listing 4.4, shows the implementation of impliesO for WritePermission. The permission 
being checked at runtime is only implied as being held if it is a Write Permission granting 
access to the network and the quota of bytes written so far has not been exceeded. When 
determining if the permission being checked is a WritePermission, the name is taken into 
account. This is to allow the Write Permission to be used to control access to streams other 
than just the network. This provides some future compatibility, because the same permis-
sion could be used to impose quotas on access to files as well as networks in the future. 
Grant a Write Limit 
The next step is to define a Java policy file as shown in Listing 4.5. This policy file grants 
the application Lirc the right to write a maximum of 1.000.000 bytes to the network is 
shown below. Again, we assume the application developer is "Bob" and the system admin-
istrator should make the policy file write protected to prevent users increasing their own 
quotas. 
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Listing 4.4: Check for implication of permissions in class WritePermission. 
public fi n a I class Write Permission extends java. secu rity . Permission 
{ 
II check if permission is implied 
public boolean implies (Permission p) { 
if (! (p instanceof Write Permission )) 
return false; 
Write Permission wp = (Write Permission) p; 
if (! getName () . eq uals (wp. getName () )) { 
return false; 
else if (getNumBytes() < (wp.getNumBytes()) 
return false; 
return true; 
II convert the string representation of number of bytes to long 
private long getNumBytes () { 
Listing 4.5: Java policy limiting Lirc's access to the network. 
keystore "teststore"; 
grant signedBy "Bob" { 
permission example. general. WritePermission "network", n 1000000·; 
} ; 
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Place Permission Checks in the Application 
The final step is to identify where the application invokes the system resource and insert 
enforcement code. Writing to a socket is achieved by invoking one of two write methods 
on an output stream associated with a socket. Again by inspecting the source code. the 
places where the application writes bytes to a socket connection are located and permission 
checks added as shown in Listing 4.6. 
Listing 4.6: Check for permission to write to the network. 
SeeurityManager sm = System. getSeeurityManager (); 
if (sm != nUll) { 
Li re . eurrBytes += requestedBytes; 
sm. eheekPerm ission (new Write Perm i ssion ( " network" . Li re . eu rrBytes ) ) : 
} 
return true; 
Here, the number of bytes to be written must be added to a running total of bytes written 
by the application as a whole. Therefore a static field belonging to the application (the Lire 
class), eurrBytes, is used. This is updated by the number of bytes to be written. This 
running total is used to create an instance of a WritePermission representing a request to 
continue writing to the network. The impliesO method will return silently if the quota ha!'. 
not been exceeded, otherwise a runtime exception will be raised and the application will 
halt. 
The use of a static field to maintain the total bytes written to the network would al-
Iowa user to defeat security enforcement by simply restarting the application afresh when 
the user's quota is reached. A better solution would be a centralised quota manager on 
initialisation and update it as the application executes. This would prevent this loophole 
being used and also allow a quota to be imposed over all instances of Lire used within the 
organisation. 
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4.3 Loadtime MOP 
The conventional approaches discussed above suffer from an intertwining of application 
and enforcement code. Changing one requires changing the other. for example should a 
new version of Lirc be released then the enforcement code would have to be added aoain 
t:' 
manually. Also, the process is laborious and error-prone. It relies upon manual inspection 
of application code and it would be quite easy to miss out a necessary piece of enforcement 
code. Overall the conventional approach leads to increased development time. decreased 
system flexibility and comprehensibility. 
An alternative security engineering technique is to use a loadtime MOP. in particular 
Kava because it meets the other criteria for least privilege. complete mediation and econ-
omy of mechanism. The aim is to reuse the permissions. enforcement code and policies 
instead of replacing them. 
This section shows how Kava can be used to achieve this by implementing the same 
policies described above using the Java security architecture but instead of checks being 
manually added they are implemented by metaobjects. The binding configuration fik spec-
ifies where the access control checks should be enforced in the application and the security 
policies are specified using a Java security policy file. Section -+.3.1 describes how this can 
be applied to an application resource while Section 4.3.2 describes how this can be applied 
to a system resource. 
4.3.1 Application Resources 
To control who can join an IRC channel when using the Lirc application, Kava must be used 
to ensure that possession of ChannelPermission is checked before the base-le\eJ application 
attempts to access an IRC channel. This requires that the meta-level programmer must 
implement a metaobject to encapsulate this enforcement code and bind it to the right base-
level object. Additionally, the Java policy file must be modified to take into account the use 
of Kava and the metaobjects. Each of these steps is detailed below. 
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Define a Metaobject 
The ChannelEnforeementMetaobjeet class redefines beforeExecuteMethod provided by the 
standard Kava metaobject class, thus ensuring that the check is performed before the method 
is executed. The code for the actual security check is similar to the code shown in List-
ing 4.3. However, the enforcement code shown earlier refers to the variable representing 
the channel name whereas this code takes the first argument from the execution context and 
uses it to construct the permission. 
Listing 4.7: ChannelEnforeementMetaObjeet controlling access to IRe channels. 
package example. Ii r c ; 
public class ChannelEnforcementMetaObject 
extends kava. metaobjects . MetaObject { 
public void 
beforeExecuteMethod (IExecuteContext context) { 
String joinChannel 
= (String) context. getArgs () [0]; 
SecurityManager sm = 
System. getSecurityManager (); 
if (sm != nUll) { 
sm. checkPerm ission ( new Channel Permission (joinChannel , 
II j 0 i nil) ) ; 
Specify a Binding 
The meta-level programmer must define a binding specification that ensures the Channe-
IEnforeementMetaObjeet is bound correctly at loadtime. Instead of providing the XML 
version of the binding specification, an English version is shown for readability below. 
"Bind the metaobject class ChannelEnforeementMetaObjeet to the base-level 
class Lire and intercept calls to the method ereateChannel." 
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Modify the Policy File 
Finally, the meta-level programmer must write a new policy file. The polic) file must grant 
access to all the code involved in the permission checking at runtime because Java requires 
that the permissions checked at the meta level must be granted to every protection domain 
that is on the call stack when the check is performed. The policy file must therefore grant 
appropriate permissions to the application itself plus the metaobject and Kava implemen-
tation. 
The new policy file is shown in Listing 4.8. Note the inclusion of principals representing 
the application developer (named "Bob"), the meta-level programmer (named "Alice") and 
the developer of Kava itself (named "Kava"). The policy file is structured in three parts: 
(1) "Bob" is granted the same rights as before; (2) "AI ice" is granted the same rights as 
"Bob" as well as the right to allow any metaobjects signed by "Alice" to be initialised 
("initialiseMetaobjectClass"); (3) "Kava" is granted the same rights as "Alice" plus any 
rights it needs such as the right to install an application-level class loader. 
4.3.2 System Resources 
To control resource usage by the Lirc application using Kava, the same steps as taken in 
Section 4.3.1 must be applied. However, unlike the previous section this requires the usc 
of a metaobject that redefines two base-level behaviours: method invocation and method 
execution. The metaobject is then bound to the application classes that create and write to 
network sockets. 
Define a Metaobject 
Writing to a socket is achieved by invoking one of the write methods on an OutputStream 
associated with a socket and Kava ensures that a permission check is made before any of 
these methods are invoked. The simplest approach would be to redefine the execution of the 
write methods. However, Kava cannot do this because the OutputStream is implemented as 
a system class and cannot be rewritten. However, this problem can be overcome by inter-
cepting invocations of the write methods made by Lirc. Unlike the application-specific IRe 
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY ONE: STANDALONE APPLICATION 
Listing 4.8: Policy file for enforcing channel access control using Kava. 
keystore "teststore"; 
grant signedBy "Bob" { 
} ; 
permission example. Ii rc . ChannelPermission 
"#help", "join"; 
grant signedBy "Alice" 
} ; 
permission example. Ii rc . ChannelPermission 
"#help", "join"; 
permission kava. runtime. KavaPermission 
"initialiseMetaobjectClass" ; 
grant signedBy "Kava" { 
} ; 
perm ission example. Ii r c . Channel Permission 
"#help" , "join"; 
permission kava. runtime. KavaPermission 
"initialiseMetaobjectClass" ; 
permissions required only by Kava 
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channel access policy, intercepting calls to standard system classes does not require knowl-
edge of the semantics of the application that is being constrained because any application 
that attempts to communicate over a socket must use these standard methods. 
Unfortunately, redefining all invocations of OutputStream write methods will not onl~ 
affect writing to sockets but also writing to files and memory as well because these also 
create OutputStream instances for writing and reading bytes. Therefore, when determining 
whether to check permission to write a number of bytes the parent of the OutputStream 
must be taken into account to distinguish those used to access sockets from other types. 
Unfortunately, this is not a straightforward task because an ObjectStream method or field 
that provides a reference to its parent does not exist. The solution is to implement extra 
meta-level code using a table to track the creation of OutputStream instances by sockets. 
When an invocation of an OutputStream write method takes place the object identity of the 
target object can be checked against the table of known socket-created output streams. The 
code implementing this is shown in Listing 4.9. The metaobject method afterlnvokeMethod 
watches for invocations of getOutputStream on a socket. The returned value is stored in a 
hashtable along with a reference to the socket that created it. This allows LIS to watch for 
the creation of output streams and determine the socket that created it. 
Listing 4.9: Meta-level enforcement code tracking the creation of OutputStream instances 
by sockets. 
public class WriteEnforcementMetaObject extends 
kava. metaobjects . MetaObject { 
II keep track of the output streams created by the socket 
private static Hashtable ostreams = new Hashtable (); 
II keep track of the current number of bytes private 
static long currBytes = 0; 
public void afterlnvokeMethod (IInvokeContext context) { 
if (context. getMetaParam (). equals ("open~output~stream ")) { 
WriteEnforcementMetaObject. ostreams. 
put (context. getReturnValue (), context. getTarget ()); 
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A check of the security policy is perfonned before any write method belonging to an 
OutputStream object is invoked. As described earlier, this only takes place if the Output-
Stream was created by a socket. Listing 4.10 shows the enforcement code encapsulated 
within the metaobject. The details of the enforcement is identical to Listing 4.6 except that 
the number of bytes to be written is extracted from the reified context. 
Listing 4.10: Meta-level enforcement code checking whether Lirc has exceeded its network 
quota. 
public class WriteEnforcementMetaObject extends 
kava. metaobjects . MetaObject { 
public boolean beforelnvokeMethod (IinvokeContext context) { 
Object target = context. getTarget (); 
if (isSocketOStream(target)) { 
Object [] args = context. getArgs (); 
if (context. getMetaParam () . equals ( "write ~bytes" )) 
currBytes += ((byte[])args[O]).length; 
else if (context. getMetaParam (). equals (" write~byte")) 
currBytes += 1; 
SecurityManager sm = System. getSecurityManager (); 
if (sm != nUll) { 
sm. checkPermission ( 
new WritePermission (" network" , Long. to String (currBytes))); 
return true; 
II is the output stream in the table? 
protected stati c boolean 
isSocketOStream (Object ostream) { 
return ostreams. containsKey (ostream ); 
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Specify a Binding 
Again, the meta-level programmer must define a binding specification that ensures the 
WriteEnforcementMetaObject is bound to the correct base-level objects at loadtime. In this 
case, the binding is to objects creating sockets and to objects invoking the write metlwds 
of the ObjectStream objects. Unlike a manual approach this can be done automatically 
because Kava can statically analyse the application code. A high-level view of the hinding 
specification is shown below: 
"Bind the metaobject class WriteEnforcementMetaObject to any application 
base-level class, where either: 
1. the method getOutputStreamO is invoked on a class Socket (associate this 
with the meta parameter "open output stream"); 
2. the method write(byte[] ... ) is invoked on a class OutputStream (associate 
this with the meta parameter "write bytes"); 
3. the method write(byte ... ) is invoked on a class OutputStream (associate 
this with the meta parameter "write byte")." 
Modify the Policy File 
Finally, the Java security policy must be specified. As before the policy file must allocate 
the appropriate rights to "Bob", "Alice" and "Kava". The policy file is shown in List-
ing 4.11. 
4.4 Improvements to the Separation of Concerns 
The conventional security engineering technique of placing enforcement code within the 
application manually led to an intertwining of enforcement and application code. This case 
study showed, for two different types of resources and access control policies, that the 
enforcement code could be modularised and implemented as metaobjects. This leads to the 
following benefits: 
• No access to application source code is required. 
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Listing 4.11: Policy file for enforcing network quota using Kava. 
keystore "teststore"; 
grant signedBy "Bob" { 
} ; 
permission example. general. WritePermission 
"network", "1000000"; 
grant signedBy "Alice" { 
} ; 
permission kava. runtime. KavaPermission 
"initialiseMetaobjectClass" ; 
permission example. general. WritePermission 
"network", "1000000"; 
grant signedBy "Kava" { 
} ; 
permission kava. runtime. KavaPermission 
"initialiseMetaobjectClass" ; 
permission example. general. WritePermission 
"network" , "1000000"; 
permissions required by Kava 
III 
CHAPTER 4. CASE STUDY ONE: STANDALONE APPLICATIOS 112 
• The application code can now be read and modified independently of the enforcement 
code. The enforcement code can also now be read and modified without requiring 
changes to the application code. 
• Should the application code change, there is no need to reapply enforcement code 
manually_ Kava will be able to insert the necessary MUs automatically. Automatic 
rather than manual changes reduce the chances of introducing errors into the imple-
mentation. 
• The metaobjects can be reused with a new application; all that is required is to mod-
ify the Java policy file and possibly the binding specification. Whether the binding 
specification changes depends upon the generality of the policy. The IRe channel 
policy is closely tied to the application and would require rereading the application 
specification and making appropriate changes. However, the network quota polic) is 
application-independent requiring no changes to the binding specification. 
4.5 Summary 
This chapter demonstrates that using a loadtime metaobject protocol provides a cleaner 
separation of concerns than manually placing enforcement code within applications. The 
next chapter demonstrates that using a loadtime metaobject protocol provides a cleaner 
separation of concerns than placing enforcement within libraries or proxies. 
Chapter 5 
Case Study Two: Distributed 
Application 
This chapter demonstrates that using a loadtime metaobject protocol to enforce acce ........ con-
trol policies upon a distributed application provide'. a better separation or concern .... than 
using conventional object-oriented techniques such as modifying librar) code, inheritdll\:e 
or proxies. 
Section 5.1 introduces the System K distributed application that i .... the subject ot the 
case study and the scenario for its use. Section 5.2 de'.cribes a conventional object-oriented 
approach to enforcement and Section 5.~ de .... cribes u .... ing Ka\ a, a loadtime metaobject ap-
proach. Section 5.4 identifies qualitatiye improvements to the .... eparation of concerns gained 
by using Kava. Finally, Section 5.5 summarises this chapter. 
5.1 Overview 
This section introduces the third-party application, referred to a-, 5) stem K I developed as 
a security demonstrator with the the objective of illustrating a security architecture using a 
distributed, heterogeneous, hypertext document serwr \\Titten in Ja\a. 
The functional part of System K is a Computer Aided Soft\\ are Engineering (C.\SE) 
I The full details of S) stem K are not a\ailahle hecause the ,) stem W<l' provided under a confidenlialil) 
agreement 
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tool implemented as a hypertext document server. Users manipulate CASE modeb repre-
sented as diagrams via viewers. A viewer allows a user to access a remote database and 
download a model for local editing. New elements and links to other models can be added 
or modified locally. Links may also be made to models that exist in other databases. When 
a user has finished editing the model object then it can be uploaded via the viewer to the 
database. 
System K requires a security architecture able to enforce access control policies upon 
client-server interactions (between Viewers and Databases) and weakly-mobile code (Mod-
els are downloaded to the same host as the viewer and edited locally). For the purposes of 
this case study, it is assumed that the local host is trusted so that security can be enforced 
locally and that the remote host is also trusted. However, the network is assumed to be 
untrusted. 
The functional part of System K comprises sixty-four Java classes, and approximately 
4,000 lines of code. At runtime, System K consists of multiple viewers interacting with 
multiple remote databases. 
The security architecture used by the demonstrator is based on work introduced by Bull 
and his colleagues [Bull, Gong & SoB ins 1992] and has the characteristic that each ob-
ject is responsible for its own security - hence the model is termed self-defence. Each 
object that provides access within the context of a security policy makes access control 
decisions on a per-request basis, and may delegate this decision to other objects such as 
authorisation servers. Additionally, each object may delegate authentication tasks to au-
thentication servers. This provides a global view, even though security decisions are made 
on a per-object basis. It also provides support for heterogeneous policies in the same system 
because each object may either use its own policy to make an access decision or delegate 
the decision to an appropriate authorisation server. 
Security for a distributed system relies upon authentication of communicating par-
ties whilst protecting the integrity and/or confidentiality of communications. Like Ker-
beros [Neuman & Ts'o 1994], System K provides a trusted third party to assist client'> 
in setting up a secure channel with servers. A trusted authentication server maintains an 
association between each principal's unique identifier and a unique symmetric key used 
for authentication and communication between the authentication server and the principal. 
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The symmetric key is established using a modified version of the Otway-Rees protocol lOt-
way & Rees 1987] and communications are encrypted using the IDEA algorithm [Schneier 
1995]. 
Again like Kerberos, System K allows delegation of authorisation decisions to trusted 
third-parties to allow for scalability and ease of administration. There are several authori-
sation servers, one for each policy type. This approach provides a global view for security 
and allows management of rights and clearances by security officers. 
Each secured object in System K may be subject to access control policies that attempt 
to ensure the integrity of objects and prevent undesirable information flow. Originator-
Control (ORCON) [McCollum, Messing & Notargiacomo 1990] access control policies are 
used to ensure that integrity is maintained, these are essentially variants on access control 
lists where the owner of an object can decide which principals may access the object. 
Undesirable information flow is implemented by an access control policy based upon the 
Bell-laPadula multilevel security policy [Bell & LaPadula 1976]. 
5.2 Conventional Object-oriented Security 
The following sections describe how the self-defence security architecture was imple-
mented in System K using standard object-oriented techniques such as modifying system 
libraries, using inheritance and the proxy design pattern [Gamma et al. 1995]. The design-
ers of System K chose these techniques because they offered a better separation of concerns 
than manually placing enforcement code within applications. 
5.2.1 Overview 
The following sections describe how secure RMI, association of security state with secure 
objects and authorisation have been implemented by placing enforcement code within li-
braries, within superclasses and within proxies. 
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5.2.2 Secure RMI 
System K places enforcement code within system libraries to implement authentication. 
integrity, confidentiality and initial authorisation checks for remote invocations and requires 
adherence to a programming convention that differs from the standard conventions when 
using Java RMI. 
A modified RMI protocol stack is created that mutually authenticates client" and "ener". 
generates session keys, manages the passing of security parameters with invocations and 
transparently encrypts and decrypts byte streams encoding remote invocations. Clas"es rep-
resenting remote invocations, remote references and the UnicastObject have been modified 
to include extra code and members to support secure RMI. 
The changes are almost transparent to the developer of a server because the modified 
protocol stack automatically encrypts and decrypts the remote method invocations with the 
current session key to provide authenticity, integrity and confidentiality. Also from the 
point-of-view of a client, the changes are transparent because the modified protocol stack 
automatically encrypts and decrypts the remote method invocations to provide authenticity. 
integrity and confidentiality. 
Had System K been developed with JDK 1.2 or greater, Secure RMI over SSL [Java 
Team 1996-1999] could have been used to provide authentication. integrity and confiden-
tiality although it would require some changes to the implementation of servers. 
5.2.3 Security State 
Each client and server in System K has security-related behaviour and state associated with 
it, namely a unique identifier, a secret key for each principal and active labels used to imple-
ment authorisation. This is achieved by requiring these classes to extend the SecureObject 
class as shown in Figure 5.1. 
Principal Identifier 
The principal identifier is a string that must be globally unique and persistent. The case 
study assumes that this can be achieved by issuing a smartcard with a global identifier. 
The identifier is read from a smartcard at the time of object creation and a'>sociate'> the 
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Figure 5.1: Class diagram for self-defence security architecture. Two classes under the 
control of the security architecture are shown: Viewer and Db. These extend Secure-
Object which maintains security-related meta data. Each SecureObject contains pointers 
to an information flow policy and an integrity policy. The abstract Policy class defines 
a check_access method that is implemented by each type of policy. The check_access 
method is invoked to determine whether a particular action is authorised. 
object with its creator. This provides each object such as a server or mobile objects with 
a principal identifier allowing authorisation servers to model access control policies based 
upon the identity of a principal. For example, all objects created by Alice may acces., all 
objects created by Bob. 
The principal identifier is passed with all remote method invocations sent by clients or 
servers acting as clients. It is not added to invocations by the RMI protocol stack. Instead 
a client-side proxy is used to add the principal identifier to invocations as discussed in 
Section 5.2.4. 
Secret Key 
A secret key associated with the user is read from the user's smartcard at the time of object 
creation. The secret key is a symmetric key shared with an authentication server that acts 
as a trusted third-party between the client and servers. The RMI protocol stack uses the key 
in a mutual authentication and key establishment protocol. 
CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY TWO: DISTRIBUTED APPLICATION 118 
Active Labels 
Active labels are a concept particular to System K. They share features similar to systems 
such as those specified in the Orange book [US Department of Defense 1985]. where each 
object protected by the system reference monitor has a label. But unlike a traditional sys-
tem, where the interpretation of the labels is fixed within the infrastructure and are simply 
state, active labels encapsulate both state and logic for interpreting their meaning. This is 
achieved by requiring each label to inherit from a Policy class that defines a checkO method 
with a string argument representing the name of a principal. The check method determines 
whether the object with the particular label will allow access to a named principal. 
Self-defending objects encapsulate active labels and whenever an object's method is 
invoked it implements authorisation policies by calling the check methods of its active 
labels. Some security policies such as MLS require the labels associated with objects to 
change following a policy check, active labels implementing these types of policies require 
implementation of an addO method that allows a new label to be created by adding the 
current label to another label. 
System K has implemented two types of policies that may be used as active labels: Or-
ConPolicy and MLSPolicy representing Originator Control and Multilevel Security respec-
tively. Both policy classes delegate their decisions to remote servers - a Groupld server 
in the case of OrConPolicy and MLSServer in the case of MLSPolicy. Each server has a 
maintenance interface that allows a security officer to implement a particular organisa-
tion's security policy. Servers must be protected so that only authorised uscrs can change 
the current policy in effect, achieved by applying the self-defence architecture recursively. 
5.2.4 Authorisation 
System K uses proxies to implement the Caretaker pattern discussed in Section 2.4.1. For 
each server that has security policies enforced upon it there is a client-side and server-side 
proxy. The client-side proxy implements transmission via RMI of principal identity, and 
the server-side proxy acts as a PEP enforcing security policies on servers. The original 
implementation of System K required a proxy to be generated manually for each clas" that 
is the target of an authorisation check. The authors did suggest that a better approach would 
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be to generate the proxy automatically, so as to reduce the possibility of error when coding 
proxies, but this approach was never implemented. 
The normal flow of control for a secure policy-controlled invocation on a database 
server is shown in Figure 5.2. Note, it is assumed that a reference to the database's securit\ 
proxy has already been obtained by invoking the openO method of the database's manager 
object. The diagram also shows the proxies and skeleton classes automatically generated 
by the Java RMI compiler that provide distribution and implement authenticity, integrity 
and confidentiality. 
The Viewer object invokes a method on a remote Db object by invoking the method on a 
client-side security proxy (Db_CIiStub). This proxy adds the principal identifier to the invo-
cation and then invokes the method on the client-side RMI proxy (Db_SvrStub_Stub). The 
RMI stub marshals the method, the arguments and the principal's identity and encrypts it 
using a session key obtained during the initial interaction with the remote Java RMI skele-
ton for the server's security proxy (Db_SvrStub_Skel) before sending the encrypted method 
call. The RMI skeleton decrypts the byte stream and unmarshals the method, arguments 
and principal. After unmarshalling the RMI skeleton invokes the server's security proxy 
(Db_SvrStub) that enforces any security policies before passing the method call on to the 
Db server object. The steps involved in checking if access is allowed depend on the type,> 
of policies being enforced on the secured object by the proxies. 
In the case of an integrity security policy, Db_SvrStub invokes the check_access method 
of the policy object using the principal's identity. If access is denied, the policy object will 
raise an exception, otherwise it will return silently. On return, the appropriate method of 
the Db object is invoked. In the case of an information flow security policy, the steps are the 
same as for an integrity security policy, except that if access is allowed, the security state 
of the server may need to be updated. This decision is hard-coded into the Db_SvrStub. If 
an update is required because the execution of the method results in a change to the server 
state, a new information flow policy is generated by adding the existing policy to one that 
is created using the principal's identity. Integrity policies such as OrConPolicy require only 
that an access check is performed, whereas information-flow policies such as MLSPolicy 
require both an access check and update to the server's security state. 
The conventional implementation requires these checks and updates to be hard coded 
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Figure 5.2: Collaboration diagram showing steps involved in a viewer invoking a method 
of a remote database under the self-defence security architecture. Step I: Viewer object in-
vokes a Db object method. Step 2: A DbCIiStub proxy receives the invocation and adds the 
identity of the principal associated with the Viewer. The DbCliStub proxy i.., only respon-
sible for access control, not with enforcing confidentiality, it invokes the DbSvrStub_Stub 
proxy. Step 3: The DbSvrStub_Stub proxy encrypts the invocation and send.., it across the 
network. Step 4: The Db_SvrStub_Skel receives the encrypted invocation and decrypts 
it before invoking the Db_SvrStub. Step 5: The Db_SvrStub retrieves a reference to the 
Policy object associated with the Db object. Step 6: The check_access method of the 
Policy object is invoked to determine if the method may be invoked. Step 7: The Policy 
object delegates the access check to the appropriate AuthorisationServer object. Thi.., may 
actually be a stub used to contact a remote authorisation server. Step 8: Either the access i.., 
allowed or disallowed. Step 9: The Policy object returns the decision. Step 10: Assuming 
that access is granted, the Db_SvrStub invokes the appropriate method of the Db object. 
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into the security proxy such as Db_SvrStub. 
System K uses the same approach as used for protecting remote servers to protect Model 
objects that are downloaded for local editing. Although this allows the same infrastructure 
to be used for both local and distributed access control it leads to an overcomplicated im-
plementation because security proxies must be downloaded with the Model objects. This 
requires that when a request is made to download a Model from a database. a security pro,) 
is returned instead. The security proxy then downloads the real Model object and acts as 
a local proxy for it. Subsequently. when the Model object is to be uploaded. the security 
proxy ensures that the Model object is uploaded to the database and the proxy is garbage 
collected. 
5.3 Loadtime MOP 
This section describes how Kava can be used to implement access control policies with-
out modifying system libraries or using inheritance or proxies. Section 5.3.1 provides 
an overview of the Kava implementation of access control and the different metaobjects 
used. Section 5.3.2 describes how a metaobject can be used to ensure that secure RMI 
is implemented and Section 5.3.4 describes how authorisation is implemented through a 
combination of access checking and passing information about principals across "ecure 
RMI. 
5.3.1 Overview 
This section outlines how the Kava metaobjects co-operate together to implement the self-
defence security architecture. Figure 5.3 shows how the metaobjects co-operate to provide 
secure RMI between a Viewer object (the client) and a Db object (the server) under the con-
trol of access control policies. Two metaobjects cooperate in realising distributed acces" 
control: (I) The MetaAuthorisation metaobject bound to methods of classes that must be 
brought under the control of a security policy enforce security decisions: (2) The MetaAu-
thentication metaobject is bound to the marshalling and unmarshaling method" of the stubs 
and skeletons that implement RMI for server classes. A RMI method invocation goe, 
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Figure 5.3: Collaboration diagram showing the steps involved in invoking a method of a 
remote database under the control of Kava metaobjects. 
through the following steps: 
1. On the client side, the Viewer object invokes a method on the local stub (Db_Stub) 
that represents the remote Db object. Before the Db_Stub marshab the argument'>. 
control is switched to the MetaAuthentication metaobject, which marshals the princi-
pal's identity. Control is returned to the Db_Stub, which then sends the byte stream 
to the remote skeleton (Db_Skel) across an encrypted socket connection. Note that 
secure communications are established as a result of the MetaConfidentiality metaob-
ject's intervention during the startup of the remote Db object, and that the metaobject 
is not otherwise involved in the communication between the client and server objects. 
2. On the server side, the Db_Skel unmarshals the arguments and invokes the appro-
priate Db method. The MetaAuthentication metaobject takes control and unmarshals 
the principal's identity which it stores. Control is returned to the Db_Skel and the 
appropriate Db method is invoked using the unmarshaled arguments. 
3. If the method is specified as being under reflective control in the binding specifica-
tion, its execution is reified and handled at the meta !e\e) b) the MetaAuthorisation 
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metaobject. 
4. If the execution of the method has been specified in the binding specification as being 
under the control of an integrity or information flow policy, the MetaAuthorisation 
metaobject invokes the check_access method of the policy object. 
(a) In the case of an integrity policy, invoking check_access may cause the access 
decision to be delegated to a remote authorisation server. If access is denied. 
a runtime exception is raised, and this is converted to a RemoteException and 
propagated all the way back to the Viewer object. Otherwise, the check_access 
method silently returns. 
(b) In the case of an information-flow policy, the check_access method is invoked 
as described above. However, if the method returns silently (indicating access 
is allowed), the information-flow policy associated with the server is updated 
by invoking the policy object's add method. 
(c) In the case that both types of policy apply, then both of the steps described 
above apply. As long as an exception is not raised due to an access control 
check, control will return to the base level and the method is executed. 
Note that the diagram doesn't show the MetaConfidentiality metaobject that is bound to 
any class that registers a server object with the RMI registry. This metaobject ensures that 
a socket factory implementing SSLffLS is used for RMI. 
5.3.2 Secure RMI 
The MetaConfidentiality metaobject ensures confidential communications between clients 
and servers. It uses standard Secure RMI facilities provided by JDK 1.2 [Sun Microsystems 
2000] for securing communications and providing authentication rather than the infrastruc-
ture developed as part of System K. Using Secure RMI is a more portable solution making 
use of the Transport Level Security protocols [Dierks & Allen 1999] that have been widely 
tested. 
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The developers of System K did not use Secure RMI for two reasons. First, System K 
was developed using JDK 1.1 rather than the more recent development kits that can pro-
vide facilities for secure RMI. Second, developers wished to avoid US export restrictions 
upon the use of public key technology [Apache Week 1997] by using a key establishment 
protocol based upon oneway functions. These restrictions were lifted in September 1999. 
The standard approach for using secure RMI is to ensure that a secure sockets layer 
(SSL) factory is used by the RMI protocol stack instead of a standard socket factory. Un-
fortunately, this cannot be done by setting a Java property in the version of 1DK:! used for 
the case study and requires extra code to be added to any client that is going to communicate 
securely with a server. To avoid changes to the application source code, we encapsulate this 
code in a metaobject class and bind it to the RMI startup code for the remote object on the 
server, and intercepts the Naming.rebind method to ensure that a secure socket factory is 
registered for the remote object. This ensures that SSL sockets are used for both client and 
server-side connections. As a side effect of using SSL, clients and servers are authenticated 
before confidential communication takes place. Note that the role of the MetaConfiden-
tiality metaobject is simply to intervene in the initialisation of the RMI layer, and that the 
metaobject does not otherwise intercept method invocations between user-level objects. 
5.3.3 Security State 
Instead of placing enforcement code relating to security state in a superclass, the MetaAu-
thorisation metaobject controls access to server methods and applies the information and 
integrity security policies as appropriate. As methods differ as to which security po\icie<, 
are applied, the binding specification file parameterises the metaobject protocol and indi-
cates whether the method is under the control of an information-flow or integrity security 
policy. In addition, in the case of an information flow policy, it indicates whether the exe-
cution of the method results in a change to the security state of the server. This is necessary 
for security policies such as Bell-LaPadula, where the security state of the server must be 
updated to reflect interaction with a principal. 
2JDKl.2 was used. 
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5.3.4 Authorisation 
Using a metaobject to perform authorisation avoids problems associated with using a sep-
arate proxy class for this purpose. As there is no proxy and no reference to be leaked. it 
is possible to provide direct access to the protected server without the need for a securit~ 
manager object. Also, in the case of the Model class, there is the benefit that there is no 
need to add extra steps that maintain the presence of a proxy, even when the Model object 
is downloaded for local editing. This is because metaobjects are automatically downloaded 
with the base-level object because they are pointed to by the base-level object and defined 
to be serializable. 
The MetaAuthentication metaobject implements the passing of a principal's identity 
from the client to the server with a remote invocation. The metaobject is designed to be 
bound to the server's RMI stub and skeleton because being bound to these objects exposes 
interfaces for marshalling and unmarshaling arguments that are passed with RMI method 
invocation. At the client side, the MetaAuthentication metaobject adds the principal's iden-
tity to the byte stream, representing the marshalled arguments. before it is sent over the 
encrypted socket connection to the skeleton, and at the server side it removes the principal 
from the byte stream before unmarshaling the arguments from the decrypted byte stream. 
The current implementation must use JDK 1. I-compliant proxies because the metaob-
ject requires access to the byte stream representation of remote methods calls and JDK 1.2 
does not generate proxies at all. This makes this implementation technique dependent upon 
current features of Java. An improved approach is to use a generic interface that provides 
access to representations of remote-method invocations as byte streams. Even if this is not 
provided by Java, the metaobjects can be insulated from these dependencies by hiding the 
implementation details behind a fixed interface to the RMI protocol stack. In early versions 
this would be implemented as described here whilst later versions could take advantage of 
any opening up of the Java protocol stack. 
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5.4 Improvements to the Separation of Concerns 
This section discusses how using Kava provided a better separation of concerns than the 
conventional techniques used in this chapter. 
Before discussing the improvements on a case-by-case basis it is useful to reflect upon 
the reduction on code size gained by using Kava to secure System K rather than conven-
tional object-oriented techniques. The Kava version reduced the size of application classes 
by between approximately 15% and 45% through the removal of explicit access checks. 
proxies and removal of code to update meta data. 
The conventional and Kava versions of the System K code base were normalised to re-
duce the impact of programmer style. Normalising the code involved removing all whites-
pace and comments from the code. This allowed the size of the codebases to be compared 
without worrying about different programmer styles with respect to code formatting or 
commenting. Additionally, because the focus of the case study was to see if the engineer-
ing of application code was improved, only the size of application code used to invoke 
either secure RMI or authorisation was compared. The code implementing the secure RMI 
protocol stacks was excluded from the counts because this is assumed to be system-level 
code and the authorisation servers were excluded because they are common to both the 
conventional and Kava versions of System K. 
The rest of this section discusses the improvements gained by using Kava on a case-by-
case basis. 
5.4.1 Place Enforcement within Libraries 
In this case study the RMI protocol stack was changed to implement authenticity, integrity 
and confidentiality. Although providing a good separation of concerns from an application 
point-of-view because it requires no changes to applications, in the context of the case 
study there are three main drawbacks to this approach: 
• All servers must use the RMI protocol stack. This means that all server implemen-
tations, even those that do not require Secure RMI were forced to make use of it. It 
is true that this could have been avoided by adding options to standard RMI cla.,.,e" 
CHAPTER 5. CASE STUDY TWO: DISTRIBUTED APPLICATIOS 1~7 
that could control which protocol implementation was used but it does point out the 
difficulties in engineering a solution that will fit all possible applications. 
• Changing the RMI protocol stack was a non-portable solution requiring changes to 
the Java runtime environment. This may not be possible in all environments for good 
security reasons. 
• Inserting enforcement code into the protocol stack may overcomplicate its design 
and lead to problems when it changes at a later stage. 
Kava was used to address implementing Secure RMI by using standard facilities and 
invoking them by encapsulating the necessary code within a metaobject. 
This addresses the first problem because the metaobject did not have to be oound to 
all server objects. Some server objects could make use of it to implement Secure RMI 
but other objects did not have to make use of it. This is a benefit of the clean separation 
of concerns provided by a loadtime MOP. The second problem is addressed because Kava 
doesn't require modification of system libraries due to its ability to redefine invocations 
by inserting MUs into application code. The third problem is actually an indication that 
adding enforcement code leads to an intertwining of enforcement code and library code that 
makes maintainability difficult. Again, by modularising the changes to the RMI protocol 
stack within a metaobject protocol the separation of concerns is improved. 
5.4.2 Place Enforcement within Proxies 
As discussed in Section 5.2.4, System K makes use of the Caretaker pattern and implements 
it using proxies. Using proxies avoids changing the implementation of the proxied object. 
However, it does require writing additional classes and manually inserting code to update 
the active labels as required for the type of policy being implemented. The following 
describes how the problems described in Section 2.4.1 can be seen in this case study: 
Self problem. Self-invocations within System K are not intercepted by the security proxy. 
Should an implementation error permit a method that should be subject to an autho-
risation check to be invokable via an unprotected method then authorisation \\ould 
be bypassed. 
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Logical wrapping problem System K suffers from the logical wrapping problem because 
the architecture is complicated by the need to add extra code to support enforcement 
of access control on mobile objects as described in Section 5.2.-1.. 
Confinement problem. Should a direct reference to a Db or Model object escape then the 
security proxies protecting them might be bypassed. This only occurs with a Db 
object if it implements a remote interface because it is only invoked using RMI. On 
the other hand, Model objects are downloaded into the local NM so possessing an 
object reference allows its security proxy to be bypassed. 
Interface gap problem. System K suffers from the interface gap that exists because of 
the introduction of an extra proxy class. Whenever the interface of an object that is 
the subject of security proxy changes, the security proxy must also be modified so 
it reflects the changes to the secured object. This complicates maintenance because 
two classes must be updated and points to a poor separation of concerns. 
Essentially, using Kava avoids these problems because there is no longer any need to 
maintain a separate proxy. The role of proxy is played by a metaobject but this is not visible 
from the point of view of any client of the base-level object. The problems are addressed 
as follows: 
Self problem. Self-invocations within System K are always intercepted by the mctaobjcct. 
Therefore other methods that are not subject to an access control policy cannot be 
used to bypass protection. 
Logical wrapping problem Avoiding the use of a separate proxy removes the requirement 
to maintain extra code to support enforcement of access control. 
Confinement problem. Should a direct reference be made to a Db or Model object, the 
security of the system is not compromised. There simply is no protected direct refer-
ence to a base-level object that can escape. 
Interface gap problem. There is no need to change the interface to ensure that proxied 
versions of objects are returned because the metaobject is associated with the object 
itself and will always be invoked. 
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5.4.3 Place Enforcement within a Superclass 
In System K, inheritance is used to associate security state with objects. Developers of new 
classes that must be secured must subclass the SecureObject class. This should present 
no problems when implementing classes from scratch. However. if an existing class is to 
be re-engineered, the programmer requires access to the source code in order to make the 
target class subclass SecureObject. This means that classes supplied only as compiled code 
cannot be re-engineered to be secure using an approach based on inheritance. although one 
way to address this would be to use wrappers and delegation. 
The decision as to which policies to associate with an object are hardwired into the 
implementation of the SecureObject class. It would be more elegant if the detai Is of policies 
applying to an object were separated out into some form of configuration file. An example 
of this problem is shown in the difference between securing a Db and a Model. System K 
implements both integrity and information-flow security policies for Model objects. but 
only an integrity security policy for Db objects. However. both classes inherit both policie" 
as part of their meta data. If an external configuration file was used. it would be possible to 
specify different policies for each. These could be adjusted at loadtime without having to 
change any source code. 
The use of Kava avoids the requirements for inheritance because the binding between 
the metaobject class and base-level class is established at loadtime allowing even compiled 
classes to be brought under the control of the meta level. Additionally, different metaobject 
classes providing different security functionality can be bound to those program classes 
that require them rather than all classes. 
5.5 Summary 
This chapter contrasted conventional object-oriented techniques with use of Kava for en-
forcing access control policies upon distributed and mobile objects. It showed that Kava 
provided a better separation of concerns than conventional techniques and led to a number 
of improvements. 
The next chapter uses the experience of the two case studies to draw some general 
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observations about using loadtime metaobject protocols to enforce access control policies. 
Chapter 6 
Inferences from Case Studies 
This chapter makes some inferences from the specific case studies about the general LI\e of 
a loadtime MOP such as Kava for security engineering. 
6.1 MOPs Provide Better Separation of Concerns than Con-
ventional Object-Oriented Techniques 
Chapter 4 discusses the application of Kava to a standalone application and Chapter 5 
discllsses the application of Kava to an application compo"cd of distributed and mobile ob-
jects showed that it led to a cleaner separation of concerns. Furthermore it "howed concrete 
benefits in terms of simplification when compared with cOll\entional object-oriented tech-
niques. This supported the abstract reasoning in Chapter :2 that loadtime metaobject pro-
tocols would provide a better approach for security engineering than conventional object-
oriented techniques. Given that both case studies were real applications and used standard 
techniques for security it seems reasonable to argue that Ka\a could be u\cd with other 
applications with similar success. 
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6.2 Constraints to Consider when Using MOPs for En-
forcement 
The following constraints must be considered when using MOPs to enforce access control 
policies upon compiled user-level code: (1) Detailed specification may be necessary: (2) 
Expressiveness of the binding specification influences success in enforcing an access con-
trol policy; (3) Granularity of interfaces also influences the success in enforcing an access 
control policy; (4) Security exceptions will break the transparency of the technique and 
increase the complexity of a solution; and (5) Applying a loadtime MOP such as Kava in 
the context of another language requires the presence of type safety, rewriting tools and an 
ability to intercept loading of classes. 
6.2.1 Detailed Specifications may be Necessary 
Experience with the case studies show that using Kava to enforce access controls upon 
either application resources or system resources requires identifying the appropriate base-
level operations to bring under the control of the meta level because these form the vocabu-
lary of the access control policy. Application-specific policies such as controlling access to 
application resources requires knowing the semantics and structure of an application. Other 
policies controlling access to system resources or operating system resources provided by 
library code requires knowing the semantics and structure of the library code. 
6.2.2 Expressiveness of Binding Influences Complexity of Use 
There is a trade-off between the expressive power of the binding specification and the com-
plexity of programming metaobjects. For example, implementation of the Lirc resource 
control example required extra code to identify socket streams created to access the net-
work from other streams. The binding specification language could be extended to allow 
extra context to be taken into account such as call graphs or aggregation relationships. This 
would relieve the programmer from having to write code to detect these relationships at 
runtime. However, it would increase the complexity of the enforcement mechanism mak-
ing verification of Kava's correctness more difficult. 
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Extending Kava's binding specification language would bring the power of the lan-
guage closer to AspectJ's notion of a pointcut [Kiczales, Hilsdale, Hugunin. Kersten. Palm 
& Griswold 2001]. AspectJ is an aspect oriented programming (AOP) language. Like 
MOPs, AOP allow a clean separation of concerns. The core idea is some concerns cro",,-
cut an application's functionality and that these concerns can be separated out to provide a 
better modularity than existing approaches [Kiczales. Irwin, Lamping. Loingtier & Lopez 
1997]. AspectJ allows the crosscutting concerns to be implemented by defining code ex-
cerpts called advice and using declarative descriptions. called joinpoint. that determine 
where the code excerpts should be woven into the final application. The joinpoints are 
similar to Kava's binding specification. However. MOPs differ in that they provide a more 
constrained way to modify the behaviour of an application because the protocol defines 
the range of possible changes that can be applied through modifications of the language 
semantics. 
6.2.3 Granularity of Interfaces Constrain Policies 
The case studies showed that the nature and abstraction level of security policies that can 
be enforced using a MOP is governed by the capabilities of the reflective language and 
the granularity of interfaces offered by the application and system classes. For example. 
Kava cannot make Java system classes reflective. although it can intercept calls to Java sys-
tem classes from application code. This has had an impact on the design. Ideally, secure 
RMI and authorisation would have been implemented by manipulating byte stream repre-
sentations of remote method invocations. For example. subject identifiers could have been 
directly inserted and removed, access checks could have been applied by inspecting the tar-
get, method name and parameters and byte streams representing individual remote method 
invocations could have been encrypted or decrypted. However, although metaobjects could 
be bound to the RMI stubs and skeletons, which allowed interception of marshalling and 
unmarshalling, access was not possible to the byte stream representations of the marshalled 
invocations (although the level of abstraction that was available allowed extra parameters to 
be inserted and removed from the remote messages). This prevented the implementation of 
my own encryption/decryption and authentication algorithms and led us to rely upon SSL 
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socket support that provides transport-level security but not middleware-Ie\ eI secLlrit\. If 
Kava was able to reflect upon system classes, metaobjects could be used to provide access 
to byte stream representations of RMI invocations. 
6.2.4 Security Exceptions Break Transparency 
Dealing with exceptions correctly is another source of complexity. When exceptions are 
raised at the server side they are unchecked exceptions. These are converted into Remote-
Exceptions at the meta level and returned to the client. The client then raises them locally 
as unchecked exceptions. This could lead to a halt of the program rather than a simple "ac-
cess denied" exception. To avoid this problem, it is necessary to intercept raised exceptions 
at the client side and include application specific exception handling at the meta level. This 
can be quite complex as a whole new error semantics was added. 
One area that is worth considering for future work is how to handle exceptions. In this 
implementation, a runtime exception is raised when a security policy is violated. Existing 
exception handlers catch the exception and print a stack trace on the console. What if 
a handler did not exist that handled runtime exceptions in a sensible way? Of course, 
what is sensible is to a degree application sensitive. In some cases the virtual machine 
should be halted. In others a message should be displayed and normal execution continued. 
This is a complex issue that we have considered in another paper where we explore some 
extensions to Kava that would support better interactions between behavioural reflection 
and exceptions [Welch et al. 2001]. 
6.2.5 Constraints upon Applying Kava to other Languages 
Could Kava be used to enforce access control policies upon compiled code other than Java 
VM byte code? Although Kava itself could not be, the general approach to dc"igning 
a MOP suitable for using for security enforcement could be applied to other languages. 
The main requirements are type safety, rewriting tools for compiled code and the ability to 
intercept class loading. A possible target language might be C# because it is object-oriented 
and uses a high-level compiled format for its classes. 
IJIP' .. 
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6.3 Summary 
This chapter attempted to stand back from the individual case studies and make some in-
ferences about using a loadtime MOP such as Kava to enforce access control policies ap-
plications. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Future Work 
This chapter provides a summary of the thesis, the contrihutions it mah.e". di"cu""es the 
overall contributions of the the"is. provide an mervic\\ of po""ihle future wllrk and make." 
some concluding remarks. 
7.1 Summary of Thesis 
Chapter 1 argued that enforcing security policies upon compiled code that mah.e" usc of ap-
plication and system resources requires more than operating ") "tern-level enlllicelllent. To 
enforce access control upon both system resources and upon application re"ources rcquire" 
application-level enforcement. Conventional object-oriented techniquc,> can he used to im-
plement existing security architectures but provide neither a clear separation of concern'> 
nor can they be used with compiled code. In-lined reference Illonitor" are he u"ed with 
compiled code but are unable to make use of existing security architectures or (currently) 
implement distributed access control policies. An approach that provide,> a clean "eparation 
of concerns invohes the use of metaobject protocols. E,i'>ting loadtime metaohject proto-
cols that can work with compiled code are able to provide sufficient lea"t privilege but do 
not explicitly address complete mediation and economy of mechani"m. Additionall) the) 
have not been used to implement distributed acce"" control. Thi" the"i" describe" an imple-
mentation of a loadtime metaobject protocol that addresse,> these problems and ime"tigates 
whether a clean separation of concerns is achievable b) carr) ing out two ca"e '>LUdie'> \\ ith 
136 
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third-party applications. 
Chapter 2 introduces a set of criteria for an ideal security engineering technique for 
enforcing access controls upon compiled user-level code, that is both library or applica-
tion code. The criteria are systematically applied to four candidate ~ecurity engineering 
techniques: operating system enforcement, conventional object-oriented engineering, in-
lined reference monitors and metaobject protocols. Table 7.1 reproduce~ the summary of 
results. Only loadtime metaobject protocols and in-lined reference monitors meet most of 
the criteria. In particular in-lined reference monitors have well-developed arguments for 
their satisfaction of complete mediation and economy of mechanism. However, loadtime 
metaobject protocols have the advantage, with respect to the aims of this thesis. of allow-
ing existing security architectures to be used instead of replacing them. Existing loadtime 
metaobject protocols do not meet all the criteria and this is used to develop a set of goals 
for the thesis. The goals are: 
1. Implement a MOP that enforces access control policies upon compiled code. 
2. Implement a MOP that controls access to both application, library and operating 
system resources. 
3. Implement a MOP that satisfies the requirements for: 
• Least privilege 
• Complete mediation 
• Economy of mechanism 
• Clean separation of concerns 
4. Demonstrate a clean separation of concerns compared with conventional software 
engineering techniques that still allows reuse of existing security architectures. 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of Kava, which is an implementation of the metaobjcct 
protocol for Java designed to meet the first three goals. The first goal is satisfied because 
Kava's exploitation of byte code rewriting to insert meta-level interceptions at loadtime al-
lows Kava to be used with compiled code. The second goal is satisfied because Ka\ a Java'" 
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, . 
Technique Description Separation Least Complete Econom~' I 
Table 7.1: Summary of evaluation of security engineering techniques 
of Privilege Mediation of 
Concerns Mechanism 
Operating Fixed placement of Good Coarse Limited control Complex 
systems enforcement code over user-level 
within kernel. code 
Libraries Fixed placement of Good Coarse Limited Language 
enforcement code dependent 
within kernel. 
Manual Place enforcement Poor Fine Complete Language 
insertion as required within dependent 
application. 
Capabilities Treat object Moderate Fine Limited Language 
references as dependent 
capabilities. 
Proxies Place enforcement Moderate Fine Limited Language 
code within dependent 
proxies. 
Inheritance Place enforcement Moderate Fine Complete Language 
within superclass. dependent 
IRMs Policy determines Good Fine Control over Good 
in-lining of local objects 
enforcement. code but not 
within compiled distributed 
code. Replaces 
existing security 
architecture. 
Compile-time Metaobjects enforce Good Fine Examples of Includes 
MOPs policy at runtime control over compiler 
and bind to base distributed and MOP 
level at compile objects but impl. 
time. not local inTCB 
Loadtime Metaobjects enforce Good Fine Examples of Only includes 
MOPs policy at runtime control over MOP 
and bind to base local objects impl. 
but not inTCB I level at load i 
time. distributed I J 
Runtime Metaobjects enforce Good Fine Examples of Includes ! 
control over i runtime MOPs policy at runtime I ! , 
local objects and \IOP I and bind to base 
level at runtime but imp\. III TCB 
time. not distributed 
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facility intercept the loading of application classes and Ka\a allows access to other t) pes of 
classes to be controlled by intercepting application invocations of classes implementing li-
brary and operating system resources. The third goal is satisfied because of the fine-gmined 
control provided by a MOP, the reuse of arguments for complete mediation and economy 
of mechanism developed for in-lined reference monitors and Kava's ability to modularisl? 
enforcement code within reusable metaobjects. 
Demonstration of the last goal required two case studies to be carried out and these 
are described in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The purpose of the case studies was to contrast 
conventional object-oriented security engineering with a loadtime metaobject protocol ap-
proach. Each chapter describes both approaches and evaluates whether the benefits of a 
good separation of concerns was used by using a loadtime metaobject protocol as opposed 
to conventional techniques. The first case study application is a third-party standalone IRe 
client. It allows comparison of approaches to enforcing access control policies control-
ling an application's access to application and system resources. The second case study 
is a third-party distributed CASE tool that also uses weakly-mobile objects. This allows 
comparison of approaches to implementing secure remote method invocations and autho-
risation. In both case studies, Kava was found to provide a better separation of concerns 
than conventional techniques. 
Finally, Chapter 6 makes some inferences from the specific case studies about the gen-
eral use of a loadtime MOP such as Kava for security engineering. First. it argues that 
the case studies showed both an improved separation of concerns was provided by using 
a loadtime MOP and these improvements would also apply if a loadtime MOP was used 
with another application. Second, it discusses a set of constraints to consider when using a 
loadtime MOP such as Kava with other applications. There are five constraints to consider: 
(1) Detailed specification may be necessary; (2) Expressiveness of the binding specification 
influences success in enforcing an access control policy; (3) Granularity of interfaces also 
influences the success in enforcing an access control policy: and (4) Security exceptions 
will break the transparency of the technique and increase the complexity of a solution: and 
(5) Applying a loadtime MOP such as Kava in the context of another language require ... the 
presence of type safety, rewriting tools and an ability to intercept loading of classes. 
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7.2 Overall Contributions 
The overall contributions of thesis go beyond exploring the issues in implementing a load-
time metaobject protocol for Java and applying it to two case studies. These contributions 
are: (1) The lessons from the case studies allow us to show that the securit~ challenges from 
Chapter 1 are met for each problem domain described there: (2) The loadtime metaobject 
protocol approach can be used to implement other non-functional concerns besides -.ecu-
rity; and (3) The loadtime metaobject approach is applicable to languages other than Java. 
----- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -, 
New Code Existing Code 
',- --------l----------: 
Services and Libraries 
Application 
Figure 7.1: A model of applications that may have security policies enforced upon them by 
Kava. New code mayor may not be untrusted. It may interact with existing trusted code in 
the form of system libraries and services. The interactions that may need to be controlled 
by a security metaobject are shown as double-headed arrows. 
First, we argue that the experiences with the case studies are generalisable to the secu-
rity challenges presented by new problem domains, as identified in Chapter I. The metaob-
ject protocol approach allows all accesses to both user-level and kernel-level resources by 
user-level code to be mediated by metaobjects that enforce security policies. This can be 
seen as enforcing a security policy upon an application composed of trusted and untrusted 
compiled code components that make use of local libraries and services. Such an applica-
tion is shown in Figure 7.1. We assume that trusted code or libraries honour their interfaces 
and their semantics are well specified. These specifications may be supplied with code 
or derived using reverse engineering or visualisation. Security policies are enforced hy 
controlling invocation of the trusted code's methods. New code components that may he 
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untrusted are not assumed to be we]] specified, security policies are enforced 0) controlling 
their access to trusted code. 
Table 7.2 revisits each of the problem domains described in Chapter I and specifies 
which code components are required to be we]] specified in order to allow a loadtime 
metaobject protocol to enforce security policies. In all the cases there is new code that is be-
ing introduced into an environment that contains other user-level code executino within the 
e 
same address space. In each problem domain knowledge differs about the specification of 
the different code components. For example, untrusted mobile code can be prevented from 
misusing the resources available in its new environment because Kava can prevent mali-
cious invocations of known methods whereas third-party code where there is a specification 
of its own methods allows us to enforce security policies particular to the functionality of 
the third-party code. Both these points are illustrated in the two case studies. 
Second, we argue that the experiences of this thesis are applicable to non-functional 
requirements other than security. Security is a notoriously difficult [Saltzer & Schroeder 
1975] non-functional concern to implement successfully and therefore has provided a good 
target for exploring the capabilities and limitations of a loadtime metaobject protocol. Fur-
ther contributions of this thesis concern how the constraints identified in Chapter 6 ap-
ply more widely. These inferences restricted themselves to the use of a loadtime MOP 
such as Kava for security engineering. In fact, Kava could be used to implement other 
non-functional concerns. For example, fault tolerance, real time constraints and dynamic 
adaptation. 
The basic requirements of least privilege, complete mediation and economy of mech-
anism also apply to the successful implementation of these other non-functional concern". 
For example, consider checkpointing. Least privilege translates to a requirement to only 
enforce checkpointing where required in the target application as otherwise unnecessary 
saving of state will lead to reduced performance. Complete mediation translate" to a re-
quirement to intercept every possible state update. Economy of mechanism is still required 
because trust in the implementation of checkpointing requires validation of the implemen-
tation and this is made easier if the implementation is small. 
The argument about the need for specification and its relationship to trust also apply 
to other non-functional concerns. Again, checkpointing requires some specification of the 
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Table 7.2: This table shows how Kava can be used to enforce security policies in all the 
new problems domains described in Chapter 1. Where the code is well specified, Kava can 
enforce policies related to the semantics of the code - for example the policies controlling 
access to IRC channels. Where no specification exists, Kava can enforce policie~ upon the 
code that limit the use of other well specified code - for example, mobile code can have ih 
access to other code within the same address space controlled. 
Problem domain Specification Policy Scope ----J 
New Code Application Services i 
and Libraries 
Email attachments N Y Y Control access to 
applications, ~ervice~ 
libraries. 
Dynamic web content N Y Y Control access to 
applications, ~crvices 
libraries. 
Mobile code N y Y Controls acces~ to 
applications, services 
libraries. 
Third-party Y y Y Control acccs~ to 
application new code, 
applications, services 
libraries. 
Component-oriented y y y Control access to 
programming new code, 
applications, services 
libraries. 
Computational grids Y y Y Control access to 
new code, 
applications. services 
libraries. 
----
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classes where state changes take place so that they can be identified. An exprc""i\c bind-
ing specification allowing declarative specifications such as bind a metaobject class to all 
classes that update a particular field simplify implementation of checkpointing. The l'Ia""c" 
making up the application must be at the right level of granularity to allow interception of 
state changes, too coarse grained and checkpoints become to unwieldy. Exceptions related 
to checkpointing failures will break transparency and require handling at the metalevcl. 
Enforcement requires the presence of type safety. rewriting tools and an ability to intercept 
loading of classes. 
Thirdly, the approach taken in this thesis is generalisable beyond Java. As stated about 
implementation of a loadtime metaobject requires three features: (I ) type safety to guaran-
tee interfaces are respected; (2) rewriting tools to allow the insertion of metalevcl intercep-
tions; and (3) an ability to intercept loading of classes to allow insertion of interceptions at 
loadtime. This could be achieved for a language such as C++ by using (I) type-safe code 
enforced using a toolkit such as TAL [Morrisett, Walker, Crary & Glew I 999b]; (2) use 
of instrumentation libraries; and, modification of static linkers and dynamic library linking 
routines. 
7.3 Future Work 
The main future work is to: 
• Improve static analysis. 
• Provide least privilege for metaobjects. 
• Improve metaobject composition. 
• Treat distribution as a first-class entity. 
• Improve complete mediation. 
• Investigate and improve performance. 
• Implement a policy language. 
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7.3.1 Improve Static Analysis 
As discussed in Section 3.2.5, Kava's static analysis needs to be extended to allow the 
superclass-subclass relationships to be determined statically. At present, the developer of 
the binding specification must manually specify these relationships. This is not a good 
approach when imposing access control policies upon unknown code. For example. in the 
programming with Kava example (Section 3.1.7) the ResourceManager metaobject must 
be bound to all classes creating an new instance of any object. The ResourceManager 
must determine at runtime whether the instance is either a Frame object or a -.ubclass. 
This imposes a considerable overhead upon the application that is the subject of the access 
control policy. Completing the implementation of static analysis would ensure that this 
could be determined at loadtime, thereby improving Kava's performance. 
Additionally, Kava's static analysis could be made more expressive. For example, im-
plementing a binding keyword allowing call graph relationships to be considered when 
determining whether to make a binding. In many cases this could be determined statically. 
7.3.2 Provide Least Privilege for Metaobjects 
The metaobject protocol approach provides least privilege except that metaobjects need 
to have the same rights as the base-level objects so that checkPermissionO will succeed. 
Should a metaobject not have the same rights then the check will fail because the rights or 
permissions must be held by every protection domain on the stack. 
In our earlier work [Welch & Stroud 2000b, Welch & Stroud 2002] it was proposed 
to avoid this problem by changing the Policy implementation so that metaobjects would 
always be granted the same rights as the base-level objects. However, this leads to a viola-
tion of least privilege because metaobjects do not need to exercise these right'> other than 
to check the base level is entitled to use them. Granting them to the metaobject creates a 
vulnerability because a hostile or faulty metaobject might go beyond checking that they are 
held by abusing these rights. 
Subsequent work on the Simple Security-Aware metaobject protocol show,> how thi.., 
can be avoided. The idea is to change the MUs so that the base le\el AccessControlContext 
is reified and passed as context to the metaobject. The access decision can then be evaluated 
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using this access control context rather than the meta level's access control context. 
This problem raises a general question, which is "What privileges should a meta level 
possess?". It seems reasonable to suppose that a set of privileges corresponding to the range 
of behaviours that can be redefined at the meta level to be defined and enforced h) the Java 
security architecture. Caromel and Vayssiere [Caromel & Vayssiere 2003] have proposed 
a security framework for limiting the privileges of the meta level to reduce the po""ihility 
of a buggy or malicious meta level subverting the behaviour of an application. Kava could 
be modified to take advantage of both of these proposals. 
7.3.3 Improve Metaobject Composition 
The second case study required multiple metaobjects to co-operate in changing the runtime 
behaviour of single object. Although the chain of responsibility [Gamma et al. 1995] can 
be used with Kava to implement co-operation, it does lead to some inefficiencies because 
both metaobjects do not always need to be invoked for the same MLI. This is because 
each metaobject in the chain is invoked even when a behaviour that it has no interest in is 
intercepted at the base level. It may ignore the behaviour but it is still invoked because Kava 
intercepts the union of all behaviours that the metaobjects in the chain may need to control. 
This is a consequence of implementing composition at the meta level rather than in the 
construction of MUs. A more efficient approach is to modify the Kava so that it chained 
the metaobjects together when implementing MUs. This means that metaobjects would 
not be invoked unnecessarily. On the other hand, embedding composition rules into Kava 
would limit future changes to composition rules for metaobjects. However, this can be 
avoided by providing the ability to customise composition (see for example, JAC [Pawlak, 
Steinturier, Duchien & Florin 200 I D. 
7.3.4 Make Distribution First-Class 
This thesis uses a single metaobject protocol to address both object and distributed object 
access control. The case study shows that this provides a working solution but leads to an 
unwieldy-looking design that may be hard to maintain. This situation can be impro\ ed if 
the concern of object distribution was made first-class in Kava. thereby making it ea"ier to 
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apply Kava to securing distributed objects. Making distribution first-cla"" means that the 
binding specification can reflect the notion of binding to the interface~ offered by distributed 
objects. A first step would be to provide access to marshalling and unmarshalling of remote 
method invocations via an abstract layer. This would make the implementation of the 
control over RMI independent of the any particular Java RMI implementation. 
7.3.5 Improve Economy of Mechanism 
Although using code rewriting to implement Kava provides a good economy of mechanism 
because left the compiler out of the trusted computing base, it doe~ rely upon a byte code 
rewriting toolkit written in Java that is roughly 20Kloc in size. Complete mediation would 
be improved by implementing a smaller byte code rewriting toolkit composed of only the 
functions depended upon by Kava. Furthermore, the toolkit could be implemented in a 
language with a more well-defined formal semantics than Java to make verification of its 
correctness tractable. 
7.3.6 Investigate and Improve Performance 
There will always be a trade-off between the generality of an approach like behavioural 
reflection and specific approaches such as manual implementation. Our case is that using a 
general approach has benefits, in terms of reusability and reducing programmer error, that 
outweigh performance costs. Only some basic performance measures have been performed 
and there is scope to carry out a more thorough performance analysis. Additionally, the 
current version of Kava incorporates some simple optimisations but considerably more can 
be done. For example, static analysis of metaobjects to determine if they need access to 
context or not. This way the costly reification of context can be avoided automatically. 
Additionally, lazy reification [Masuhara et al. 1992] can also be explored. 
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7.3.7 Provide a Policy Language for Kava 
At the moment security policies are expressed through a combination of Kava'~ binding 
specification (specifying what language-level operations to control) and the policy repre-
sentation used by the security model being enforced by Kava. Separation between the 
enforcement and policy is something that the current approach provide~ at the implemen-
tation level but is something that should not be separate from the user's point of ,iew, 
Keeping them separate, when defining a security policy, raises the possibility of control-
ling an operation from a policy point of view but forgetting to include the operation in the 
binding specification. An improved approach is to use a single high-level policy language 
that automatically generates the binding specification and policy representation particular 
to the security model being enforced by Kava. 
As a proof-of-concept, a prototype implementation of a policy compiler that maps Pon-
der [Damianou 2002] policies to Kava binding specifications and Java security policie~ 
has been developed [Lu 2004]. The main problem that had to be solved were providing a 
means to translate Ponder targets and actions to the required Java policy targets and per-
missions. This was solved by requiring the developers of application or library resources to 
provide a resource description file that provides a resource-specific Ponder vocabulary for 
specifying policies. This notion of a resource description file is based upon the concept of 
resource descriptions found in Naccio [Evans & Twyman 1999] where these a dictionary 
providing translations between platform-neutral abstractions and platform-specific imple-
mentations. The translator uses this to determine what permissions to add to the Java policy 
file and to generate the binding specification. At present the binding specification is fixed 
and encoded in the resource file and future work would be to automatically generate the 
binding specification based upon the rights being granted to programs using the user-level 
resources. 
Ponder could also be used to specify other policies such as policies such as Clark-
Wilson [Clark & Wilson 1987]. As part of earlier work, libraries of metaobjects for imple-
menting the Clark-Wilson [Welch 1999] security policy was designed, Using the Ponder to 
Kava policy translator requires defining new resource descriptions to allow Ponder abstrac-
tions to be mapped to Kava binding specifications and appropriate Ja\a security policie ... , 
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7.4 Concluding Remarks 
Security is a notoriously difficult non-functional concern to implement successfull). Fur-
thermore, existing attempts to implement security while maintaining a separation of con-
cerns has led to inflexible or untrustworthy implementations. The loadtime metoabject 
approach described in this thesis avoids either pitfall by combining code rewriting and 
metaobject protocols. Additionally, this thesis describes an approach that could he applied 
to other non-functional concerns and other languages. This is a significant step forward in 
allowing developers to meet the challenges arising in new problem domains such as mobile 
code or component-oriented programming. 
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